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Belonging: 
Citizenship and Migration in the European 
Union and in Germany 
By 
Helen Elizabeth Hartnell * 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the European Union and Germany 
are magnets for both voluntary and involuntary migrants from around the world. 
Indeed, one key feature of the contemporary condition known as globalization is 
a profound increase in mobility and other "more permanent forms of human 
migration." I Thus ever more people face the challenge of withstanding the pulls 
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate in Jurisprudence and 
Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; and Visiting Scholar, University of Cologne Legal 
Centre for European and International Cooperation (R.I.Z.). Thanks are owed to Golden Gate 
University for generous research support, to R.I.Z. for providing a stimulating and supportive work 
environment, and to Hannah Luise Buxbaum for comments on an earlier version of this article. The 
author is a naturalized American citizen who was born in Germany to American parents. She is not 
now, nor has she ever been, a national or citizen of Germany, though she feels at home there. 
I. SHEILA L. CROUCHER, GLOBALIZATION AND BELONGING: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN A 
CHANGING WORLD 16 (2004). Croucher documents rising rates of travel and air traffic, along with 
steadily-if not dramatically-growing numbers of foreign born residents in Australia (24% in 
1999), Canada (17.4% in 1996), and the United States (\ I % in 2000). Social anthropologists, 
however, offer a different perspective: 
Movement within one or two generations rather than fixed settlement has generally 
characterised human populations. . .. What is really new is the awareness among many 
communities that there are innumerable other such populations linked globally by rapid 
transport, electronic communication systems and common access to the same consumer 
goods and styles, and that these often supplement rather than replace older ties forged 
through ... trade and intermarriage. 
David Parkin, Foreword to LOCALITY AND BELONGING, at ix (Nadia LoveIl ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
LOVELL]; see also NIKOS PAPASTERGlADIS, THE TURBULENCE OF MIGRATION: GLOBALIZATION, 
DETERRITORIALIZATION AND HYBRlDITY 76·99 (2000) (exploring the linkages between modernity, 
globalization, and migration). 
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between here and there, of balancing potentially conflicting needs to integrate2 
(or even assimilate3) and to maintain transnational ties.4 Migrants are 
differently affected by these and other forces, since their motives and individual 
circumstances vary widely, yet all share the fact of dislocation. Identities can 
hardly help but be reshaped in this vortex.5 The challenge to identity is starkest 
where the receiving country demands a high level of integration or 
2. The term 'integration' is an alternative to 'assimilation'. The latter term has become 
suspect in an era characterized by increasingly multicultural societies in many parts of the world. In 
Germany, for example, "[ c ]ultural 'assimilation' as a prerequisite for citizenship acquisition was 
explicitly rejected and replaced by a weaker 'integration' requirement." Christian Joppke, Exclusion 
in the Liberal State: The Case of Immigration and Citizenship Policy, 8 EUR. J. Soc. THEORY 43, 52 
(2005). See generally ADRIAN FAVELL, PHILOSOPHIES OF INTEGRATION: IMMIGRATION AND THE 
IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN (2d ed., 2001). For a succinct discussion of the 
Leitkultur ("leading culture") controversy that erupted in Germany in 2000, see Ernst B. Haas, Sally 
Roever & Anna Schmidt, Germany and the Norms of European Governance, 20 GERMAN POL. & 
SOC'y 148 (2002); see also Richard Bernstein, "A Continent Watching Anxiously Over the Melting 
Pot," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. IS, 2004 (discussing German "discomfort with multiculturalism" and the 
belief expressed by "[m]any politicians and commentators ... that immigrants should accept ... the 
dominant culture, as their own, or they should leave"). 
3. Immigrant assimilation as a political project emerged during the "first wave of industrial-
age migration in the late nineteenth century," and thus has affinities with "imperialist state rivalry, 
war, and aggressive nation-building." Christian Joppke & Ewa Morawska, integrating Immigrants in 
Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices, in TOWARD ASSIMILATION AND CITIZENSHIP: 
IMMIGRANTS IN LIBERAL NATION-STATES I, 4 (Christian Joppke & Ewa Morawska eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter TOWARD ASSIMILATION]. "The essence of old-style assimilation was cultural 
assimilation, a sort of alchemy through which an immigrant was transformed into a standardized unit 
of the state-bearing nation." Id. at 5. The contemporary understanding of assimilation imposes "no 
mandate for immigrants to adopt the substantive culture of the receiving society." Id. It instead refers 
in social scientific terms to: 
a multipath process involving the incorporation of immigrants and their offspring into the 
economic, political and social institutions, and culture of different segments of the host 
society: mainstream middle- and rising lower class (so-called upward assimilation), 
struggling lower- and underclass (downward assimilation), or immigrant/ethnic enclave 
(also called adhesive ... assimilation, which can also follow the intragroup middle- or 
lower-class pattern). 
Ewa Morawska, Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the 
Analytic Strategy it Suggests, in TOWARD ASSIMILATION, supra at 133, 134. Morawska's updated 
definition virtually erodes the distinction between assimilation and integration, and renders the term 
assimilation usable in contemporary discourse by excising its "old-style" connotations. Joppke & 
Morawska, supra at I, argue that there is "a trend in immigration studies. . . [to] tum away from 
multicultural and postnational perspectives, toward a renewed emphasis on assimilation and 
citizenship." 
4. See, e.g., Wolfgang Bergem, Culture, Identity, and Distinction: Ethnic Minorities between 
Scylla and Charybdis, in GERMAN MINORITIES IN EUROPE: ETHNIC IDENTITY AND CULTURAL 
BELONGING I, I (Stefan Wolff ed., 2000) [hereinafter WOLFF] ("Ethnic minorities are constantly 
challenged by two equally threatening perspectives-maintaining their ethnicity and insisting on 
their cultural distinctiveness bears the danger of marginalisation in their host-state, while attempts 
aimed at integration imply the no less troublesome possibility of being absorbed into the majority 
culture and the consequential loss of their particular identity."). 
5. "Transnational migration significantly affects individual and collective identities, and it 
creates new identities." Martin O. Heisler, Now and Then, Here and There: Migration and the 
Transformation of Identities, Borders, and Orders, in IDENTITIES, BORDERS, ORDERS: RETHINKING 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 225, 225 (Mathias Albert et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
ALBERT ET AL., 180]. 
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assimilation.6 
Like migrants themselves, countries also vary widely in their treatment of 
nationality, citizenship, and migration,7 as well as in the degree to which they 
tolerate or promote multiculturalism, on the one hand, or press immigrants to 
integrate into the host country, on the other. 8 Recent comparative historical 
analyses of citizenship in the United States and some European countries, for 
example, show that countries reflect varying sui generis combinations of 
"common components of citizenship" that result from "nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century state-building,,,9 as well as from social and political factors 
that may "pre-date the era of mass politics and even the nation-state."iO In the 
context of European integration, however, there is a strong trend towards 
coordination and in some cases even harmonization in these two fields, and thus 
towards at least partial convergence. 11 
One such component of citizenship, or avenue for conceptualizing 
membership in a political community, is the notion of belonging. The American 
6. The terms 'assimilation' and 'integration' have an historical relationship: 
The old nationalizing and assimilationist idiom ... was carried along until the I960s; but it 
remained largely rhetorical, and was mostly not accompanied by related policies. Only 
when the problem of 'integrating' postcolonial, labor, and new settler migrants, and 
especially their offspring, seriously emerged in the I970s and I980s, was the postwar 
liberalism and human-rights discourse applied to the immigration domain, and the notion of 
integration was born. 
Joppke & Morawska, supra note 3, at 4-5. My usage of these two terms arranges them along a 
continuum from multi- to monoculturalism, with the latter represented by the original nationalist 
notion of assimilation. Between these two poles lies a range of notions and practices. Despite Joppke 
and Morawska's effort to resuscitate the term 'assimilation' for use in academic discourse, I use the 
term 'integration' in this article, since it is the term actually used in both Germany and in the 
European Union, even while recognizing that this term is problematic, insofar as it "rests on the 
premise of an already integrated, bounded society." Joppke & Morawska, supra at 3. This premise 
has been discredited by postclassical sociology, which takes a more "systemic, decentered view of 
society." Id. 
7. The term 'migration' is used here to refer to the sum total of emigration and immigration, 
without regard to the reasons people leave home in the first place. This topic is addressed infra in 
Parts ILB and Ill.B. 
8. Joppke & Morawska, supra note 3, at 1, argue that the "scope of official multiculturalism 
policies and programs has either been exaggerated in public and academic perception, or, where such 
policies have actually been in place, there has recently been a covert or overt move away from 
them." 
9. Richard Bellamy, Introduction: The Making of Modern Citizenship, in LINEAGES OF 
EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: RIGHTS, BELONGING AND PARTICIPATION IN ELEVEN NATION STATES 1,4 
(Richard Bellamy et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Bellamy, The Making of Modern Citizenship and 
BELLAMY ET AL. respectively] (explaining variation in the citizenship regimes of the European 
Union, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Spain, and the 
United States). 
10. Id. at 14. Notably, these factors include "the ways state-church relations were resolved in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whether industrialization came early or late, and the stamp 
placed on the political system by the earlier struggles occasioned by the growth of monarchical 
power." Id. 
11. European Union developments relating to citizenship and migration are discussed infra 
in Parts ILA and II.B, respectively. 
2006] CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION 333 
myth promising that all can belongl2 is traditionally viewed as the antithesis of 
ethno-cultural notions of belonging of the sort that have historically prevailed in 
Germany: 3 This contrast, while overdrawn, marks the range of perspectives 
between the 'primordialist' and 'constructivist' poles of the membership 
spectrum,14 and takes a first step towards grasping the multifaceted nature of 
belonging. 
Belonging is an imperfect analytical concept that tears a jagged path across 
pertinent legal categories and available ~olitical opportunities. This concept has 
strong appeal to writers in many fields,1 since it supplements the usual analytic 
categories and thus refracts a wider spectrum of contemporary conditions.16 
12. "America itself was a myth long before it was a place, a people. It was imagined as a 
New World, a new beginning where orphans and refugees could build a new way of belonging to 
each other and to the world." MADONNA KOLBENSCHLAG, LOST IN THE LAND OF OZ: THE SEARCH 
FOR IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICAN LIFE xi (1990). "States, such as the United States, 
may deliberately foster myths of a shared 'melting-pot' nationhood." Thomas M. Franck, Clan and 
Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 362 
(1996). For Franck's definitions of 'nation' and 'state' see infra notes 23 and 28, respectively. The 
nineteenth-century model of assimilation in countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United 
States expected migrants to transfer their political identity from "home to host state," usually in 
connection with "the act of renouncing home country citizenship and taking an oath of allegiance 
during naturalization." Rey Koslowski, Demographic Boundary Maintenance in World Politics: Of 
International Norms on Dual Nationality, in ALBERT ET AL., lBO, supra note 5, at 203, 214-15. 
13. The romantic notion of the German people as a Volk was popularized in the eighteenth 
century by Johann Gottfried Herder. See generally ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND 
NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (1992). Regardless of the salience this notion once enjoyed 
(or may continue to enjoy), it is necessary to differentiate between the myth, on the one hand, and 
the reality of German laws and practices connected with migration and citizenship, on the other 
hand. See, e.g., DIETER GOSEWINKEL, EINBURGERN UND AUSSCHLIESSEN: DIE NATIONALISIERUNG 
DER STAATSANGEHORIGKEIT VOM DEUTSCHEN BUND BIS ZUR BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION: THE NATIONALIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP FROM THE GERMAN 
CONFEDERATION TO THE FEDERAL REpUBLIC OF GERMANY] (2001); Joppke, supra note 2; Ulrich K. 
PreuB, Citizenship and the German Nation, in BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 9, at 22-45. 
14. See generally Alain Dieckhoff, Introduction: New Perspectives on Nationalism, in THE 
POLITICS OF BELONGING: NATIONALISM, LiBERALISM, AND PLURALISM I, 1-2 (Alain Dieckhoff ed., 
2004) [hereinafter Dieckhofl] (noting that the literature on nationalism is divided between these two 
extreme positions). However, Dieckhoff urges caution ''when using such exaggeratedly dichotomous 
distinctions," since both are problematic. !d. at 5. Franck, supra note 12 at 362, draws a sharp 
contrast between the constructivist term 'state' and the primordialist terms 'nation' and 'tribe'. 
15. See, e.g., BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 9; STEPHEN CASTLES & ALASTAIR DAVIDSON, 
CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION: GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING (2000); 
CROUCHER, supra note I; Dieckhoff, supra note 14; MARKUS FUNCK ET AL., SACRIFICE AND 
NATIONAL BELONGING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMANY (Greg Eghigian & Matthew Paul Berg 
eds., 2002); THE POLITICS OF BELONGING: MIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 
(Andres Geddes & Adrian Favell eds., 1999); ISABEL HUGGAN, BELONGING: HOME AWAY FROM 
HOME (2003); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING (1993); LOVELL, supra note I; 
Vivienne Orchard, Culture as Opposed to What? Cultural Belonging in the Context of National and 
European Identity, 5 EUR. J. Soc. THEORY 419 (2002); E. PROBYN, OUTSIDE BELONGING (1996); 
MIKE SAVAGE, GAYNOR BAGNALL & BRIAN LONGHURST, GLOBALIZATION AND BELONGING 
(2005); VICTOR JELENIEWSKI SEIDLER, SHADOWS OF THE SHOAH: JEWISH IDENTITY AND 
BELONGING (2000); Elaine R. Thomas, Who Belongs? Competing Conceptions of Political 
Membership, 5 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 323 (2002); SALLIE WESTWOOD & ANNIE PHIZACKLEA, 
TRANS-NATIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING (2000); WOLFF, supra note 4. 
16. Indeed, "belonging exists on as many dimensions as people are prepared to delineate." 
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Belonging may be defined through a territorial reference point,17 but is not 
necessarilr, so.18 While some authors emphasize belonging's affective 
character, 9 others experience it as physical sensation20 or even as essential 
quality.21 Most social scientists, however, view belonging through the optic of 
Parkin, supra note I, at xii; see also Vikki Bell, Performativity and Belonging: An Introduction, 16 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'y I, 3 (1999) ("Belonging is an achievement at several levels of 
abstraction."). As Hedetoft and Hjort explain: 
[B)elonging constitutes a political and cultural field of global contestation ... summoning a 
range of pertinent issues concerning relations between individuals, groups, and 
communities. It raises questions about cultural, sociological, and political transformative 
processes and their impact on imagined and real boundaries, notions of citizenship and 
cultural hybridization, migration and other forms of mobility, displacements and so-called 
ethnic cleansing, and of course also on the extent and nature of perceived normalcies of 
national belonging. 
Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, Introduction to THE POSTNA TIONAL SELF: BELONGING AND IDENTITY 
vii, x (Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort eds., 2002) [hereinafter Hedetoft & Hjort and HEDETOFT & 
HJORT respectively]. 
17. Nadia Lovell, Introduction to LOVELL, supra note I, at I. In territorial terms, belonging 
can invoke either the importance of the local in a global era, or geography-based notions of inclusion 
and exclusion. As to the fonner, see SAVAGE, BAGNALL & LONGHURST, supra note 15, at 7 
(arguing for the "ongoing significance of territoriality for social relationships"). The debate over 
Turkey's push to join the European Union, which is sometimes characterized as being about where 
to draw the line between Europe and non-Europe, provides an example of the latter approach. See 
also PreuB, supra note 13 (discussing the special significance of territory in the development of the 
German notion of nationality). 
18. Indeed, belonging appears to be less linked to territory than it has been in the past. 
Parkin, supra note I, at ix, notes that "anthropologists can no longer assume that the people they 
study see themselves as attached to a particular, bounded locality. Diaspora, transnational 
community and dispersed networks are typically some of the terms used to convey the image of 
movements of people who retain common socio-cultural consciousness in the face of constant 
displac.ement." See also PAPASTERGIADIS, supra note I, at 39 (discussing "new forms of bi-
locality"); id. at 100-21 (discussing the deterritorialization of culture); JOHN URRY, SOCIOLOGY 
BEYOND SOCIETIES 132-33 (2000) (urging replacement of territory-based sociology by a "sociology 
of flows" since contemporary belonging "almost always involve[s] diverse forms of mobility" and a 
"dialectic of roots and routes"). 
19. Belonging, despite its "pragmatic connotations and potential for tying people to place 
and social relationships, also evokes emotions, sentiments of longing to be in a particular location, 
be it real or fictive." LOVELL, supra note I, at I; see also CASTLES & DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at 
\30 ("[H)ome is where one feels a sense of belonging and securitY, and where one can decide on 
acceptable values and forms of behaviour."); Hedetoft & Hjort, supra note 16, at vii (referring to the 
"thick" view of belonging as "feelings of 'homeness'" and as a "significant determinant of identity, 
that elusive but still real psycho-sociological state of being in sync with oneself under given external 
conditions"); SAVAGE, BAGNALL & LONGHURST, supra note 15, at 10-11 (noting that there is "no 
one space where we feel at home all the time," and defining belonging in terms of Bordieu' s notions 
about "how people ... feel comfortable or not in anyone place"). 
Id. 
20. For Huggan, supra note IS, at 4, there are 
places on the planet where we belong and they are not necessarily where we are born. If we 
are lucky ... we find them, ... [and] ... know that ... we belong to the earth and it to us. 
Even if we cannot articulate this intense physical sensation, ... we know what home is then, 
in our very bones." She likens this "magnetic ... hormonal pull" to "carnal knowledge of 
landscape. 
21. DIANE ACKERMAN, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SENSES 20 (1990) (describing the 
feeling while scuba-diving that "[h]ome was everywhere" since "we carry the ocean within us; ... 
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culture or identity.22 Belonging is especially salient in a discussion of 
migration, since the word itself captures the potential schism of "being" from 
"longing"-of physical location in a set of socio-political coordinates that may 
not correspond to one's own experienced or imagined place-as well as the felt 
(or compelled) need to bridge that gap. My goals here are to supplement (not 
supplant) discourses of culture and identity, and to liberate 'belonging' from its 
traditional association with the dark range of the membership spectrum. 
At the primordialist extreme, belonging is an exclusionary concept based 
on notions of shared culture and ascribed identity, and is often23 though not 
necessarilr4 synonymous with nationalism. The primordial or essentialist 
view-which has an affinity with "international legal norms against dual 
nationality,,25 based on the presumption of exclusive attachment-has fallen out 
of favor with many social scientists,26 despite the persistence of ethnic violence, 
religious fundamentalism, and national or sub-national self-determination 
our veins mirror the tides"). 
22. See, e.g., QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY (Stuart Hall & Paul du Gay eds., 1996) 
[hereinafter QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY); HEDETOFT & HJORT, supra note 16; Heisler, 
supra note 5; LOVELL, supra note 1; Orchard, supra note 15; Jo Shaw, The Interpretation of 
European Union Citizenship, 61 MOD. L. REv. 293 (1998); WOLFF, supra note 4. 
23. Belonging may be predicated on "possession of a shared culture." Bellamy, The Making 
of Modem Citizenship, supra note 9, at 9. As an ideal type, "belonging" generally implies a national 
community, but not necessarily an ethno-national one. Thus, for example, Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Nationality defines 'nationality' as "the legal bond between a person and a State and 
does not indicate the person's ethnic origin." Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, no. 166,6 
November 1997 [hereinafter European Convention on Nationality]. Franck, supra note 12, at 362, 
uses the terms 'nation' and 'tribe' to mean "an affinity group that has placed certain values high on 
its agenda: shared genealogical origins, language and historic myths, as well as cultural and, perhaps, 
religious compatibility." He argues that nations, as a form of political identity, are forged in "a 
continual ebb and flow of differing, little-understood imperatives that at various times and 
circumstances rearrange the self-image of persons and thereby provoke revision of the boundaries of 
political communities." Id. at 365. For the view linking nationalism with intolerance, see, for 
example, Hedetoft & Hjort, supra note 16, at ix ("[T]he politics of belonging has always spelled 
unadulterated racism and national chauvinism" on the political right); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, supra 
note 15. 
24. Franck, supra note 12, at 365, cites contemporary Israel for the proposition that 
nationalist origins of a State are compatible with multiethnicity. 
25. Koslowski, supra note 12, at 204. "The phenomenon of dual nationality challenges 
traditional notions of political identity and ... basic assumptions of the classical European states 
system." Id. Koslowski does not merely argue that this prohibition reflects the Westphalian system, 
but that "[i]ntemational norms against statelessness and dual nationality helped establish [it] by 
delineating its parts in terms of population." Id. at 207 (emphasis added). However, this traditional 
prohibition is eroding.Id. at 205,208-13. 
26. Indeed, "most modem sociologists and historians ... tend to believe that there 'is no 
firm sociological mooring to the nation, not in language, not in religion, not in ethnicity. '" Franck, 
supra note 12, at 364 (quoting John A. Hall, Nationalism: Classified and Explained, DAEDALUS 1,4 
(Summer 1993)); see also CROUCHER, supra note 1, at 38-39 (summarizing constructivist critiques 
of primordial ism); Suzanne Shanahan, Different Standards and Standard Differences: Contemporary 
Citizenship and Immigration Debates, 26 THEORY & SOC'Y 421, 421 (1997) ("Ethnicity, like any 
other social category, is a political construction that is less representative of palpable social 
distinctions or individual and collective differences than it is a particular historical manifestation of 
the boundary between states and peoples. "). 
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movements in our times.27 
At the opposite constructivist extreme, belonging is inclusive28 and 
vOluntary,29 and reflects the notion that identity is malleable30 and compound.3l 
This view is compatible with the notion that healthy people may have multiple 
identities32 and loyalties, and thus that little harm, and maybe even some good 
can come of dual nationality. In fact, the truth of most individual lives will lie 
somewhere between the extremes of prescription and choice. 
My use of the term 'belonging' incorporates both internal and external 
aspects, that is, the "socially constructed, embedded process in which 
[particular] people reflexively judge the suitability of a given site as 
27. Some who perceive the constructivist approach as inadequate to explain the "powerful 
and seemingly irrational passion and sense of embeddedness that often surround identity" propose a 
hybrid "constructed primordiality" approach. CROUCHER, supra note I, at 39. 
28. Franck, supra note 12, at 362, draws a sharp contrast between the constructivist term 
'state' and the primordialist terms 'nation' and 'tribe.' "[T]he multicultural state reflects quite 
different social values: a civil society sharing a preference for the civic virtues of liberty and material 
well-being, as well as a desire to associate for protection and security." Id. The term 'national 
identity' can thus refer simply to a "common civic consciousness and allegiance to the state and 
one's fellow citizens" such as may be cultivated through "[n]ational systems of education." Bellamy, 
supra note 9, at 7. See, e.g., Cecile Laborde, Republican Citizenship and the Crisis of Integration in 
France, in BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 9, at 46. 
29. 'Voluntary' in this context must be understood as constrained, since belonging is not 
simply a matter "of individual choice, but rather the confluence of state laws and policies regarding 
the ascription, acquisition, and renunciation of nationality." Koslowski, supra note 12, at 214. 
30. "Distinctly different tribes or nations, for historic reasons and to different degrees, do 
sometimes merge their identities and submerge their origins, opting to become partly or entirely 
assimilated into a larger tribe/nation identity." Franck, supra note 12, at 367. Bauman argues that 
"the modem 'problem of identity' was primarily how to construct an identity and keep it solid and 
stable," whereas the "postmodem 'problem of identity' is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep 
the options open." Zygmunt Bauman, From Pilgrim to Tourist; or, A Short History of Identity, in 
QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY, supra note 22, at 18. 
31. Multiple identities and loyalties are not, however, an innovation of our time. Indeed, 
"persons have often had multiple or compound identities" in the past. Franck, supra note 12, at 359. 
"Except during the latter part of the nineteenth and most ofthe twentieth centuries, it was normal for 
persons ... to define themselves by multiple loyalties." Id. at 377 (citing examples from the Roman, 
Ottoman, and Holy Roman Empires). Historically, however, individuals did not choose their 
multiple loyalties, but these were rather "imposed on [them] by virtue of who they were and where 
they lived." Id. 
32. "Identities are not like hats. Human beings can and do put on several at a time." LINDA 
COLLEY, BRITONS 6 (1992). Contemporary European conditions are marked by the development of 
"a more diffuse and fragmented set of attachments that are both sub-national and transnational in 
character .... The ties of family, work, identity, religion and sport, for example, increasingly 
operate either below or beyond the nation-state, competing with and diluting any sense of a purely 
national identity." Richard Bellamy & Alex Warleigh, Introduction: The Puzzle of European 
Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 3, 5 (Richard Bellamy & 
Alex Warleigh eds., 2001) [hereinafter Bellamy & Warleigh and BELLAMY & WARLEIGH 
respectively). Unlike mUltiple or compound identities in prior historical contexts, "[t]oday a person's 
loyalty system is increasingly likely to be a compound of subjectively chosen external references." 
Franck, supra note 12, at 362. However, multiple identities cannot simply be assumed-not even 
from the fact of dual nationality, which is ambiguous. As Koslowski points out, dual nationality 
"may be an actualization of multiple political identification," supra note 12, at 216, but it may also 
"be indicative of neither assimilation nor homeland political identification, but rather of ... an 
ambivalent political identity, or even an apolitical identity." Id. at 215. 
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appropriate,,33 in view of their own circumstances, as well as the process by 
which others in that site judge the appropriateness of their presence there. These 
internal and external aspects imply a two-way process based on mutual 
adaptation and tolerance. In the end, belonging is not limited to either the nation 
or the state for its frame of reference, but incorporates social and psychological 
dimensions as well. 
German history, at least since unification in the late nineteenth century, 
reveals an abiding preoccupation with the question of who belongs to or in 
Germany.34 This issue was omnipresent during the twentieth century.35 
Migration and its consequences emerged after 1989 as a "leading political, 
social, and cultural issue,,36 in Germany, as elsewhere in much of Europe, when 
the collapsing bi-polar postwar order and new wars-both inside Europe and 
beyond its borders-set even more migrants into motion.37 Though 
traditionally a sending country, Germany has in fact become one of the largest 
migrant-receiving countries in the world,38 and continues to wrestle with the 
challenges posed by its changing population and by the persistent demographic 
pressures to allow and even solicit further imrnigration.39 
Germany and the European Union ("EU") have both scrambled to provide 
an adequate legal framework for this changing human landscape. The EU has 
33. SAVAGE, BAGNALL & LONGHURST, supra note 15, at 12. These authors also stress that 
belonging is "not a given but is itself unstable." Id. at 11. For "newcomers [who] seek to construct a 
place that they can again call home," they must engage in "negotiations with neighbours." CASTLES 
& DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at 130. 
34. BRUBAKER, supra note 13; GOSEWTNKEL, supra note 13; CHALLENGING ETHNIC 
CITIZENSHIP: GERMAN AND ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRATION (Daniel Levy & Yfaat Weiss 
eds., 2002) [hereinafter CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP]; Michael Minkenberg, The Politics of 
Citizenship in the New Republic, in GERMANY: BEYOND THE STABLE STATE 219 (Herbert Kitschelt 
& Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2004); ELI NATHANS, THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY: 
ETHNICITY, UTILITY AND NATIONALISM (2004); Preufi, supra note 13; see also Franck, supra note 
12, at 374 (referring to German "romantic nationalism and its tribal definition ofthe nation"). 
35. Id. 
36. Tobias Brinkmann, German Migrations: Between Blood and Soil, 20 GERMAN POL. & 
SOC'Y 137, 137 (2002) [hereinafter Brinkmann, German Migrations]. 
37. See Migration Policy Institute, Migration Information Source: Global Data Center 
(showing stock of foreign population in Germany by country of nationality by year; inflow of 
foreign population by country of nationality; top ten sending countries to Germany by nationality; 
and related data), available at http://www.migrationinformation.orgiGlobaiData (last visited Nov. 
21,2005). 
38. See Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220 ("[B]etween 1954 and 1999, Germany became 
one of the largest immigrant-receiving countries in the world; the net balance of nine million 
immigrants during this period accounts for more than ten percent of today's population."). This 
accepted wisdom has recently been challenged by revised official statistics, which purport to have 
cleaned up the registry of foreign nationals in Germany. According to the revised statistics, only 6.7 
million non-German nationals were legally residing in Germany at the end of 2004. Deutschland: 
Bereinigtes Ausliinderregister [Germany: Sanitized Alien Registry], 5 MIGRATION UND 
BEVOLKERUNG I (June 2005) [hereinafter Bereinigtes Ausliinderregister]. 
39. See Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220; GUNTER RENNER, STAATS-
ANGEHORIGKEITSRECHT 1M ZEICHEN DES NEUEN ZUWANDERUNGSRECHTS [CITIZENSHIP LAW 
UNDER THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAW] (Oct. 2004), at 4, MIGRATIONS RECHT. NET (last visited Nov. 
29,2005). 
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moved gradually but nonetheless dramatically into this formerly exclusive area 
of Member State sovereignty and created an elaborate legal framework to 
address some of these pressing issues at the regional level. However, the EU's 
legal framework on nationality/citizenship and on migration remains a highly 
contested work in progress. Member States retain considerable room to 
legislate, along with great flexibility when it comes to implementing EU norms. 
For its part, Germany has passed comprehensive new legislation governing both 
nationality/citizenship40 and immigration41 within the past five years. Thus, at 
both the national and the supranational levels, dramatic legal reforms testify to 
the continuing salience of nationality, citizenship, and migration, and make it 
safe to predict that the question of belonging will remain at the forefront of elite 
as well as popular concern in Germany and in the EU well into the twenty-first 
century. 
This article investigates the evolving notion of belonging through the lens 
of Germany's new frameworks for nationality/citizenship and migration.42 
Given the quantity of EU activity in the fields under consideration here, 
European developments are also analyzed, though less for their own sake than 
for the sake of staking out the parameters within which Germany remains 
sovereign to act. 
Throughout this article, the question of how concrete developments bear on 
larger questions about belonging will recur. I make two main arguments. First, 
however welcome Germany's dramatic legal reforms may be, they will not 
necessarily solve the problems such legislation was intended to address. With 
regard to the new German law governing nationality/citizenship, the experience 
of German Jews teaches, among other lessons, that the legal status of citizenship 
does not automatically resolve the question of belonging. Tolerance cannot be 
legislated, but must-and can-be learned, albeit with difficulty.43 While 
40. The reform of German nationality/citizenship law is discussed infra in Part III.A. 
41. The reform of German immigration law is discussed infra in Part III.B. 
42. This article does not provide a rigorous comparative analysis of German developments, 
but does make occasional comparative references when doing so casts German developments into 
sharper contour. Numerous comparative analyses are available. See, e.g., FROM MIGRANTS TO 
CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer 
eds., 2000); THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE (M. Baldwin-Edwards & Martin 
Schain eds., 1994); CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, IMMIGRATION AND THE NATION-STATE: THE UNITED 
STATES, GERMANY, AND GREAT BRITAIN (1999); RIVA KASTORYANO, NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES: 
STATES AND IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (Barbara Harshav trans., 2002); 
CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP, supra note 34; Liza Schuster & John Solomos, Rights and 
Wrongs Across European Borders: Migrants, Minorities and Citizenship, 6 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 37 
(2002) (analyzing Britain, France, Germany and Italy); Dietrich Thranhardt, Einwanderungs- und 
Integrationspolitik in Deutschland und den Niederlanden [Immigration and Integration Policy in 
Germany and the Netherlands], 30 LEVIATHAN, June 2002, at 220; Patrick Weil, Access to 
Citizenship: Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter CITIZENSHIP TODAY]' 
43. "Germans have a certain joy about cultural plurality, but then there's this other intriguing 
thing .... To learn tolerance is difficult." Axel Honneth, quoted in Jeffrey Fleishman, Debate Over 
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public opinIOn data from the 1990s showed an overall high degree of 
convergence between the values held by Germans and other Europeans, the data 
also provide some evidence that Germans may be less tolerant of diversity.44 
Second, despite even the best intentions, some aspects of recent legal reforms in 
Germany have the potential to exacerbate rather than alleviate social tensions. 
While many affected persons in Germany welcome the new integration 
requirements,45 Germany's revamped legal regime has simultaneously set off a 
storm of debate that is unlikely to dissipate any time soon.46 
Questions surrounding tolerance, multiculturalism, and the existence of 
'parallel societies' have returned to the forefront of contemporary debates in 
Germany, particularly since the eruption of ethnic violence in the neighboring 
Netherlands in the summer of 200447 and in France in October 2005.48 The 
recent wave of 'honor killing' (Ehrenmord) of Muslim women by family 
members49 and controversies over extremist preaching in mosques50 have kept 
Tolerance Hangs Over Germany, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 13,2003, at A5. 
44. Germans were slightly more likely (75.8%) to mention tolerance as an important value to 
teach children than other Europeans (74%), and were also more likely to say they would like to like 
to have immigrants as neighbors (17.1%) than other Europeans (12.1%). Results were virtually 
identical on general questions about tolerance of minority groups. However, Germans endorsed 
diversity less enthusiastically (53%) than other Europeans (64%), and were less likely to find other 
religions "not disturbing" (76%) than other Europeans (83%). Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 
2, at 155-56. These results are hardly conclusive and are in dire need of updating, but are interesting 
insofar as they pinpoint the most salient differences the researchers uncovered between Germans and 
other Europeans in the available survey data. 
45. See, e.g., Bereitschaft zur Integration [Readiness to Integrate], KOLNER STADT-
ANZEIGER, Dec. 23, 2004, at 8 (Minister for Social Affairs in North Rhine-Westphalia seeks to 
counteract "wide-spread prejudice" among Germans by means of data showing a "great willingness 
to integrate," such as high demand to participate in German language classes). 
46. The call for integration is not new, but was already part of German policy in the 1970s. 
Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220 (citing the 1977 government report on immigration); see also 
Katharina Stankiewicz, Changing Immigration and Integration Politics in Germany (unpublished 
2002 manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Stankiewicz, Changing Politics], at 8 (on the 
implementation of naturalization guidelines-Einbiirgerungsrichtlinien-in 1977). What is new is 
the threatened loss of welfare benefits and even potential deportation of migrants who do not make 
concrete efforts to integrate. Timm Kriigenow, Bundesamt siebt Zuwanderer aus [Federal Office 
Sifts Out Migrants], FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, Jan. 20, 2005, at 1. See generally Ulrike Davy, 
Integration of Immigrants in Germany: A Slowly Evolving Concept, 7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 123 
(2005). 
47. Violence erupted in the neighboring Netherlands after the murder of filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh by Islam extremists. See Niederlande: Serie von Anschliigen nach Mord an Filmemacher, 
[Netherlands: Series of Attacks Following Murder of Filmmaker], 9 MIGRATION UND 
BEVOLKERUNG I, I (Dec. 2004). The events in the Netherlands contributed to the renewal of 
integration debates in Germany, as well as to the discussion of integration at the EU level. See 
Deutschland: Neue Integrationsdebatte [Germany: New Integration Debate], 9 MIGRATION UND 
BEVOLKERUNG I, 1-2 (Dec. 2004); EU: Grundprinzipien zur Integrationspolitik [EU: Basic 
Principles on Integration Policy], 9 MIGRATION UND BEVOLKERUNG 3, 3-4 (Dec. 2004). 
48. See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Riots Spread from Paris to Other French Cities, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Nov. 6,2005, at AI3. 
49. As of the end of 2005, the latest such murder of a young Muslim woman in Germany by 
a family member occurred in Wiesbaden in June 2005. Zwangsheirat Thema im Bundesrat 
[Bundesrat Discusses Forced Marriage], 3SAT ONLINE, at http://www.3sat.delbookmarklsendungl 
80388 (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). Before that, six such crimes occurred in Berlin during a four-
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these issues in the German headlines. The list of prominent German politicians 
who have declared multiculturalism a dead letter includes the new federal 
chancellor, Angela Merkel. 51 Migrants in Germany thus remain in a precarious 
situation, despite legislative and other efforts to improve their conditions. The 
situation could polarize even further, as Germany moves ahead with plans to 
deport more than a hundred Muslim 'extremists' .52 This already tense ethno-
cultural milieu is further strained by bleak economic conditions in Germany 
itself.53 
During tense times, it is important to ratchet up the exchange of ideas about 
the relationship between law and belonging. The lens of belonging, by drawing 
attention to the distance between rules and aspirations at the normative level, on 
the one hand, and conditions on the ground, on the other, navigates a dynamic 
middle course between the polar extremes of primordialist and constructivist 
approaches to the topics of citizenship and migration. 54 At the same time, this 
month period. Klaus Weisner, Ehrenmord---"honor crime (March 2005), at 
http://www.dekomnetz.de (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). Between 1996 and 2004, around 45 such 
murders occurred in Germany. Wisebadener Ehrenmord kein EinzelJall [Wiesbaden Honor Killing 
Was Not an Isolated Case], HESSISCHES SOZIALMINISTERIUM, at 
http://www.sozialministerium.hessen.de/ca/ilbgv (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
50. In 2004, a Berlin imam was caught on camera telling worshipers that Germans would 
"bum in hell" because they were non-believers. Ray Furlong, Germans Argue Over Integration, 
BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2004), at http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/woridieurope/4056109.stm (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2005). The response to this event is discussed infra in note 289. 
51. See, e.g., Werner Shiffauer, Die Tiirken, ein deutscher Gliicksfall [The Turks: Germany's 
Lucky Break], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE SONNTAGSZElTUNG, Nov. 28, 2004, at 31 (quoting 
Merkel's reference to the "grandiose failure of multiculturalism"). Former Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt caused further furor by suggesting that the decision to invite guest workers to Germany in 
the 1960s had been a mistake. Furlong, Germans Argue Over Integration, supra note 50. 
52. lslamisten droht Ausweisung [Islamists Face Deportation], FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 
Jan. 24, 2005, at 4. The threatened deportations are being pursued by the Lander-not by the federal 
government-on the basis of changes in the new immigration law, which has been in effect since 
January 1, 2005. Another potential source of destabilization, at least among the large Turkish 
population living in Germany and elsewhere in the EU, has been forestalled by the EU's October 
2005 decision to open accession (that is, membership) negotiations with Turkey. EU Opens Historic 
Accession Talks with Turkey, EUOBSERVER.COM (Oct. 3, 2005) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
53. The Hartz IV reforms that took effect in January 2005 have radically reformed and 
reduced welfare benefits, and pushed the number of registered unemployed in Germany past the five 
million post by February 2005. Arbeitslosigkeit auf Rekordhoch [Unemployment at a Record High], 
FAZ.NET (Feb. 2, 2005) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). The last time Germany saw such high 
unemployment was during the Great Depression. Funf Millionen [Five Million], FAZ.NET (Feb. 2, 
2005) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
54. By aiming to avoid the excesses of both primordialist/cultural and constructivist/identity 
approaches to the matter of membership, I do not claim that such approaches are necessarily flawed. 
Indeed, some of the most compelling contemporary accounts of European developments are framed 
in terms of identity. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 22, at 294 (focusing on "the interaction between a 
narrow and formal legal concept of citizenship ... and a broader notion of 'membership' comprising 
constitutional, political and socio-economic elements in a multilevel (non-state) polity which is 
developing under post-national conditions involving fractured (state and individual) identities"}. 
However, cultural and identity-based approaches often suffer from conceptual vagueness. They pose 
methodological dangers as well. For example, cultural approaches can fall prey to over-
determination or reification, whereas identity-based approaches may privilege agency over more 
immutable structural factors. Some particularly meticulous observers of European integration argue 
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approach helps to denature the notion that attachments form primarily, if not 
solely at the level of the nation. This aspect renders belonging congenial for 
examining developments in the EU and in Germany that are driving a wedge 
between nationality and citizenship, between the nation and the state.55 But 
while national identity in Germany appears to be in decline,56 it is too soon to 
predict whether it will stand its ground or yield to other forms of sub- or 
supranational attachment. The lens of belonging offered here turns away from 
such ultimate questions and looks instead at different levels where it may be 
experienced and constructed, ranging from the family through group, city,57 
community and nation, to international society58 and beyond. Belonging, 
understood as the experience or practice of embeddedness, may become more 
salient as rights migrate 'upward' from the local communities that first granted 
them59 towards increasingly abstract entities. 
I tum now to a concrete examination of the legal frameworks within which 
belonging must be negotiated. This article proceeds by first providing a 
conceptual framework and addressing European-level developments pertaining 
to nationality/citizenship (Part II.A) and migration (Part II.B), then turns to 
that "[ c Julture and identity are useful concepts only to delineate the baseline of a process ... that 
constitutes the single most striking case of wholly peaceful and voluntary political change in world 
history. They are not useful for describing and analyzing that phenomenon." Haas, Roever & 
Schmidt, supra note 2, at 151. 
55. See, e.g., Joppke, supra note 2, at 53-54: 
The picture that. . . emerges is that of the dissociation of state and nation in the liberal 
state's membership policies. States certainly continue to be 'nation-states', identifiable by a 
name like an individual, and embodying a unique history and collectivity. However, they 
have become wide open for new entrants, who can no longer be included or excluded on the 
basis of ascribed group characteristics, but only as individuals. 
This trend marks a departure from the traditional view of the "powerful and assumed relationship" 
between belonging (understood as membership in the nation) and rights (understood as membership 
in the state). DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF 
CITIZENSHIP ix, 107 (1996). 
56. According to the public opinion data analyzed by Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, 
at 154-55, Germany (like other European countries) is experiencing a decline in the salience of 
national identity. Conversely, Germans are more likely than other Europeans to claim European 
identity. 
57. For example, a recent immigrant to the U.S. from Kazakhstan joined the U.S. military 
after the September II attacks, explaining that it "doesn't matter that America is not my country. 
New York is my city." War on Terror: Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5,2001, at 25. See also 
SAVAGE, BAGNALL & LONGHURST, supra note 15 (on local belonging and attachment). 
5S. See generally INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND ITS CRITICS (Alex J. Bellamy ed., 2005) 
(surveying debates in the fiel:! of international relations); URRY, supra note IS, at 6 (providing a 
sociological perspective and arguing that contemporary challenges to traditional notions of '''nation-
state-society' ... suggest that maybe Thatcher was oddly right when she said there is no such thing 
as society"). 
59. The rise of international and supranational human rights law is discussed infra in Part 
Il.A.I. It bears mention here that, although states are becoming less essential as a source of rights, 
they remain "critical as the mediating mechanism, the node, of a variety of international institutions 
and global processes . . . . [IJt is primarily through the state that international human rights law is 
realized (and contested), and it is through the state that different groups and organizations (or 
individuals) can seek to shape interpretations of that law." JACOBSON, supra note 55, at x. 
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consider the recent changes in German law on nationality/citizenship (Part lILA) 
and on migration (Part III.B). The discussion of integration in Part IV provides 
the common thread that ties the two strands of analysis in Parts II and III 
together. The emerging integration paradigm evidences a pragmatic approach to 
both the internal and external dimensions of belonging, but also contains the 
seeds of future conflict. 
II. 
FRAMING GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS 
A. BELONGING TO: NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP 
1. Overview 
'Nationality' and 'citizenship' both capture fundamental aspects of the 
content and meaning of belonging. Unfortunately, neither of these terms can lay 
claim to a clearly bounded definition. Moreover, these English terms are often 
treated as synonymous, when in fact they refer to different, albeit overlapping, 
statuses. Some official EU languages use the same term for both concepts, 
whereas others, including English, employ different terms.60 The task of 
defining and delineating the English terms 'nationality' and 'citizenship' poses a 
major threshold challenge to any inquiry in this field. This difficulty is 
compounded when one grafts a transnational or supranational dimension onto 
the territory-based system in which these phenomena emerged. Thus, an 
attempt at conceptual clarification must precede any examination of recent 
developments in the ED and in Germany. 
Nationality is the traditional international legal term that refers to the link 
between an individual and a state.6l International law leaves questions of 
nationality largely up to each country, which can "settle by its own legislation 
the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that 
60. For a detailed analysis of the terminology corresponding to these two English terms in 
other EU languages, along with a comparison of how these terms are used in England, Ireland, and 
the United States, see Gerard-Rene de Groot, Towards a European Nationality Law, 8.3 
ELECTRONIC J. COMPo L. I, 2 (October 2004), available at http://www.ejcl.org (providing detailed 
etymological analysis of the terminology used in all EU member states) (last visited Nov. 29, 2005). 
Yet de Groot notes that despite the existence of parallel terminology in various languages (including 
the German terms Staatsangehorigkeit and -burgerschaft), the "relationship between these two 
concepts ... is not fully clear." Id. at 2-3. 
61. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 211 
cmt. a (1987) ("[T]he principal relationship that links an individual to the state is nationality."). I 
refrain from using the term nation-state since "there are very few states that consist of a single nation 
or ethnie." Franck, supra note 12, at 360. Nationality has also been described as "citizenship's 
external face." Alex Warleigh, Purposeful Opportunists? EU Institutions and the Struggle over 
European Citizenship, in BELLAMY & WARLEIGH, supra note 32, at 19,24. See also Alice Ludvig, 
Why Should Austria be Different from Germany? The Two Recent Nationality Reforms in Contrast, 
J3 GERMAN POLITICS 499, 500 (2004) ("[T]he rules on naturalization ... are the institutional 
expression of who is to be included and who is to be excluded from membership in the demos."). 
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nationality b~ naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that 
legislation." 2 This explains why questions of nationality have thus far63 been 
regulated by domestic legislation, such as the Immigration and Nationality Act 
in the United States.64 Under international law, nationality implies a host of 
rights and obligations for the individual, including "being subject to a nation's 
laws, its taxes, and military conscription while enjoying the right of protection 
by the state even when abroad.,,65 Whereas this term is still commonly used in 
English, particularly in international legal discourse, it has fallen into disrepute 
in some Continental countries, where it evokes abhorrent ethnic notions of 
nationalism. 
Citizenship is a tougher notion to grasp because it lies at the intersection of 
law, social science, and political theory. Whereas the meaning of nationality has 
remained relatively stable within the so-called Westphalian system from which 
it emerged, the meaning of citizenship has evolved over time and differs from 
place to place.66 Citizenship implies "full membership" in a political 
community. 67 Before the state emerged as the predominant form of political 
organization, citizenship referred to membership in smaller governmental units 
and implied the rights enjoyed by, as well as the duties imposed on, those lawful 
residents who were entitled to the status of citizen.68 Later, in the Westphalian 
62. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 l.C.J. 4, 20-21 (Nov. 29, 1955); see also, 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 211 cmt. c (\987) ("A 
state is free to establish nationality law and confer nationality as it sees fit."). However, 
international law does impose some limits on each state's sovereignty in regard to nationality. Thus, 
"other states need not recognize a nationality that is involuntary. .. or that is not based on an 
accepted 'genuine link.'" Id. 
63. De Groot, supra note 60, at 20 suggests that the EU is on its way to adopting a common 
nationality law. Others "emphasize the enduring importance of nationality, in opposition to the thesis 
of a postnational age in which state membership is fading in significance, eclipsed by the rise of 
transnational identities and human rights protections." Gerald L. Neuman, Book Review, 96 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 514, 514 (2002). 
64. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. §§ 1101-1537 (2000). Section lI03(a)(3) 
defines "alien" as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." A U.S. "national" is a 
person who is either "(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) ... who, though not a citizen of the 
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States." § llOl(a)(22). 
65. Koslowski, supra note 12, at 205. 
66. Bellamy, The Making of Modern Citizenship, supra note 9, at 5, doubts whether "a 
history of the concept from ancient Greece to the present could plausibly be written," given that: 
[T]he term 'citizen' has had different meanings in different historical periods and 
languages. It can signify the member of a city and/or a given class, as in the Greek polities 
or the original usage of the German Staatsbuerger, or be equated with subjecthood of a 
monarchy, as in Britain, or membership of a state, as in France, or be associated primarily 
with belonging to a people or nation, as was the case in Germany. 
Id. 
67. Shaw, supra note 22, at 297 (noting that citizenship is not merely a "formal legal 
status"). 
68. Maarten Prak, Burghers into Citizens: Urban and National Citizenship in the 
Netherlands during the Revolutionary Era (c. 1800), 26 THEORY & SOC'y 403 (\997). These 
historical origins explain the high level of variance that prevailed from one governmental entity to 
another in the early conditions of citizenship. Tilly notes as well that the "rights and obligations 
linking citizens to states have formed through struggle." Charles Tilly, A Primer on Citizenship, 26 
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system, citizenship came to mean membership in a particular state. This familiar 
meaning has come under increasing attack, particularly in the wake of the 
development ofEU citizenship.69 
The term citizenship itself can "denote a relationship to a polity, a social 
status, an activity, a package of rights, or a package of responsibilities.,,70 It is a 
sociological and political concept as well as a legal one. From the legal 
perspective, citizenship has been rooted in domestic law and has not 
traditionally been a concept of intemationallaw?l In contemporary usage, the 
concept of citizenship serves as the marker for membership in democratic 
society, regardless of the form that the political community happens to take. 
Citizenship is an "institution which has.. . been developed and refined to 
nurture and protect" the homo politicus, who embodies the democratic 
expectation that individuals should "playa part in the social and political life of 
the society in which they reside."n Viewing citizenship solely through a legal 
or constitutional lens thus misses much of the "functional significance of the 
relevant polity for individual citizens.,,73 Consequently, it is relatively easy to 
pinpoint the legal content of citizenship, but much more difficult to fathom its 
political and social meaning?4 
Citizenship is a "contested truth,,75 that has in recent years enjoyed the 
THEORY & SOC'Y 599, 601 (1997); see also Pietro Costa, From National to European Citizenship: A 
Historical Comparison, in BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 9, at 207. 
69. In order to render the evolving nature of political community, Tilly, supra note 63, at 
600, has proposed a more generic definition that does not limit citizenship to any particular type of 
governmental entity, but rather defines it as a "set of mutually enforceable claims relating categories 
of persons to agents of governments." While broad enough to capture some emerging forms of 
membership, Tilly's referential frame is too narrow to embrace all notions of citizenship found in 
contemporary discourse. In particular, there appears to be no room in Tilly's definition for 
discussions of cosmopolitan citizenship based on membership in international society. See, e.g., 
DANIELE ARCHIBUGI & DAVID HELD, COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW 
WORLD ORDER (1995); RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN 
CITIZENSHIP (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998); DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL 
ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995). Moreover, Tilly's 
emphasis on "claims" misses the full range of practices involved in the construction of citizenship. 
See, e.g., Antje Wiener, Making Sense of the New Geography of Citizenship: Fragmented 
Citizenship in the European Union, 26 THEORY & SOC'y 529 (1997) [hereinafter Wiener, 
Fragmented Citizenship J. 
70. Neuman, supra note 63, at 514. 
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 211 cm!. h 
(1987) (observing that not all States recognize this distinction). 
72. Michelle Everson, The Legacy of the Market Citizen, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF 
EUROPEAN UNION 73, 76 (Io Shaw & Gillian Moore eds., 1995) [hereinafter SHAW & MOORE] 
(noting that citizen is "both governor and governed"). 
73. R.I. Barry Jones, The Political Economy of European Citizenship, in BELLAMY & 
W ARLEIGH, supra note 32, at 145 ("[T]he sets of legal definitions and provisions that endow 
individuals with formal membership of a polity are important, but remain only a small part of the 
picture of substantive and meaningful citizenship." (citations omitted». 
74. Everson, supra note 72, at 76; see also Rainer BaubOck, Recombinant Citizenship, 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna Political Science Series No. 67 (1999) (distinguishing "thick" 
and "thin" conceptions of citizenship). 
75. M.R. Sommers, Rights, Relationality and Membership: Rethinking the Making and 
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attention of scholars from across the disciplinary spectrum.16 Despite the great 
range of opinion found in the massive literature on citizenship, most authors 
agree that citizenship includes, at the very least, the "bundle of civil, political, 
and social rights possessed by individuals,,77 by virtue of their relationship to a 
governmental entity. However, this is an unsatisfactory definition of citizenship 
because it overlaps substantially with that of nationality. Thus, most authors 
take this rights-based definition as a starting point for their analysis of 
citizenship, then elaborate upon it by expanding on the list of rights granted 78 or 
creating typologies that differentiate the internal structure of citizenship.19 
Some authors emphasize the important distinction between passive80 and active 
citizenship, and draw attention to the constitutive role of practices,81 while still 
Meaning of Citizenship, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 63, 64 (1994). 
76. Even the best legal scholars recognize the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the 
study of European citizenship. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 22, at 309-10. However, Shaw has also 
observed that "lawyers ... were the first group of writers to begin to extrapolate concepts of 
citizenship out of the materials of what was then EEC law." Id. at 297 n.lO. For examples of 
different frames of analysis, see CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN THE NEW EUROPE 
(Percy B. Lehning & Albert Weale eds., 1997); Symposium, Changing Citizenship Theory and 
Practice, 38 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 667-99 (Oct. 2005); Y ASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, 
LIMITS TO CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); Joseph 
H.H. Weiler, To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilization, in JOSEPH WEILER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 324 (1999) [hereinafter Weiler, Eros and Civilization]; Antje Wiener, The 
Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance, 4 EUR. L.J. 
294 (1998) [hereinafter Wiener, Embedded Acquis]. 
77. See, e.g., Koslowski, supra note 12, at 205. Here Koslowski, like most other experts on 
citizenship, invokes "the almost canonical approach to citizenship issues taken by the sociologist 
T.H. Marshall." Shaw, supra note 22, at 297 (quoting T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL 
CLASS) (1950». Everson argues that "entitlement by right" is the "core of citizenship," supra note 
72, at 84, and explains that "entitlements are the classic rights of citizenship, arranged in a series of 
concentric circles, with civil or civic rights forming the core, then political rights, and with social 
rights situated beyond these." Id. at 83. 
78. For example, Baubock has argued that cultural citizenship constitutes a fourth kind of 
citizenship. Rainer Baubock, Cultural Citizenship, Minority Rights and Self-Government, in 
CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra note 42, at 319-48. 
79. Bellamy, The Making of Modern Citizenship, supra note 9, identifies three components 
of citizenship (that is, rights, belonging, and participation), whereas Jones claims that citizenship has 
formal, instrumental and affective facets that provide the "foundations of effective polities." Jones, 
supra note 73, at 144, 146. 
80. Bellamy, The Making of Modern Citizenship, supra note 9, at 7, stresses the distinction 
between citizenship and "mere subjecthood," which I understand as a form of passivity or non-
agency. See also PreuB, supra note 13, at 23 ("As part of the evolution of modern statehood, 
nationals changed from being mere passive subjects of the nation-state in which they lived to 
become active citizens who constituted the state-as-nation."). This semantic distinction appears to 
have a rough parallel in the field of public international law, where some experts similarly reject the 
term "subjects of' international law, and use the term "persons in" international law instead. See 
Introductory Note to Part 2 of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (cautioning 
against use of the term "subject" since it "may have more limited connotations, suggesting that such 
entities have only rights and obligations," whereas "entities that are persons under international 
law ... have legal status, personality, rights, and duties under international law"). 
81. See, e.g., Richard Bellamy, The 'Right to Have Rights ': Citizenship Practice and the 
Political Constitution of the EU, in BELLAMY & W ARLEIGH, supra note 32, at 41-70 [hereinafter 
Bellamy, Citizenship Practice]; Riva Kastoryano, Citizenship and Belonging: Beyond Blood and 
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others proceed by recognizing and analyzing further dimensions of citizenship, 
such as its relational character82 or its nonnative nature,83 that help to 
distinguish it from mere nationality. Thus, the contemporary understanding of 
citizenship refers less to an overarching status, than to a set of rights and 
obligations that the individual must negotiate across various levels of 
governance, from concrete local communities and institutions on up to higher 
levels of abstraction. 
With these basic definitions in place, we can now reconsider the 
relationship between nationality and citizenship. First, as already noted, the two 
concepts overlap in tenns of their content since rights and duties play a central 
role in defining each tenn. Second, in the Westphalian system, where the state 
is understood as the main source of rights and personal identity,84 nationality 
and citizenship may be, but are not necessarily identical in the fonnal legal 
sense. Nationality is in one sense broader and more inclusive, since it is a 
necessary but not always sufficient condition for citizenship. Thus, "every 
citizen is a national, but not every national is necessarily a citizen of the State 
concerned.,,85 For example, c02'0rations, ships and aircraft possess nationality 
but do not possess citizenship.8 This may also be true of individuals in some 
countries. For example, not all British nationals enjoy the privileged status of 
British citizen,87 nor do all American nationals enjoy fuJI rights of citizenship. 88 
Soil, in HEDETOFT & HJORT, supra note 16, at 120-36; Warleigh, supra note 61; Wiener, 
Fragmented Citizenship, supra note 69. 
82. Tilly, supra note 68, at 600 (arguing that citizenship "has the character of a contract: 
variable in range, never completely specificable, always depending on unstated assumptions about 
context, modified by practice, constrained by collective memory, yet ineluctably involving rights 
and obligations sufficiently defined that either party is likely to express indignation and take 
corrective action when the other fails to meet expectations built into the relationship"). 
83. The normative aspect of citizenship "concerns the manner in which people feel their 
particular community should be organized." Everson, supra note 72, at 80. See, e.g., Bellamy, 
Citizenship Practice, supra note 81; LEHNING & WEALE, supra note 76; Nikos Prentoulis, On the 
Technology of Collective Identity: Normative Reconstructions of the Concept of EU Citizenship, 7 
EUR. L.J. 196 (2001); Shaw, supra note 22, at 294,315. 
84. "Since the Reformation, the Peace of Westphalia and the writings of Hugo Grotius, the 
state has been the alpha and omega of personal identity." Franck, supra note 12, at 360. 
85. PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1979); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 211 cmt. h (1987) ("A citizen under 
national law is generally a national for purposes of international law, but in some states not all 
nationals are citizens."). 
86. Koslowski, supra note 12, at 205. The following discussion pertains only to individuals 
and does not explore further implications of nationality or citizenship for corporations, ships or 
aircraft. 
87. For an overview of the various statuses recognized under the British Nationality Act, see 
de Groot, supra note 60, at 2 and text accompanying note 7 (noting the categories of British 
Overseas Territories Citizen, British Overseas Citizen, British Subject without Citizenship, and 
British Protected Person). 
88. Currently, persons born in an outlying possession of the United States (that is, American 
Samoa and Swains Island) fall into this category. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 308 (8 
U.S.C. §1408 (2000). Moreover, U.S. felons may lose their citizenship rights, but still retain their 
nationality. Koslowski, supra note 12, at 205. Historically, Black Americans were treated as non-
citizen nationals prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. 
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As these examples show, citizenship may constitute a narrower and more 
exclusive category, or subset, of nationality, when viewed in terms of 
membership. Yet in such cases, citizenship simultaneously implies a broader 
range or greater quantum of rights and duties than those attached to mere 
nationality, when viewed in terms of its content.89 In addition, neither 
nationality nor citizenship inherently requires that the relationship between 
individual and state be an exclusive one. Rather, the Westphalian presumption 
of singular allegiance is an historical artifact of relatively recent modernist 
origin. "Human beings for millennia have defined themselves in terms of loyalty 
to more than one system of social and political organization.,,90 This stricture of 
the Westphalian system began eroding after World War II and was noticeably 
diminished by the turn of the millennium, though it still retains considerable 
force.91 
Citizenship, like nationality, is still largely defined with reference to the 
state, despite the advance of new forms of belonging. It has, however, taken on 
a wealth of post-Westphalian meaning, particularly since its formal introduction 
at the EU level by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union ("TEU,,).92 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857). 
89. This distinction roughly parallels the one under international law between absolute and 
relative human rights, where "absolute rights are rights that everyone has against everyone else," 
while relative rights are those "that every member of every legal community has in her respective 
legal community." Rut Rubio Marin & Rory O'Connell, The European Convention and the Relative 
Rights of Resident Aliens, 5 EUR. L.J. 4, 4 (1999). For example, the European Convention on 
Human Rights accords "some rights to all persons within the jurisdiction of the state, but reserves 
certain rights for the nationals of each country." !d. at 5; see European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 (ETS No.5), 213 U.N.T.S. 
222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended [hereinafter ECHR]; see also International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
90. Franck, supra note 12, at 370. In Western Europe, the "common accommodation of 
multiple loyalties ... generally ceased in late Tudor England and in the Sun King's France, when the 
state became sovereign and the sovereign became the state." [d. at 371. The French and American 
revolutions substituted "horizontal" loyalty to the sovereign people for "vertical" personal fealty to 
the monarch, and transformed individuals from subjects into citizens, but did not abandon the 
insistence on exclusive loyalty to one sovereign. [d. at 372. In that historical context, the term 
'nation' referred to the "new sovereign" constituted by "the people ... themselves, conjoined in 
liberty, equality and fraternity," and thus meant "something entirely different from its current 
usage." [d. In the late eighteenth century, "the state became the nation: not the nation of ethnic 
compatibility but the nation of kindred ideals." [d. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century 
were the terms 'nation' and 'nationalism' "appropriated" and "twisted into new loyalty patterns 
based on exclusive and xenophobic loyalty to myth-history, race, language, ethnie and culture. The 
French nation that emerged in 1789 was not even remotely related conceptually to the German 
nation created and led a century later by Prussia." !d. 
91. Franck, supra note 12; Koslowski, supra note 12; Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and 
the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1413 (1997) (noting that the U.S. "has moved 
towards almost complete toleration of dual nationality"). German views on dual nationality are 
discussed infra in Part IILA. 
92. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 191) I [hereinafter TEU]. The 
TEU entered into effect on November 1, 1993. A consolidated version containing subsequent 
amendments to the TEU is available at 2002 OJ. (C 325) 5. 
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Contemporary practices of citizenship are "increasingly decoupled from 
belon~ing in the national collective" and occur in a proliferating number of 
sites. As the state's role as exclusive provider of rights characteristic of 
citizenship declines,94 the breach between nationality and citizenship widens. 
2. Nationality and Citizenship in the European Union 
EU citizenship demonstrates both continuity and rupture with the 
prevailing Westphalian system. This section offers an overview of the nature 
and content of this complex phenomenon. My aims here are to identify key 
continuities and discontinuities, and to pinpoint areas where further 
developments are brewing, in order to illuminate the shifting parameters within 
which Germany and other FU Member States remain sovereign over matters 
pertaining to nationality and citizenship. Article 17 of the EC Treaty provides: 
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the 
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.,,5 
On its face, this formulation reveals a fundamental continuity between 
state-based and EU citizenship. Additional continuities, along with a number of 
important discontinuities, can be discerned upon further analysis of the nature 
and content of EU citizenship. Particular care must be taken to differentiate 
these facets of EU citizenship, since they reflect and are thus key to appreciating 
the EU's sui generis nature,96 which combines characteristics of international' 
93. Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Postwar 
Europe?, in HEDETOFT & HJORT, supra note 16, at 137, 139; see also Veit Bader, Citizenship and 
Exclusion: Radical Democracy. Community. and Justice. Or. What's Wrong with 
Communitarianism?, 23 POL. THEORY 224 (1995) (calling for "democratic citizenship ... to be 
disentangled from citizenship as state membership"); KASTORYANO, supra note 42, at 132 
(observing the increasing "dissociation of citizenship from nationality"). 
94. Today, the "consolidated state remains the most important locus of rights," but is "no 
longer their only locus." Michael Hanagan, Recasting Citizenship: Introduction, 26 THEORY & 
SOC'y 397, 399 (1997). This is particularly true in the EU, but can also be taken to refer to the 
increasing role of international law as a source of rights that might be characterized as pertaining to 
citizenship, such as the ECHR, supra note 89. 
95. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 
11,4 EUR. Y.B. 412, as amended [hereinafter EC Treaty]. A consolidated version incorporating 
subsequent amendments to the EC Treaty-which is still often referred to as the Rome Treaty-is 
available at 2002 OJ. (C 325) 33. The first sentence of Article 17 was added as Article 8 to the pre-
existing EC Treaty by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty of European Union, supra note 92. The second 
sentence of Article 17 was added by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on May I, 
1999. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 0.1. (C 340) I [hereinafter 
Treaty of Amsterdam]. The Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered the citizenship provisions in the EC 
Treaty, with the effect that former Article 8 became Article 17. The Treaty of Nice, which entered 
into effect on February 1, 2003, did not alter the EC Treaty in regard to citizenship. Treaty of Nice 
amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and 
Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001,2001 OJ. (C 80) 70 [hereinafter Treaty of Nice). 
96. Curtin asserts that the "true world-historical significance" of this sui generis entity lies in 
its conferral of "rights on individuals." Dierdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure oJthe Union: A 
Europe oj Bits and Pieces, 20 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 17, 67 (1993); see also Bellamy & 
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organizations with those found in different types of states.97 EU citizenship 
creates "schizophrenic" citizens who are simultaneously linked to "two 
divergent forms" ofpolity.98 
a. The Link Between Nationality and Citizenship 
The first and most overt continuity is that nationality remains a necessary 
precondition of EU citizenship,99 just as it is required in the context of the 
Westphalian state. EU citizenship also hews to tradition insofar as "the question 
whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be 
settled solel~ by reference to the national law of the Member State 
concerned.,,1 0 Further continuity exists insofar as Member State nationality, 
while necessary, does not always suffice to confer EU citizenship. Thus, some 
persons possessing Member State nationality do not enjoy full membership in 
the EU. IOI However, there are indications that these traditional foundations of 
EU citizenship are under strain and that "full [Member State] autonomy cannot 
be maintained ... in all circumstances.',102 
This pressure towards convergence with regard to nationality comes from 
various directions. First, the EU's expanding role in the field of immigration 103 
increases the practical need to devise common approaches to some aspects of 
nationality law, such as the treatment of stateless persons lO4 and rules on 
Warleigh, supra note 32, at 8 (noting the EU's "betwixt-and-between character"). 
97. Everson, supra note 72, at 77, suggests that a "tenuous analogy may be drawn between 
this supranational citizen/diluted alien and the federal/state citizen of orthodox constitutional 
government." See generally Peter Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. 1. COMPo L. 195 
(2000). 
98. Everson, supra note 72, at 77. 
99. De Groot, supra note 60, at 2, points out that the meaning of the term "national 
citizenship" is unclear, but presumes that it refers to "possession and exercise of 'citizenship rights' 
at the national level." 
100. Declaration (No.2) on Nationality of a Member State, 1992 0.1. (C 191) 98. This 
principle is not contradicted by the existence of the optional European Convention on Nationality, 
supra note 23, which was prepared under the auspices of the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe. 
De Groot, supra note 60, at 30, urges the EU to "cooperate with the Council of Europe" in regard to 
harmonization of rules on acquisition and loss of nationality; Gerard-Rene de Groot, The European 
Convention on Nationality: A Step towards a Ius Commune in the Field of Nationality Law, 7 
MAASTRICHT 1. EUR. & COMPo L. 117 (2000). 
101. See de Groot, supra note 60, at 8-9. De Groot claims that "Fidel Castro himself could 
immediately opt for European citizenship while continuing to reside in Cuba" by virtue of recent 
changes in Spanish nationality law. !d. at 10. 
102. De Groot, supra note 60, at 10; see also A EUROPEAN NATIONALITY: CITIZENSHIP, 
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW IN THE EU (Randall Hansen & Patrick Wei I eds., 2001). 
Numerous authors have called explicitly for decoup1ing Union citizenship from nationality. See 
generally Norbert Reich, Union Citizenship-Metaphor or Source of Rights?, 7 EUR. L.J. 4, 15-19 
(2001) (summarizing the debate on this topic, including the possibility of taking residence as a 
central criterion for citizenship). 
103. See the discussion of the emerging EU framework for migration, infra Part II.B. 
104. European Parliament Resolution (Sept. 18, 1981) on the British Nationality Bill, 1981 
0.1. (C 260) 100 (issued in connection with the British Nationality Act 1981). 
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naturalization. 105 For example, the 1999 Tampere Council I 06 endorsed the 
"long-term objective that long-term residents should be offered the opportunity 
to obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they are resident," and 
thereby also to gain EU citizenship. 107 In line with that objective, the 
Commission-ostensibly "without prejudice to the fact that the Member States 
alone remain competent in the area of nationality laws,,108-subsequently 
prepared a report presenting its views in favor of naturalization as a means to 
promote further integration of legal immigrants. 109 Second, evolving 
applications of the principles of non-discrimination and equality may drive 
further harmonization. For example, the existence of "striking ... differences" 
in the treatment of descendants of persons originating in the territory of the 
various Member States provides an occasion that may tempt EU institutions to 
limit Member State sovereignty in regard to nationality. I 10 The European Court 
of Justice ("ECJ") has already made clear that it will review Member State 
nationality laws to assess their compatibility with principles of Community 
law. III While none of these sources of pressure spell the certain end of 
Member State sovereignty with regard to nationality, when taken together, they 
portend further development at the EU level and concomitant constraints on 
Member State action in this field. 
105. De Groot, supra note 60, at 20 n.92, points out that Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the 
U.S. Constitution granted the Congress the power to "establish an unifonn Rule on Naturalization," 
in order to prevent the States of the Union from developing different policies on naturalization and 
immigration. In contrast, other matters of nationality law, such as acquisition by birth and loss of 
nationality, were regulated by the States and not by the Federal Government until 1868, when the 
14th Amendment came into force. 
106. In October 1999, during the Finnish Presidency, the European Council held a special 
meeting to elaborate the "policy orientations and priorities" necessary to implement the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice ("AFSJ") that had been established by Article 2 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council (Oct. 15-16, 1999), Bull. 
EU 10-1999, ~~ 1.3 - 1.11, ~ 1.3.9 [hereinafter Tampere Milestones). This special meeting of the 
European Council adopted the tenn "genuine European area of justice" to describe the telos of the 
justice component of the AFSJ. Id. ~ 1.8. 
107. Commission o/the European Communities, Fourth Report on Citizenship o/the Union, 
COM (2004) 695 final (Oct. 26, 2004), at 4 [hereinafter Fourth Citizenship Report). 
108. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 4. 
109. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Immigration, 
Integration and Employment, COM (2003) 336 final (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter COMMISSION 
COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT]. 
110. De Groot, supra note 60, at 21 (arguing that "[i]t will be difficult to continue to accept 
such unequal treatment"). 
Ill. De Groot, supra note 60, at 11-20, summarizes a number of cases in text accompanying 
notes 49-90. Among these is the 1992 Micheletti case, in which the ECJ stated that "[t]he definition 
of the conditions of acquisition and loss of nationality is, in confonnity with international law, 
within the competence of each Member State, which competence must be exercised with due regard 
to Community law." Case 369/90, Micheletti v. Delegacion del Gobiemo European Cantabria, 1992 
E.C.R. 1-4258 (emphasis added). 
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b. The Centrality of Rights 
The second major continuity between EU and State-based citizenship 
comprises the centrality of rights in defining EU citizenship. 1 12 Primary (that 
is, treaty) law is supplemented by a growing body of secondary legislation at the 
EU level. However, this perspective oversimplifies the picture in two respects. 
First, cataloging the formal legal rights that make up EU citizenship is just the 
first step towards comprehending this phenomenon.t 13 The picture of EU 
citizenship as a juridical status based on conferred rights is too limited. Rather, 
a holistic inquiry into the active, engaged citizen "as political being" is 
needed,114 given the proliferation of both individual and institutional practices 
that constitute EU citizenship in action. 1 15 Second, while it is clear that Union 
citizenship supplements the rights of national citizenship, it is less clear to what 
extent it really improves the position already enjoyed by individuals under EC 
law. 116 From this perspective, Union citizenship is "less than revolutionary 
[but] far from a dead letter." 1 17 
A fully rendered portrayal of Union citizenship would require projecting its 
content against the double backdrops of Member State citizenship and the 
acquis communautaire. However, such a comprehensive analysis is beyond the 
scope of the following sketch of the contours of Union citizenship. In the 
narrow sense of provisions found in Part II of the EC Treaty, EU citizenship 
bestows four limited but nonetheless "genuine" 1 18 new rights upon nationals of 
112. "Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be 
subject to the duties imposed thereby." Article 17, EC Treaty, supra note 95. To date, no concrete 
duties have been imposed on EU citizens. But see Reich, supra note 102, at 20-23 (discussing the 
notion of "duty ofloyalty" and other concepts that might be used to limit individuals' rights). 
113. Antje Wiener has traced "the roots of citizenship policy and actual citizenship 
practice ... over a period of about two decades ... since the early 1970s." Wiener, Fragmented 
Citizenship, supra note 69, at 537-38. 
114. CROUCHER, supra note I, at 46-47 (contrasting the legalistic Roman notion of 
citizenship with the political, Aristotelian view). A number of leading scholars on EU citizenship 
stress the importance of the political facet of citizenship. See, e.g., Bellamy, Citizenship Practice, 
supra note 81; Shaw, supra note 22, at 294 (EU membership is "an ideal type" based on "an active 
conception of social citizenship based on a politically defined community"); Warleigh, supra note 
61. 
115. Citizenship is a "dynamic" concept, Wiener, Fragmented Citizenship, supra note 69, at 
530, that embodies "the institutional struggle over the development of the EU itself." Warleigh, 
supra note 61, at 21; see also Wiener, Embedded Acquis, supra note 76. 
116. Many commentators on EU citizenship have examined whether, and if so, how and to 
what extent, it has altered the existing position of individuals under Community law. See, e.g., 
Everson, supra note 72; Reich, supra note 102; Shaw, supra note 22; Wiener, Embedded Acquis, 
supra note 76. For example, one leading author argues that EU citizenship departs from the "market 
citizen" role traditionally ascribed to the individual in the context of European integration. Everson, 
supra note 72, at 79 ("The forerunner to the Union citizen, the market citizen, was also distinguished 
as a bearer of rights vis-a-vis an international organization."). 
117. Warleigh, supra note 61, at 23. 
118. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 4. "Citizenship of the Union has 
developed over twelve years of existence into a source of real and concrete rights." Id. at 10. 
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its Member States. 119 Among them, the first merely extends the rights already 
existing under Community law, while the latter three constitute real innovations 
at the supranational level. In the broader sense, EU citizenship also comprises 
the emergence and development of rights based on an array of other treaty 
provisions and legal sources. 
i. Citizenship in the Narrow Sense: Rights Based on Part Two of 
the EC Treaty 
The first right laid down is the personal right to free movement and 
residence throughout the EU. 120 This provision represents a de jure expansion 
of the free movement rights of workers (and their families) based on Article 39 
of the EC Treaty. At the formal level, EU citizenship enhances pre-existing 
rights by expressly extending the right of free movement to persons "not seeking 
economic advantafe or services.,,121 To a large extent, however, this 
"decommodified,,1 2 EU citizenship simply codifies accrued developments 
under Community law. Still, Article 18 of the EC Treaty provides a firm 
foundation for further expansion of this fundamental right under Community 
law. Thus, in the spirit of modernizing and extending the basic legal framework 
governing free movement of persons, the EU enacted a new directive in April 
2004 that revamps the rights of Union citizens and their family members 
(including in some cases registered fartners) to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States. 12 
119. The formal legal content of EU citizenship comprises numerous elements that are 
spread throughout the treaties, along with related secondary Community legislation. The principal 
source for ascertaining the content of EU citizenship is Part Two of the EC Treaty, supra note 95, 
Articles 17-22, the provisions of which confer four types of rights on EU citizens. 
120. "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and 
by the measures adopted to give it effect." Id. at Art. 18(1). This right is akin to a purported right 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution to "enter any State of the Union, 
either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein." Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
121. Everson, supra note 72, at 89. 
122. Iyiola Solanke, The Decommodification of European Citizenship 2 (2005) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author) (noting that the "'market' citizen whom the member states have 
slowly and in some cases unwillingly learnt to accept is being recast as a 'social' citizen"). 
123. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38 On the Right of Citizens of the 
Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member 
States, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77. Member States must implement the provisions of this Directive, which 
has the potential to affect millions of lives, by April 20, 2006. The Commission asserts that this 
Directive "marks a major step forward in terms of freedom of movement and residence" for all 
European citizens and their family members (broadly defined). Fourth Citizenship Report, supra 
note 107, at 5. First, this Directive revamps the legal framework in this field by codifying "in a 
single instrument the complex legislative corpus and the rich case-law on free movement and 
residence." Id. at 6. It does not quite amount to a clean sweep, but replaces the bulk of former 
legislation in the field, and amends the few old measures that remain in place. Second, this new 
framework simplifies conditions and formalities, and will thus facilitate the exercise of the right of 
residence. Third, it creates a permanent right of residence in the host Member State after five years 
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Second, EU citizenship confers "heavily circumscribed,,124 political rights 
on EU citizens. In particular, EU citizens have the right to stand and to vote in 
European Parliament and municipal elections in their Member State of 
residence, even if they are not nationals of that state.125 A body of secondary 
law is slowly developing to put these measures into effect. 126 Even at its 
current embryonic stage of development, this element of Union citizenship 
significantly expands the type of rights enjoyed by individuals within the EU's 
constitutional legal order, at least in most Member States. 127 There is some 
pressure for further Europeanization in the field of electoral rights, insofar as EU 
citizens regularly express growing concern about the underdeveloped state of 
their rights to political participation. 128 
Third, Union citizenship creates new options for EU citizens who find 
themselves abroad and in need of diplomatic or consular help. In particular, EU 
nationals of one Member State can tum to the authorities of another Member 
State for help in cases involving death, illness, arrest, and other forms of 
distress, provided that their own Member State has no embassy or consulate in 
the third country where help is needed.129 This right does not provide an 
of continued residence. Fourth, the Directive treats registered partners as family members in defined 
cases, and requires at the very least that Member States in other cases "facilitate entry and residence 
of partners with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship." Jd. at 6. 
124. Everson, supra note 72, at 89; see also Jones, supra note 73, at 147-48 (arguing that the 
participatory rights "remain at the level of polity-maintenance and do not encroach far into areas of 
substantial interest to the majority of the population of the EU"). 
125. "Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national 
shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in 
which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State." EC Treaty, supra note 95, 
Art. 19(1). 
126. The Commission has reported the following developments in the field of electoral 
rights. First, common principles for conducting elections to the European Parliament came into 
force on April I, 2004. Council Decision 20021772 of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002, 
amending Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct 
Universal Suffrage, 2002 OJ. (L 283) I, amending 1976 Act [annexed to Decision 7617871ECSC, 
EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976, O.J. (L 278) 5]. Second, new rules have been adopted that 
establish a framework for financing European political parties from the Community budget. 
European Parliament and Council Regulation 200412003 on the Regulations Governing Political 
Parties at European Level and the Rules Regarding Their Funding, 2003 O.J. (L 297) I. See 
generally Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 8-9. 
127. Some current Member States-including Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands-
"extended municipal voting rights to noncitizens" as early as the mid-1970s. CROUCHER, supra note 
I, at 56. See generally Rainer Baubock, Expansive Citizenship-Voting beyond Territory and 
Membership, 38 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 683 (Oct. 2005). 
128. Some EU citizens perceive "a gap in electoral rights" that deprive them of the "right to 
participate in national or regional elections" when they exercise their personal freedom of 
movement. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note \07, at 8-9 (reporting "[r]ecurrent petitions, 
parliamentary questions and public correspondence"). Among EU Member States, only Ireland and 
the United Kingdom "grant electoral rights at national or regional elections to nationals of other 
Member States residing in their territory." Id. at 9. 
129. "Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the 
Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic 
or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State." 
EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 20(1). 
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alternative to protection by the Member State whose national the EU citizen is, 
but merely a back-up for cases where that state is not in a position to help the 
citizen in need. In such circumstances, Union citizenship broadens the classic 
duty of states toward their own nationals under international law to include 
nationals of fellow Member States. Secondary legislation implementing this 
right became effective in May 2002, after a slow ratification process. 130 
The fourth element of citizenship in the narrow sense pertains to the 
relationship between the citizen and the institutions of the Union. In particular, 
Union citizenship introduced two non-judicial means of redress for citizens, 1 3 I 
one via the European Parliament l32 and the other (in cases involvinj 
maladministration by Community institutions or bodies) via the Ombudsman. 13 
These rights are bolstered by a guarantee that EU citizens may correspond and 
be answered in any of the official languages with the EP, the Ombudsman, and 
other EU institutions and advisory bodies. 134 However, the fact that neither of 
these rights of access is available solely to Union citizens diminishes their 
significance as markers for citizenship. 135 
ii. Citizenship in the Broad Sense: Rights Based on Other 
Sources 
In terms of content, the last major component of EU citizenship is an array 
of rights 136 whose sources are found outside Part Two of the EC Treaty. 137 For 
130. Council Decision 951553 Regarding Protection for Citizens of the European Union by 
Diplomatic and Consular Representations, 1995 0.1. (L 314) 73. See generally Fourth Citizenship 
Report, supra note 107, at 9. 
131. "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to petition the European Parliament in 
accordance with Article 194. Every citizen of the Union may apply to the Ombudsman established in 
accordance with Article 195." EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 21. 
132. "Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, shall have the right to address, individually or in association 
with other citizens or persons, a petition to the European Parliament on a matter which comes within 
the Community's fields of activity and which affects him, her or it directly." EC Treaty, supra note 
95, art. 194. The European Parliament received 1283 petitions during its 2001-2002 term, of which 
744 were admissible, and 1514 during its 2002-2003 term, of which 642 were admissible. Fourth 
Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 9. 
133. The Ombudsman is appointed by the European Parliament and is "empowered to 
receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the 
Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance acting in their judicial role." EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 195(1). The Ombudsman has 
seen a steady rise in the number of complaints received in recent years. Fourth Citizenship Report, 
supra note 107, at 9. 
134. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 21. Reich, supra note 102, at 11-14, explores some of the 
more difficult questions of citizenship that arise in connection with the use of one's own (or a 
preferred) language when dealing with public authorities. 
135. Moreover, the eroding margin of preference between citizens and resident aliens may 
help to explain declining rates of naturalization in some states. CROUCHER, supra note I, at 55-58. 
136. Thorough analysis of this important topic is beyond the scope of this article. A good 
starting point in the voluminous literature is de Burca, who surveys the usages of the language of 
rights in Community law and provides an overview of the various contexts in which rights had arisen 
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the most part, such rights are based either on other treaty provisions, 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, or both. The Commission has 
proclaimed that the "most significant,,138 among citizenship rights in this 
broader sense are those derived from Article 12 (ex 6) EC Treaty, which 
prohibits "any discrimination on grounds of nationality.,,139 Yet this right, 
together with the right of free movement noted above, has been a core principle 
of Community law since the beginning of European integration. As such, it is 
difficult to view it as an innovation attributable to the emergence of Union 
citizenship. 140 
Broader notions of individual rights extending beyond this traditional 
core l41 have emerged slowly and awkwardly under Community law. The ECJ 
opened the door to the development of individual rights as general principles of 
Community law,142 often at the behest of German litigants or courts. 143 
However, efforts to formalize rights in the treaties have encountered resistance 
along the way. This has been particularly true for two categories of rights: first, 
social rights,144 and second, civil and political liberties. 145 Both these 
by 1995. Gniinne de Burca, The Language of Rights and European Integration, in SHAW & MOORE, 
supra note 72, at 29, 29-54. 
137. "[M]uch of what makes EU citizenship worth having is scattered throughout the acquis 
rather than encapsulated in Articles 17-22." Warleigh, supra note 61, at 27. 
138. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 4. 
139. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 12. See generally Gareth Davies, 'Any Place I Hang My 
Hat?' or: Residence is the New Nationality, 11 EUR. L.J. 43 (2005). 
140. The "rights of the market citizen, particularly that of free movement, have not merely 
been transferred to the Union citizen but continue to form the very core of that citizenship." 
Everson, supra note 72, at 79. 
141. The continuing special role of these principles is acknowledged by their restatement in 
Part 1 of the EU Constitution, which provides: 
(I) The free movement of persons ... shall be guaranteed within and by the Union, in 
accordance with the Constitution. 
(2) Within the scope of the Constitution, and without prejudice to any of its specific 
provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. 
Art. 1-4, EU Constitution. The EU Constitution has not yet entered into effect. 
142. Already in the 1970s, the ECJ declared various "fundamental rights" to be part of the 
general principles of Community law. See, e.g., Case 11/70, Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft v. 
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case 4/73, Nold v. 
Commission 1974 E.C.R. 491; Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz 1979 E.C.R. 3727. These 
early cases focused on "economic, commercial, and property rights, such as the right to trade, the 
right to use land, and economic liberty." De Burca, supra note 136, at 31. The ECJ also recognized 
so-called "rights of the defense" early on, such as "the privilege against self-incrimination, the right 
to a hearing, freedom from search and seizure, confidentiality of information, and protection from 
excessive penalties." Id. at 32. 
143. See, e.g., de Burca, supra note 136, at 39 (noting that the "challenge to the supremacy 
of Community law... came first from the German legal system, in which constitutionally 
recognized rights were allegedly infringed by Community measures"). For those challenges, see 
Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] (Federal Constitutional Court) of May 29, 
1976,37 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] (Decisions of the BverfG) 271 
(F.R.G.); Decision of the BVerfG of Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 339 (F.R.G.); available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen (last visited Nov. 21,2005). 
144. Social rights are not primarily judicial creations in Community law, but have emerged 
through a fitful process involving agreements among the Member States themselves and secondary 
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categories of human rights have gradually been incorporated, at least to some 
degree, into the EU's legal order. Yet not even the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights succeeded in fully incorporating such rights into the corpus of 
Community law. 146 Absent a constitutional settlement to resolve these long-
legislation enacted at the European level in cases where the Member States have agreed to establish 
legislative bases for such measures in the EU's treaty framework. Willing Member States have 
articulated two charters of social rights, and tried (but largely failed) to incorporate them into the 
EU's treaty framework. The high-water mark achieved thus far is the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra 
note 95, which amended the TEU's Preamble to confirm the Member States' "attachment to 
fundamental social rights as defined in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 
1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers." This 
commitment is operationalized by Article 136 (ex 117) of the EC Treaty, supra note 95, which 
provides in this regard that the "Community and the Member States ... shall have as their objectives 
the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, ... proper social protection, 
dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to 
lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion." However, Article 136 does not provide 
for full harmonization in this field, but merely calls for the implementation of "measures which take 
account of the diverse forms of national practices ... and the need to maintain the competitiveness 
of the Community economy." Art. 136, para. 2. The social policy fields in which the Community 
may act are spelled out more clearly in Article 137 (ex 118A), which embodies the strained 
compromise between Community and Member State competences in this contested field. Secondary 
legislation in the field of social policy has also been adopted at European level pursuant to a variety 
of other treaty provisions, including Article 141 (ex 119) relating to equal pay for male and female 
workers. 
145. This category of rights, like social rights, has developed gradually in Community law, 
and not without controversy. One of the key challenges for the EU has been to work out the 
relationship between the Community legal order and the ECHR, supra note 89, which all Member 
States have adopted, as well as with the European Court of Human Rights. See generally Joseph 
H.H. Weiler, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On the Conflict of Standards and 
Values in the Protection of Human Rights in the European Legal Space, in WEILER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE, supra note 76, at 102. Community institutions expressed their view early 
on that the ECHR framework should be viewed as part of the Community legal order. See Joint 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights, 1977 O.J. (C 103) I. For its part, the ECJ has referred to the 
ECHR in numerous cases, though it has been careful to preserve its own role as sole interpreter of 
fundamental rights within the EU's legal order. More recently, explicit references to fundamental 
rights and even to the ECHR have been incorporated into the EU's own treaty framework. For 
example, the Preamble to the TEU, supra note 92, confirms the Member States' "attachment to the 
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law," while Article 6(1) (ex F) of the TEU asserts that the "Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States." The most explicit statement of the relationship 
can be found in Article 6(2) of the TEU, which states that "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law" 
(emphasis added). These general statements are not mirrored in the concrete policy areas delineated 
in Article 3 of the EC Treaty. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam did add a new provision 
empowering Community institutions to take concrete steps to expand non-discrimination beyond the 
traditional concern with nationality by taking "appropriate action to combat discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation." EC Treaty, supra 
note 95, art. 13. 
146. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 OJ. (C 364) I. The 
charter was annexed to the Treaty of Nice but is not legally binding. See generally Erik Oddvar 
Eriksen, Why a Charter of Fundamental Human Rights in the EU?, 16 RATIO JURIS 352 (2003). See 
also Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 9 (noting the "close link" and numerous overlaps 
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standing complexities, the status and contours of rights in the EU, as well as the 
proper relationship between Union citizenship and human rights in the EU,147 
remain vital arenas of contestation. . 
Linking human rights (that is, those based on sources other than Part Two 
of the EC Treaty) to the overarching concept of Union citizenship might open a 
new avenue for embedding such rights in Community law. Yet this tactic is not 
without risk. The more recent invention of EU citizenship, which claims to have 
"placed the individual at the heart" of the Union's activities,148 consolidates and 
bolsters the EU's commitment to rights, but does not fully encompass it. An 
institutional decision has been taken to gather the increasingly dense and 
coherent body of rights taking shape within the EU's legal order under the 
umbrella concept of citizenship, in order to fill out the contours of Union 
citizenship and render it more legitimate in the eyes of the affected persons. 
While it makes conceptual sense to link citizenship to rights in the broader 
sense, particularly given the central role of rights in Marshall's canonical 
definition of citizenship, doing so runs the risk of further complicating an 
already complex area of EU law. Moreover, any effort to squeeze human rights 
into the corset of citizenship risks stifling their development. These risks 
caution against subordinating rights to citizenship, at least until such time as the 
discourse or techniques of citizenship can contribute fruitfully to the 
development of rights jurisprudence in the EU. 
iii. Conclusions on Citizenship and Rights 
The relationship between rights and citizenship in the EU is likely to 
remain ambiguous for some time to come, not least in the wake of the obstacles 
encountered by the EU Constitution during the ratification process in 2005. Yet 
regardless of how the overarching ambiguities surrounding the relationship 
between rights and citizenship are ultimately resolved, the fact remains that 
citizenship and rights (in the narrow and broad senses identified above) are both 
experiencing a boom phase in the EU. Future research should attend to the 
evolving relationship between citizenship and rights, particularly to how 
developments in one arena affect developments in the other, and whether their 
developmental trajectories converge or diverge. 
c. Functional Continuity Between National and Union Citizenship 
The third dimension of continuity between national and EU citizenship 
between Union citizenship and the Charter). 
147. Weiler, Eros and Civilization, supra note 76, at 334, takes issue with the "conflation of 
citizenship with (human) rights," while O'Leary criticizes the EU for its "failure to recognize an 
explicit link between fundamental rights and the scope and operation of [Union] citizenship." Siofra 
O'Leary, The Relationship Between Community Citizenship and the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights in Community Law, 32 COMMON MARKET L.R. 519,537 (1995). 
148. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 9. 
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comprises the function of citizenship. Both types of membership constitute a 
fundamental means ofpromotinr, democratic legitimacy, and hence allegiance to 
the institutions of governance. 49 In practice, the EU's traditional "market-
based citizenship has proved insufficient as a means of generating support for, 
and loyalty to, the EU.,,150 Whether Union citizenship can tum around the EU's 
legitimac~ deficit and win the 'hearts and minds' of its citizens remains an open 
question. 51 The success of citizenship as a means of generating collective 
identity must ultimately be measured by the extent to which it actually 
encourages "political engagement with the Union and its decision-making.,,152 
Viewed in this light, EU citizenship reduces in some measure to a chicken-and-
egg problem: What comes first, the (supra)nation or its (supra)national 
citizens? 153 
d. Conclusions on Nationality and Citizenship in the EU 
The apparent continuity between national and Union citizenship is 
deceptive. On the one hand, EU Member States retain sovereignty to defme 
who 'belongs to' them by drawing the "cultural, horizontal boundary between 
insiders and outsiders, that is between members and non-members of the 
nation.,,154 Yet notwithstanding their formal authority, these states are 
149. See de Burca, supra note 136, at 40-41; Everson, supra note 72, at 83-84, 89 (referring 
to the functional requirement of allegiance); Warleigh, supra note 61, at 21 (arguing that the EU had 
a "double rationale" for creating EU citizenship: first, "a utilitarian justification, centred on making a 
success of the single market," and second, "a more normative te/os of helping reduce the notorious 
democratic deficit"). 
150. Bellamy & Warleigh, supra note 32, at 12 ("So far, Union citizenship has failed to 
provide the mechanism for a significant attachment between either the publics of the member states 
or the Union and the various national demoi. "). 
151. W arleigh has shown that the "take-up rates and the actual influence of those citizens 
and citizens' groups who rise to the [citizenship] challenge are often relatively low." Warleigh, 
supra note 61, at 19. The mechanisms available to the EU "appear weak ... compared with those of 
sovereignty and status evolved at national level," Everson, supra note 72, at 89, particularly insofar 
as the EU lacks the capacity to "bribe" its way into the "hearts of citizens through the provision of 
public welfare." Bellamy & Warleigh, supra note 32, at 12. 
152. Bellamy & Warleigh, supra note 32, at 12. Those authors argue that the "EU has ... 
largely failed to capitalize on the opportunity to provide citizens with an alternative means of 
effecting political change," and that "for EU citizenship to be meaningful, it must be reinvented as 
an instrument of political engagement: a tool for the expression of opinions and the resolution of 
problems rather than simply a batch of entitlements." !d. at 12-13. 
153. Another way to conceptualize this dilemma is in terms of building citizenship from the 
'bottom-up' or from the 'top-down'. On the one hand, it is hard not to see parallels between Union 
citizenship and earlier top-down nation-building efforts, such as followed the French revolution. See, 
e.g., Franck, supra note 12, at 372-73 (discussing the creation of "a new [French] nation of shared 
political ideals, from the top down" through the efforts of a "new and much broader-based elite of 
officialdom, professionals, educators and intellectuals," who "deliberately ... [spread] a national 
language, culture and identity"). In contrast, Wiener argues that "identities are never generated by 
the institutions of the state but have been created through practice." Wiener, Fragmented 
Citizenship, supra note 69, at 531. 
154. Preu/3, supra note 13, at 23 (contrasting this cultural criterion of belonging with the 
"socio-economic, vertical, dimension of top and bottom, that is, of class cleavages"). 
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increasingly subject to universalistic non-discrimination and equality norms that 
constrain them to make such decisions on the basis of individual rather than 
group characteristics. 155 The autonomy of the Member States is further 
constrained by developments at ED level that erode their ability to define the 
rights of persons within their territory.156 Thus the continuities identified 
above, while substantial, appear to be of declining significance. Moreover, the 
continuities between national and Union citizenship do not negate the novelty of 
the latter, nor should they be allowed to blur the distinctions between the 
two. 157 
Despite persistent "ambivalences and worries,,158 about its meaning, EU 
citizenship clearly marks "a dramatic deviation from modem concepts of 
citizenship," I 59 and offers the most vivid contemporary example of 
postnational160 membership. Four actual or potential points of departure from 
the Westphalian model of state-based citizenship have been identified in the 
preceding analysis. First, although Union citizenship is still derived from 
Member State nationality, there are numerous signs that this nexus is eroding de 
jacto, as rights in the European legal space are increasingly uncoupled from 
nationality and citizenship. Second, the traditional Member State autonomy on 
matters of nationality faces a potential de jure threat, insofar as ED institutions 
appear poised to encroach on their prerogatives. Third, the creation of ED 
citizenship departs from the exclusivity inherent in Westphalian orthodoxy by 
ISS. "[ejollective and ascriptive modes of exclusion have been replaced by individualist 
modes of exclusion." Joppke, supra note 2, at 46. In Joppke's view, "nation-states ... continue to 
exist but national particularisms can no longer be enforced through their membership policies ... 
[despite] (almost) unfettered state sovereignty in matters of immigration and nationality law," id. at 
44, since "[I]iberal non-discrimination and human rights norms have put brakes on the particularistic 
nation-building possibilities of the state. Its membership policies may still be notionalIy 'nation-
building', but only in the generic sense of forging non-ethnic, liberal-democratic colIectivities that 
are not different here from elsewhere." Id. at 54. Moreover, as noted supra in note III, the ECJ 
keeps a watchful eye to ensure that the Member States have due regard for Community law when 
exercising their competence over nationality. 
156. For example, Warleigh, supra note 61, at 26, observes that citizenship "clips the wings 
of the member governments" in terms of "national sovereignty over the welfare state, since member 
governments no longer have the right to decide on whether certain non-nationals are entitled to 
receive social security benefits." 
157. That relationship is more ambiguous than meets the eye. BelIamy & Warleigh, supra 
note 32, at 8, argue that the appearance of Union citizenship as "a discrete and detachable addition 
to, with no effect upon, national citizenship" is misleading, and insist rather that "Union citizenship 
reflects the fragmentation of national citizenship and not only supplements but replaces, interacts 
and occasionally competes and conflicts with it." 
158. BelIamy & Warleigh, supra note 32, at 4. 
159. Wiener, Fragmented Citizenship, supra note 69, at 530. See also Bellamy & Warleigh, 
supra note 32, at 16 (Union citizenship "is more than symbolically important."). 
160. I adopt Shaw's use of the term 'postnational' to describe EU citizenship, which is a 
"vital building block in the ongoing process of polity-formation within Europe." Shaw, supra note 
22, at 294. This usage of the term is narrower than Soysa\'s, for whom the term refers to the 
situation in which "what were previously defined as national rights become entitlements legitimized 
on the basis of personhood." SOYSAL, supra note 76, at 3. 
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reinstating the earlier European tradition of tolerating mUltiple loyaIties. 16l And 
fourth, the EU's sui generis nature is clearly revealed in the division of labor 
between the Union and its Member States, as well as in the nature of rights 
appurtenant to EU citizenship. Union citizenship "comprises rights and 
practices which distinguish the EU from any other international 
organization.,,162 In particular, EU citizenship tacks the most basic rights 
accorded to individuals under international law (e.g., diplomatic protection) onto 
those accorded to individuals within a domestic constitutional order (e.g., 
democratic participation) and in a federally arranged political community. 
EU citizenship constitutes a dramatic adaptation to an environment 
characterized by increasing intra-EU migration ('mobility') and decreasing 
Member State salience. Yet the dramatically changing nature of citizenship 
captures only part of larger debates about belonging in the EU. Indeed, 
questions about "the community of belonging and more specifically, about how 
to define borders of belonging" I 63 are not limited to the realm of nationality or 
citizenship. Rather, other forms of social exclusion-such as those based on 
"ethnicity, race, and gender"-ma~ be (or become) more salient than those 
based on nationality or citizenship. 64 From this perspective, the development 
of rights in the EU legal order, including the evolving notion of equal 
opportunities for migrants discussed below in Part II.B.2., may be a more 
important arena for contests over belonging than the arena of citizenship itself. 
B. BELONGING IN: THE REGULATION OF MIGRATION 
1. Overview 
Immigration policy is a field of increasingly circumscribed Member State 
soverei~ty. Indeed, the EU's role in regard to immigration (as well as 
asylum 65) is much greater than it is in connection with citizenship, where the 
161. "In historical tenus, both nationalism and transnational regimes have long bid 
(sometimes competitively) for the adherence of persons. Indeed, in the past, persons have often had 
multiple or compound identities." Franck, supra note 12, at 359. Compare Richard Falk, The 
Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization, 4 CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 5, 6 (2000) 
(distinguishing "thin" from "thick" affinities in this context). 
162. Bellamy & WarIeigh, supra note 32, at 16. "EU citizenship is a novel mixture of 
nation-state-based and innovative supranational and transnational practices." /d. at 12. 
163. Wiener, Fragmented Citizenship, supra note 69, at 529. Wiener notes that the question 
"[w]ho has a legitimate right to belong legally to [the EU] has become a much debated issue." Id. 
Particular debates over exclusion and inclusion have focused on the status of non-Member State 
nationals who reside within the EU, as well as on the other fonus of social exclusion, such as race 
and gender. !d. at 551-52 n.5. 
164. Id. at 530-31 ("[M]obilization around questions of ethnicity, race, and gender ... 
represent a second challenge to the concept of citizenship, suggesting that the 'language of 
citizenship' is becoming outdated . . . . [T]he borders of citizenship are challenged both internally 
and externally."). Wiener refers to this phenomenon as the "erosion of citizenship 'from below' by 
the trend to extend rights on bases other than nationality-based citizenship alone." Id. at 531. 
165. Due to space limitations, this article does not address the related field of refugee and 
asylum law, which has recently become an area of EU competence. The first phase of the Common 
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Member States remain (to date) largely in control over questions of nationality. 
In contrast, Member States retain an essential, but clearly subsidiary role 
regarding the regulation of immigration. In this field, as in so many others, 
developments at the regional (EU) level are unprecedented, rapidly changing, 
and bear close watching. This section, like the previous one on citizenship, 
provides an overview of the regulation of immigration at EU level, in order to 
frame dramatic recent German legal reforms. 
In concrete terms, immigration policy regulates "access to the territory of 
[a] state," as well as to "selected sectors of society, most notably the labour 
market.,,166 Immigration policies thus regulate not only which migrants may 
enter a country, but also what such persons may do and how they must behave 
once they are there. In particular, some immigration laws address themselves 
not only to technical matters of entry, stay and deportation, but also proscribe 
the aim and, in some cases, the means of their int~ation into that state's social, 
economic, cultural, and even political structures. I In this sense, migrants find 
themselves "at the cross-section of external and internal exclusion.,,168 This 
nexus points to the close, and potentially continuous relationship between 
immigration and citizenship, where an emerging "non-discrimination norm 
regulates the legal transition from entry to residence to citizenship in the 
contemporary liberal state.,,169 
From a historical perspective, both immigration and citizenship laws in 
liberal states have moved away from exclusion on the basis of ascriptive group 
distinctions, such as ethnicity and race.170 Instead, contemporary immigration 
European Asylum System was adopted at EU level in 2004. Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 
April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted, 2004 0.1. (L 304) 12. For discussions ofEU asylum law, see generally Gisbert Brinkmann, 
The Immigration and Asylum Agenda, \0 EUR. L. J. 182, 193-96 (2004); Sonia Boutillon, The 
Interpretation of Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refogees by the European 
Union: Toward Harmonization, 18 OEO. IMMIGRATION L.J. III (2003); Rosemary Byrne et aI., 
Understanding Refugee Law in an Enlarged European Union, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 355 (2004). 
166. Joppke, supra note 2, at 49. 
167. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the integration requirements under EU, as well as 
under German law. 
168. Joppke, supra note 2, at 49. 
169. Joppke, supra note 2, at 49. As a consequence, liberal states facing anti-immigration 
public sentiment face limited options: they can close "all immigration," but cannot close "particular 
immigration" from one group or another. /d. at 50 (emphasis in original). 
170. As noted in the discussion of citizenship, however, Germany continues to offer what 
Joppke describes as a "narrowly circumscribed" preferential treatment on the basis of ethnicity to 
some migrants. Id. at 49 (citation omitted). However, "[i]f one surveys the evolution of Western 
states' immigration policies since their first systematic elaboration at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, one notes their increased universalism, and the reduced scope of ascriptive group 
distinctions in them... [S]uch ascriptive group distinctions have notionally disappeared from 
immigration policies." Id. From these trends, Joppke draws the conclusion that the immigration 
policies of contemporary Western states "are no longer at the service of reproducing particular 
nationhood." Jd. at 50. 
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policies tend to be based on "individual criteria of skills and family ties.,,171 As 
a consequence of this trend, the term 'alien' is no longer a "national or ethnic 
category but [rather] a formal leral category" positioned at the opposite end of 
the spectrum from 'citizen'. 17 The fact that "nationalist or xenophobic 
tendencies" in liberal states "are no longer institutionalized in [their] 
immigration policies (as used to be the case in the early twentieth century)" does 
not mean that they have been abolished; rather they have been relocated to the 
level of civil society.173 States that permit or even encourage inward mifation 
"inevitably risk the ethnic and racial transformation of their societies,,,17 along 
with the social tension that might accompany diversification of their 
populations. 
This trend towards non-discrimination in the context of entry does not 
necessarily imply an overarching loss of state control over immigration. Liberal 
states, including the Member States of the EU in general and Germany in 
particular, retain and continue to exercise numerous levers of control over 
immigration. In addition to those techniques already noted-that is, policies 
defining the permitted bases for residence, imposing integration requirements on 
migrants, and setting criteria and procedures for deportation-states also 
exercise numeric control over the number of inward migrants to their territory. 
2. Regulating Migration in the EU 
Migration law, like Union citizenship, is a key component of the EU's Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice ("AFSJ"),175 which in tum is one of the 
biggest growth areas in the EU's legal order. 176 Growing EU competence in 
171. !d. at 49. 
172. Id. ("The only legitimate group distinction left is that between 'citizens', who have a 
right to enter and cannot be expelled, and 'aliens' who have no such rights and are subject to a 
state's 'immigration' or 'foreigners' policies."). 
173. Id. at 50-51. It is a different (but important) empirical question whether liberal states 
apply such facially non-discriminatory criteria for entry, stay, and deportation in a manner that 
suggests defacto discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, nationality, or race. 
174. Id. at 50. 
175. As already noted, the "policy orientations and priorities" needed to elaborate the AFSJ 
were first laid out in October 1999 in the Tampere Milestones. See supra note 106 and references 
cited therein. For an overview of the development of the AFSJ, see Helen E. Hartnell, EUstitia: 
Institutionalizing Justice in the European Union, 23 NORTHWESTERN J. INT'L L. & Bus. 65 (2002). 
176. See, e.g., Simon Green, Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany: The Impact 
of Unification and the Berlin Republic, 24 W. EUR. POL. 82, 99 (Oct. 200 I) ("Undoubtedly, the main 
new paradigm is the increasing importance of the EU in asylum and immigration policy."). In 
substantive terms, immigration law and policy in the EU covers a wide range of issues, including 
labor migration, family reunification, political asylum, social integration, and the fight against illegal 
immigration (including human trafficking). See generally Terry Givens & Adam Luedtke, The 
Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization, 32 
POL'y STUD. J. 145 (2004); Matthias Knauff, Europiiische Einwanderungspolitik: Grundlagen und 
aktuelle Entwicklungen [European Immigration Policy; Foundations and Current Developments], 1 
ZEuS 11 (2004); Adam Luedtke, One Market, 25 States, 20 Million Outsiders?: European Union 
Immigration Policy (February 2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); Jiirg Monar, 
Justice and Home Affairs, 43 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 131 (2005); Steve Peers, Key Legislative 
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this field partly reflects the fact that it tends to be "the EU as a whole, rather 
than individual countries, [that] is emerging as an immigration destination."I77 
Yet despite enormous changes in this recently-and increasingly-
Europeanized field, it remains one in which Member States continue to play an 
active role, as illustrated below by the recent German immigration reform. 
The EU Member States committed themselves to "develop close 
cooperation on justice and home affairs" in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty of 
European Union ("TEU,,).178 At the same time, they supplemented the 
Community's institutional architecture by erecting a common justice and home 
affairs policy ("1HA") as the intergovernmental Third Pillar of the newly 
established European Union. 179 Most of the provisions formally incorporated 
into the EU's treaty structure in 1992 codified practices that had already 
emerged, particularly in the areas of asylum, immigration and police 
cooperation. The original treaties establishing the European Communities did 
not address any of the JHA matters that were formally brought within the scope 
of European integration by the TEU. However, both of these recent policy 
endeavors-the JHA and the AFSJ-are rooted in the free movement of 
persons, which is one of the freedoms 180 at the core of the European integration 
project. 181 
Developments on Migration in the European Union, 7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 87 (2005). 
177. Green, supra note 176, at 99. "With the fall of the Iron Curtain ... migration to, 
through, and within Europe is the norm rather than the exception." Brinkmann, German Migrations, 
supra note 36, at 149. For a broader historical perspective on EU developments in the field of 
migration, see Claude Moraes MEP, The Politics of European Union Migration Policy (2003), at I, 
available at http://www.europeananalysis.org.uklresearchlmoraes2.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2005) 
(arguing that "a complex but steady process ofEU cooperation has taken place from the 1980's"). 
178. TEU, supra note 92, art. 2. 
179. Title VI (Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs), TEU, 
supra note 92, art. K-K.9; see generally Peter MUller-Graff, The Legal Bases of the Third Pillar and 
its Position in the Framework of the European Union Treaty, 3 I COMMON MKT. L. REv. 493 (1994). 
The Third Pillar crystallized into institutional structure those practices that had emerged for 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA). Elspeth Guild, The Constitutional 
Consequences of Lawmaking in the Third Pillar of the European Union, in LAWMAKING IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 65, 65 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998). The nine "areas of common 
interest" identified by the TEU include: asylum policy; rules governing the crossing by persons of 
the external borders of the Member States; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of 
third countries; conditions of residence by national of third countries (including family reunion and 
access to employment); combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by nationals of 
third countries; and police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, 
unlawful drug-trafficking, and other serious forms of international crime. TEU art. K.I (before 
modification by the Treaty of Amsterdam). 
180. EC Treaty, supra note 95, tit. III, art. 39-42 (ex 48-51). In the preamble to the pre-
Amsterdam version of the TEU, supra note 92, the Member States "[reaffirmed] their objective to 
facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, but 
including provisions on justice and home affairs in this Treaty." Jd. at pmbl. 
181. Freedom of movement of the individual is increasingly linked to the notion of "free 
movement of his or her fundamental rights." Elspeth Guild, Editorial, 10 EUR. L.J. 147, 149 (2004). 
In tum, this "security of rights for the individual"-irrespective of whether he or she is a citizen of 
the Union or of some third country-"is the essence of' the AFSJ. /d. See generally Norbert Reich, 
The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union, II EUR. LJ. 
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The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam substantially altered the preliminary JHA 
framework that had been established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.182 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on May 1, 1999, the TEU 
obliges the Member States "to maintain and develop the Union as an area of 
freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured 
in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border 
controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.,,183 
Also effective that date, a new Title IlIa on "Visas, Asylum, Immigration and 
other Policies related to Free Movement of Persons" was added to the EC 
Treaty. 184 This change in the EC Treaty demonstrates one of the key 
innovations introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was to 
'communitarize' some JHA issues by moving them from the intergovernmental 
Third Pillar to the supranational First Pillar. 185 Indeed, since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam entered into force, the only issues remammg in the 
intergovernmental Third Pillar are police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. 186 
The communitarization of migration law, while dramatic, did not effect a 
wholesale transfer of law and policy in this field to the EU. It did, however, 
substantially expand EU involvement in these volatile arenas. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam laid down a five-year timetable for adopting certain measures aimed 
at building the AFSJ. 187 The Member State ministers of justice and home 
(interior) affairs met for the first time as an EU body in Tampere in October 
675 (2005). 
182. The Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 95, amended both the EC Treaty, supra note 95, 
and the TEU, supra note 92. The Member States resolve "to facilitate the free movement of persons, 
while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, by establishing an area of freedom, security 
and justice in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." TEU pmbl. (emphasis added). In the 
consolidated version of the TEU, JHA provisions are found in art. 29-42. 
183. TEU, supra note 92, art. 2. 
184. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 61-69 (as amended by the Treaty of Nice, supra note 95). 
185. See generally Kay Hailbronner, European Immigration and Asylum under the 
Amsterdam Treaty, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1047 (1998); Pieter Jan Kuijper, The Evolution of the 
Third Pillar from Maastricht to the European Constitution: Institutional Aspects, 41 COMMON MKT. 
L. REv. 609 (2004). "In the sphere of the third pillar, the Member States are the actors; the 
institutional framework created by the Maastricht Treaty enables them to use Community institutions 
to facilitate their cooperation. The main actor in the sphere of the first pillar is the Community, 
acting on the basis of legislative powers conferred upon it by the Treaties." Hailbronner, supra at 
\047. A further consequence of communitarization is that "[i]mmigration and asylum decisions by 
the Community. . . will not only be binding for the EU Member States, but also be capable of 
having direct effect within the national legal orders, provided that they meet the general 
requirements ... developed by" the ECJ. Id. at 1048. 
186. TEU, supra note 92, tit. VI, art. 29-42, as amended by the Treaty of Nice, supra note 
95. The main innovation at Nice was the introduction of Eurojust. Kuijper, supra note 185, at 609. 
187. This timetable applied to many, but not all obligations created in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, supra note 95. For present purposes, the only immigration measure required to be 
adopted during the five-year period was the adoption of measures on "illegal immigration and illegal 
residence, including repatriation of illegal residents" set forth in Article 63(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, 
supra note 95. 
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1999, where they adopted an ambitious five-year planl88 aimed at progressive 
adoption of the measures called for by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The target 
date for completing these "Tamp ere Milestones"-May I, 2004--is the same 
date on which the EU was enlarged from fifteen to twenty-five members. 189 In 
its final reportl90 at the end of this live-year term, the Commission poignantly 
noted that the "original ambition" regarding the AFSJ had been "limited by 
institutional constraints" as well as by the "lack of sufficient political 
consensus." 191 
Legal immigration is one of the main fields in which there was a marked 
gap between ambition and achievement dUrinf the first five-year program marked out by the 1999 Tampere Milestones,19 although a concerted push in 
2003 and 2004 narrowed that gap considerably.193 Yet despite the tone of 
disappointment audible in the Commission's late scoreboards and in the AFSJ 
Report,194 the EU has taken numerous steps towards harmonization in the field 
188. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing the Tampere Milestones). This 
program resulted in a virtual explosion of legislative activity, which was chronicled in the 
Commission's bi-annual 'scoreboard' reports. Each scoreboard appeared in the form of a 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament bearing the title 
Biannual Update of the Scoreboard to Review Progress on the Creation of an Area of "Freedom. 
Security and Justice" in the European Union. The scoreboards can be found in the following 
documents: COM (2000) 167 final; COM (2000) 782 final; COM (2001) 278 final; COM (2001) 628 
final; COM (2002) 261 final; COM (2002) 738 final; COM (2003) 291 fmal; COM (2003) 812 final. 
189. PETER J. VAN KRIEKEN, THE CONSOLIDATED ASYLUM AND MIGRATION ACQUIS: THE 
EU DIRECTIVES IN AN EXPANDED EUROPE vii (2004); Joanne van Selm & Eleni Tsolakis, The 
Enlargement of an "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice"; Managing Migration in a European 
Union of 25 Members, I MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE POLICY BRIEF 4 (May 2004), available at 
http://www.migrationpolilcy.orglpubl/eu_enlargement.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2005). 
190. In lieu of a final scoreboard report at the end of the five-year term, the Commission 
instead prepared the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Area of Freedom. Security and Justice; Assessment of the Tampere Programme and 
Future Orientations, SEC (2004) 680 & SEC (2004) 693, COM (2004) 401 final (June 2, 2004) 
[hereinafter AFSJ REpORT]. 
191. Jd. at 5. In its report, the Commission anticipated further progress towards building the 
AFSJ in the wake of further liberalization of decision-making procedures. In this regard, it noted that 
some new procedures "automatically entered into force on I February 2003 and on I May 2004," 
and in addition that Article 67(2) of the EC Treaty, supra note 95, calls upon the Council "to take a 
decision with a view to providing for all or parts of the areas covered by Title IV to be governed by 
the co-decision procedure." Jd. Declaration 5 concerning Article 67 of the EC Treaty, which was 
annexed to the Treaty of Nice, supra note 95, contains a "precise political commitment to change 
over to the co-decision procedure immediately after I May 2004 for measures ... concerning the 
free movement of third-country nationals for a maximum three-month period and illegal immigration 
and residence, including repatriation." Jd. at n.6. See Council Decision 2004/927, 2004 O.J. (L 396) 
45 (providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty to be governed by 
the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty); see also Peers, supra note 176, at 87-89. 
192. See. e.g., Scoreboard for the First Half of 2003, COM (2003) 291 final, at 4 ("[T]he 
degree of harmonisation is at risk of being reduced to the lowest common denominator at the 
expense of value added by common action at European level [in the field oflegal immigration]."). 
193. VAN KRIEKEN, supra note 189, at vii, notes that "[the] Commission and Council more 
or less met the deadline." 
194. AFSJ REpORT, supra note 190, at 5. The most significant measures adopted to date 
have been in the fields of expulsion, social security, family reunification, the status of long-term 
residents who are not EU citizens, entry and residence for the purpose of studies, vocational training 
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of immigration law since 1999. 
While Member States and EU institutions have renewed their commitment 
to pursue further harmonization in the field of immigration law and policy, as 
urged by the Commission's AFSJ Report,195 the field is characterized by a 
delicate balance between Member State and EU competence. This tension is 
already visible in the Commission's report. On the one hand, the AFSJ Report 
urges the need for a "realistic approach taking account of economic and 
demographic needs, to facilitate the legal admission of immigrants to the Union, 
in accordance with a coherent policy respecting the principle of fair treatment of 
third-country nationals.,,196 On the other hand, however, the Commission 
explicitly acknowledges that the EU's ability to regulate this field remains 
constrained by the "right of Member States to set the actual numbers of third-
country nationals admitted to work in an employed or self-employed 
capacity.,,197 
The second five-year plan aimed at achieving the AFSJ was adopted by the 
Brussels European Council in November 2004. 198 This so-called Hague 
or voluntary service, and illegal migration. Despite this impressive list, the Commission's 
disappointment does not appear to be out of place. As van Selm has noted, 
the policy documents on which the EU has managed to agree since 1992, when the EU first 
decided to cooperate on migration and asylum issues, have generally taken a minimalist 
approach. This has mean that few, if any, changes have been necessary in individual 
Member States to put new community laws into effect. Also, it often means a new EU law 
can allow some states to become more restrictive-although the EU law is intended only to 
set the minimum level of asylum or immigration practice permitted. 
Joanne van Selm, The Hague Program Reflects New European Realities, MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (Jan. I, 2005), at I, available at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org(lastvisited Nov. 19,2005). 
195. The AFSJ REpORT, supra note 190, at 16, calls for the elaboration of a "second 
European programme for the area of freedom, security and justice, with detailed priorities and a 
precise timetable" following the Tampere method. 
196. AFSJ REpORT, supra note 190, at 9. The EU's economic and demographic needs, 
which were already articulated in the 1999 Tampere Milestones, pertain largely to labor shortages 
and to the "growing, if controversial, view that the EU as a whole will need more immigration as its 
population ages." Moraes, supra note 177, at 8-9; see Tampere Milestones, supra note I 06, ~ lIL20. 
197. AFSJ REpORT, supra note 190, at 9. However, it asserts at the same time the need for 
"an overall framework including the respect of Community preference" as well as the "interests of 
countries of origin." Id. at 9-10. See generally Luedtke, supra note 176, noting that Germany was 
responsible for inserting the limitation to this effect in the EU Constitution. 
198. Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council (Nov. 4-5, 2004), 
1429211104 REV I, ~ 15 (stating that the goal is to "enable the Union to build on [previous] 
achievements and effectively meet the new challenges it will face"). The Hague Programme 
Strengthening Freedom. Security and Justice in the European Union [hereinafter Hague Program] is 
attached to the Conclusions of the Presidency from that Brussels European Council (14292/1/04 
REV I) as Annex L The new Hague Program-which was initially referred to as "Tampere 1I"-
covers "all aspects of policies relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, including their 
external dimension, notably fundamental rights and citizenship, asylum and migration, border 
management, integration, the fight against terrorism and organised crime, justice and police 
cooperation, and civil law." Id. ~ 16. A European Strategy on Drugs 2005-2012 was added in 
December 2004. Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council (Dec. 16-17,2004), 
16238/1104 REV I, CONCL 4 (Feb. I, 2005), ~ 37. See generally Luedtke, supra note 176; van 
Selm, supra note 194, at I (noting that the Hague Program is "more of a 'wish list'" than a "detailed 
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Program introduces a new conceptual scheme organized around the "specific 
orientations" of freedom, security and justice, in lieu of the former organization 
along functional lines. 199 Within this new framework, asylum, migration and 
border policy are ironically conceived of as ~olicy measures that contribute 
toward "strengthening freedom" within the EU. 00 Among other objectives, the 
Hague Program aims to "improve the common capability of the Union and its 
Member States to ... regulate migration flows.,,201 
The Hague Program specifically addresses four aspects of migration. First, 
the European Council stressed the importance of legal migration and 
employment for "enhancing the knowledge-based economy in Europe" and for 
"advancing economic development. ,,202 In this context, the European Council 
called upon the Commission to formulate a plan for the regulation of legal 
migration, while simultaneously acknowledging that Member States remain 
competent to determine the number of labor migrants to be admitted to their 
territories.203 The Commission quickly obliged by adopting a Green Paper on 
economic migration in January 2005,204 which document aims to stimulate a 
policy document"). 
199. Hague Program, supra note 198, Heading III, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX J, at 16. The 
Commission's scoreboards subdivided the heading "A Common EU Asylum and Migration Policy" 
as follows: partnership with countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment 
of third country nationals, and management of migration flows. See, e.g, Scoreboard for the First 
Half of 2003, COM (2003) 291 final, at 18-37. Separate headings existed inter alia for the Union-
wide fight against crime, id. at 55-85, policies on internal and external borders (including visas and 
Schengen), id. at 86-94, citizenship, id. at 95-96, and cooperation against drugs, id. at 97-100. The 
scheme used in the Commission Scoreboards is based on that found in the 1999 Tampere 
Milestones, supra note 106. See generally van Selm, supra note 194, at 2 (noting the "subtle, but 
important ways in which [the Hague Program] diverges from the four themes included in the 
previous Tampere program"). 
200. Hague Program, supra note 198, ~ \.2, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, at 16. In this 
regard, the European Council urges the "Council, Member States and the Commission to pursue 
coordinated, strong and effective working relations between those responsible for migration and 
asylum policies and those responsible for other policy fields relevant to these areas." /d. at 17. 
Moreover, it emphasizes the need for a "common analysis of migratory phenomena in all their 
aspects" and stresses the importance of collecting, providing, exchanging and efficiently using "up-
to-date information and data on all relevant migratory developments." /d. Two of the issues relevant 
to strengthening freedom are not discussed here, since they nominally fall outside the narrow scope 
of migration matters that I wish to consider. In particular, I do not examine the provisions of the 
Hague Program dealing with citizenship of the Union, id. ~ 1.1, at 16, or the Common European 
Asylum System, id. ~1.3, at 17-18. 
201. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ I, at 12. 
202. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX J, ~ 1.4, at 19. These 
goals were linked to "implementation of the Lisbon strategy," id., which program Commission 
President Barroso abandoned in February 2005. 
203. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.4, at 19. In 
particular, such a plan should include "admission procedures capable of responding promptly to 
fluctuating demands for migrant labour in the labour market." ld. 
204. Green Paper: On an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, COM (2004) 
81 I final (Jan. I 1,2005) [hereinafter Migration Green Paper]. The promptness of the Commission's 
response reflects its hitherto frustrated efforts to move the economic migration agenda forward. A 
directive proposed by the Commission in 2002 pursuant to the Tampere Milestones foundered for 
lack of political support and never became law. See Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
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public debate among Member States, EU institutions, and "civil society, In 
particular the social partners" on this controversial topic.205 
The second major aspect of migration addressed by the Hague Program is 
the integration of third-country nationals. In this context, the Hague Program 
largely reiterates and extends the objectives articulated in the 1999 Tampere 
Milestones, which called for a "common approach ... to ensure the integration 
into our societies of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in 
the Union.,,206 Despite Tampere's call for a common approach, there is to date 
no harmonized definition of integration, and Member State policies and 
practices differ. After studying the issue, the Commission proposed a 
"holistic,,207 understanding of integration, which it conceptualizes "as a two-
way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally 
resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full 
participation of the immigrant.,,208 The European Council has endorsed this 
"comprehensive,,209 and "incremental,,210 approach to integration, and thereby 
Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purpose of Paid Employment 
and Self-Employed Economic Activities, COM(2001) 386 final (July II, 2001); see also 
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT, supra note 
109; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, First Annual Report on 
Migration and Integration, COM (2004) 508 final (July 16,2004). 
205. Migration Green Paper, supra note 204. 
206. Tampere Milestones, supra note \06, ~ 4. In particular, under the heading "fair 
treatment of third country nationals," the Tampere Milestones called for a "more vigorous 
integration policy" which aimed at granting third country nationals "rights and obligations 
comparable to those of EU citizens." Id. ~ HU8 (emphasis added). The Tampere European Council 
simultaneously called for enhancing "non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life" and 
for developing "measures against racism and xenophobia." Id. 
207. COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT, 
supra note \09, ~ 3.2, at 18 ("[AJ holistic approach takes into account not only the economic and 
social aspects of integration but also issues related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, 
participation and political rights."). In particular, a holistic approach "calls for comprehensive 
integration policies" in regard to integration into the labor market, education and language skills, 
housing and other urban issues, health and social services, the social and cultural environment, and 
nationality, civic citizenship and respect for diversity. Id. ~ 3.3,3.3.1-3.3.6, at 19. 
208. COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT, 
supra note I 09, ~ 3.1, at 17. In the Commission's view, such a holistic approach 
implies on the one hand that it is the responsibility of the host society to ensure that the 
formal rights of immigrants are in place in such a way that the individual has the possibility 
of participating in economic, social, cultural and civil life and on the other, that immigrants 
respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate actively in the 
integration process, without having to relinquish their own identity. 
Id. ~ 3.1, at 17-18. This Communication draws upon earlier Commission Communications. See 
COM (2000) 757 final and COM (2001) 387 final. 
209. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.5, at 19 (noting the 
link between successful integration and social "[s]tability and cohesion" and expressing the need to 
"prevent the isolation of certain groups"). Moreover, a comprehensive approach is one that involves 
"stakeholders at the local, regional, national, and EU level." Id. 
210. An incremental approach is based on the idea that rights and obligations develop and 
come into balance over time. COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT, supra note 109, ~ 3.1, at 18. "[T]hus, the longer a third country national resides 
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taken a large step in the direction mapped out by the Commission. The Hague 
Program goes beyond Tampere's insistence upon "fair treatment of legally 
resident third-country nationals in the EU," insofar as it calls for "the creation of 
equal opportunities to participate fully in society.,,211 To this end, and in view 
of the "need for greater coordination of national integration policies and EU 
initiatives in this field," the Hague Program expressly calls for establishing a 
"coherent European framework on integration.,,212 This call was quickly 
answered by the JHA Council, which adopted "Common Basic Principles for 
Immi~rant Integration Policy in the European Union" on November 19, 
2004. 13 These principles expressly preserve the Member States' leading role in 
regard to integration, which "must engage the local, regional, and national 
institutions, with which immigrants interact, in both the public and private 
realms.,,214 In addition, the principles recognize that inte~ation policies "will 
differ significantly from Member State to Member State." 15 This framework 
was readily visible in the two prior EU immigration directives, which deferred 
to Member States to determine what kind of integration requirements, if any, 
could be imposed on third country nationals.216 
Third, the Hague Program articulates the need to address in a more 
systematic way the external dimension of migration, which it views as essential, 
given the inherently international nature of this field.217 
legally in a Member State, the more rights and obligations such a person should acquire." Id. 
211. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.5, at 19. It bears 
mention in this context that the Hague Program insists that "[i]ntegration ... includes, but goes 
beyond, anti-discrimination policy." Id. at 20. 
212. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.5, at 20 (laying 
down minimum "common basic principles" intended to "form the foundation for future initiatives in 
the EU, relying on clear goals and means of evaluation"). 
213. Conclusions of the 2618th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs (Brussels, Nov. 
19,2004), reported in Press Release C/04/321, 14615/04 (Presse 321) (Nov. 19, 2004), at 11-13, 
plus Annex, id. at 13-18 (containing explanations that "are intended to give direction to the common 
basic principle") [hereinafter Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration]. This meeting of 
the JHA Council is occasionally referred to as the "Ministerial Conference on Integration." See, e.g., 
Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council (Dec. 16-17,2004), 16238/1/04 REV I, 
CONCL 4 (Feb. I, 2005), ~ 38 (welcoming the "establishment of common basic principles for 
immigrant integration policy of the Member States"). 
214. Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration, supra note 213, pmbl., ~ 3 ("The 
development and implementation of integration policy is therefore the primary responsibility of 
individual Member States rather than of the Union as a whole."). 
215. Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration, supra note 213, pmbl., ~ 6 ("They 
must be geared to the individual needs of the receiving society, reflecting each individual Member 
State's history and legal framework. They may also target diverse audiences, the mix of which varies 
between the Member States."). 
216. See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/86IEC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, 2003 OJ. (L 251) 12, art. 7(2); Council Directive 2003/10/EC of 25 November 2003 
concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, 2004 O.J. (L 16) 44, 
art. 5(2). Both of these directives provide that Member States "may" require third country nationals 
to comply with integration conditions laid down by national law. 
217. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~~ 1.6 & 1.6.1, at 20. In 
particular, the Hague Program calls for forming partnerships with third countries, id. ~ \.6.1, at 20-
21, and for development of a return and re-admission policy, id. ~ 1.6.4, at 22-23. 
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Fourth and last, the Hague Program addresses a range of issues pertaining 
to technical aspects of managing migration flows,2l8 which are particularly 
relevant to the fight against illegal immigration, cross-border crime and 
terrorism. In this context, the EU's primary objective is to "fully abolish 
internal borders while providing the maximum security and orderly passage at 
external borders.,,2l9 
Overall, the ambitious Hague Program still falls short of a "truly common 
European policy on immigration (and asylum).,,220 It preserves the current 
arrangement under which Member States first must agree on new measures 
within the Council, then subsequently implement the agreed measures into their 
domestic legal systems. This arrangement has resulted in relatively "low and 
slow" harmonization22I thus far in the highly contested migration arena.222 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, subject to the later developments noted above, 
provides the relevant framework within which Member States can act, at least 
until such time as an EU Constitution or further treaty revisions enter into force. 
Three criteria constrain Member State sovereignty in this field. First, in terms of 
scope, EU institutions may adopt migration policy measures within three areas: 
conditions of entry and residence (including standards on procedures for the 
issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits);223 illegal 
immigration and illegal residence;224 and measures defining the rights and 
conditions under which nationals of third countries who are legally resident in a 
Member State may reside in other Member States.225 Second, the principle of 
subsidiarity is relevant in the migration field. 226 The Treaty of Amsterdam 
218. Hague Program, supra note 198, 1429211104 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.7, at 23-27. 
219. Van Selm, supra note 194, at 4. 
220. Van Selm, supra note 194, at 5. 
221. Under the Hague Program, "Member States can be expected to continue to seek 
legislation that is similar to their existing national laws," which are "perceived as much weaker than 
ones based on a 'clean sheet' developed at the EU level." Van Selm, supra note 194, at 5. Moreover, 
not even the move to qualified majority voting in this field is likely to "speed up this slow-moving 
process." Id. The decision to leave control over legal immigration and immigrant integration in 
Member States hands suggests that "the political will to truly have a European immigration policy is 
still lacking, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary." !d. at 5. 
222. On the one hand, Member States face domestic political pressure to 'do something' 
about immigration. Seen from this perspective, Member State governments might well be reluctant 
to relinquish what control they still possess. Luedtke, supra note 176, at 4 (arguing that "one might 
not expect to see national governments willingly giving up what control they do have" over 
immigration, given the fact that they are often accused-and indeed, may be politically vulnerable-
for "losing control" over immigration). On the other hand, this propensity is counterbalanced by fact 
that some Member States perceive transferring such issues to the supranational level as offering a 
measure of relief from domestic left-right contention. See Brinkmann, supra note 165, at 199 
(suggesting that some countries perceive Community legislation on immigration as a way to short-
cut domestic political contestation). 
223. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 63(3)(a) (including those for the purpose of family 
reunion). 
224. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 63(3)(b) (including repatriation of illegal residents). 
225. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 63(4). 
226. Hailbronner, supra note 185, at 1051. 
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specifies that Member States remain competent to act in regard to these issues, 
and thus that EU competence is shared rather than exclusive in regard to these 
issues.227 Germany, which is particularly protective of its prerogatives in this 
field, submitted a letter to the President of the Council setting forth its 
interpretation of Article 63.228 And finally, Member State sovereignty is 
expressly preserved ''with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security.,,229 
3. CONCLUSION 
Even without its own Constitution and in the face of severely 
circumscribed powers regarding citizenship and migration, EU regional 
governance of these traditional state concerns has taken enormous strides in 
recent years. Yet despite increasing activity at the EU level regarding both 
issues, crucial questions of belonging remain in Member State hands. In regard 
to citizenship, the crucial question of inclusion or exclusion is largely tied up 
with the issue of nationality, which thus far remains a Member State prerogative. 
In connection with migration, the EU has taken minimal steps towards a 
common approach to the question of integration, but defers to the Member 
States to do what they deem necessary to make diversity work. Belonging thus 
remains largely a local issue, except where Member States tread upon rights 
defined by public international or EU law. 
III. 
REFORMING GERMAN LAW AND PRACTICE 
Two major legal enactments have transformed the German landscape in 
recent years: first, the overhaul of the Citizenship Act (Staatsangehorigkeits-
gesetz),230 which entered into force on January I, 2000, and second, the 
227. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 63. National provisions must, however, be "compatible 
with [the EC Treaty] and with international agreements," id., because Member States "did not intend 
to give up any national control on immigration." Hailbronner, supra note 185, at 1050. 
228. Hailbronner, supra note 185, at 1051-52. 
229. Hailbronner, supra note 185 at 1052, rightly observes that this provision is ambiguous. 
Although immigration law "is traditionally considered as being part of the national public order," it 
does not follow that Article 64 means "that Member States keep a primary responsibility" in regard 
to these issues. Id. Rather, he suggests that Article 64 must be interpreted as referring "to the 
exercise of police power rather than to the formulation of an immigration policy and the legal 
conditions under which ... third-country nationals will be permitted to enter Union territory." !d. at 
1053. 
230. The current Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (StAG) [hereinafter Citizenship Act] is an 
amended and consolidated text based on the Reichs- und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (RuStAG). 
RGBI. I 583 (July 22, 1913) [hereinafter 1913 Citizenship Act], as amended, inter alia by the 
StaatsangehorigkeitsreJormgesetz, BGBI I 1618 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Citizenship Reform 
Act). Among other changes, the Citizenship Reform Act, which entered into effect on January I, 
2000, retitled the 1913 Citizenship Act by dropping the Imperial reference from its title. Subsequent 
references to the "Citizenship Act" refer to its current consolidated version, including amendments 
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omnibus Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz),231 which entered into force 
on January 1, 2005. The Citizenship Act represents an exercise of legislative 
sovereignty to determine which individuals .... elong to the German state. In this 
context, Germany's regulatory power is barely constrained by public 
international or EU law. In contrast, the Immigration Act is of a more hybrid 
nature, since its broad scope encompasses some issues that fall within the 
exclusive German domain, along with others regarding which Germany shares 
competence with the institutions of the EU. The Immigration Act thus includes 
a number of measures that are affected by, and in some cases already regulated 
by EU law. Indeed, some provisions of the new Immigration Act implement EU 
rules that are binding on Germany. Regardless of their implications for German 
legal sovereignty, both new Acts render Germany a more inclusive state, at least 
on the books. 
A. NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP 
After reunification, Germany extensively revised its 1913 Citizenship 
Act.232 The new Citizenship Ac~33 has important implications, both in light of 
Germany's own past and with regard to the future prospects for postnational 
citizenship. The new Citizenship Act not only illustrates the government's "new 
pragmatism" in the face of demographic changes and labor-market imperatives, 
but also points towards a possible "transformation" of nationhood in 
made subsequent to the date of the Citizenship Reform Act. There is considerable disagreement over 
the proper translation of Staatsangehorigkeit. I use the term 'citizenship' in this article, despite the 
fact that I consider 'nationality' to be the more accurate translation of this German term. 
Staatsangehorigkeit literally invokes the notion of belonging to the State, and may be contrasted 
with Staatsbiirgerschaji, which term was explicitly coined by German authors such as Wieland and 
Kant to render the French term citoyen. PreuB, supra note 13, at 22-23. I consider 
Staatsburgerschaji to be the better counterpart to the English term 'citizenship'. Indeed, Austria uses 
the term Staatsbiirgerschaji in its law regulating nationality/citizenship, in lieu of 
Staatsangehorigkeit. However, usage by scholars is inconsistent. Compare Ludvig, supra note 61 
and PreuB, supra note 13, with Minkenberg, supra note 34. I opt to use the term 'citizenship' here, 
in part because it is the term that the German government itself uses in English translations, but also 
because it is more consistent with the aim of the recent legal reform, which is to drive a wedge 
between citizenship and nationhood. See generally Joppke, supra note 2, at 54. 
231. Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des 
Aufenthaltes und der Integration von Unionsburgem und Ausliindem ("Zuwanderungsgesetz ") 
[Law to Manage and Limit Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of Union 
Citizens and Foreigners), BGBI I 1950 (July 30, 2004) [hereinafter Immigration Act). Most 
provisions of the new Immigration Act entered into effect on January 1,2005. 
232. Citizenship Reform Act, supra note 230. For historical analy~es of the development of 
German citizenship law prior to the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, see GOSEWINKEL, 
supra note 13; NATHANS, supra note 34. 
233. Citizenship Act, supra note 230. For a detailed analysis of key provisions, see Holger 
Hoffmann, The Reform of the Law on Citizenship in Germany: Political Aims, Legal Concepts and 
Provisional Results, 6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 195 (2004). For an analysis of the political debates 
behind the new Citizenship Act, supra note 230, see Green, supra note 176; Randall Hansen & Jobst 
Koehler, Issue definition, political discourse and the politics of nationality reform in France and 
Germany,44 EUR. J. POL. RESEARCH 623 (2005); Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220-25. 
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Germany.234 While too early to predict such dramatic consequences with any 
degree of confidence, it is already apparent that the new law is having a major 
impact on the persons affected, for good or ill. 
Germany is typically viewed as exemplifying the primordialist or organicist 
view that belonging presupposes ethno-cultural homogeneity.235 The new 
Citizenship Act has taken a first step away from "a model of ethno-cultural 
exclusion towards a model of multicultural inclusion.,,236 To be sure, the 
Citizenship Act is just the first of what are likely to be many steps in the years 
ahead, but it is an important one nonetheless.237 Brief conceptual and historical 
frames are provided to contextualize the ensuing discussion of the key changes 
and implications of Germany's new Citizenship Act. 
In conceptual terms, one must begin by qualifying the common 
characterization of Germany as a practitioner of ethno-cultural exclusion. It is 
more accurate to recognize that Germany, like many other countries, recognizes 
a distinction between the particularistic notion of nationality and the more 
universalistic notion of citizenship. These notions emerged separately in 
German history, but later became entangled, and even fused, during the Nazi era 
and thereafter.238 However, post-war developments in general, and the new 
Citizenship Act in particular, show an incremental but nonetheless salutary 
tendency to decouple these two notions again. The developments surveyed 
below provide thus provide modest support for the hopeful claim that "the 
tradition of nationhood is not condemned to remain constant.,,239 
In historical terms, the ethnification of German nationhood and citizenship 
234. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 2. That author considers Gennany's 
"developing republican self-conception," but also discusses at length some of the problems that have 
arisen in that regard. /d. at 15-16, 27. See also Andrea Klimt, The Myth of Heimkehrillusion, 20 
GERMAN POL. & SOC'y 115 (2002) (discussing the myth that foreign guest workers were temporary 
residents in Gennany). 
235. See, e.g., BRUBAKER, supra note 13; KASTORYANO, supra note 42, at 121 
("Gennany . .. is considered 'exclusivist' because of the significance accorded to criteria of 
membership based on ancestry .... [T]he German nation is defined as a cultural and ethnic unity 
based on common descent as a sign of belonging."). In contrast, some contemporary historians argue 
that "ethnicity was. . . not the only factor that detennined whether a foreigner might become a 
Gennan citizen. Decisions ... often reflected considerations of interest and utility that were distinct 
from the pursuit of ethnic homogeneity." NATHANS, supra note 34, at I. In his path-breaking 
analysis of Gennan citizenship between 1815 and 1949, Gosewinkel emphasizes the importance of 
religious confession, military service, and gender for explaining Gennan citizenship policy prior to 
the Nazi takeover. GOSEWINKEL, supra note 13. See also NATHANS, supra note 34, at 1-2 (arguing 
that economic utility, military recruitment, and relations with neighboring states were important 
explanatory factors). 
236. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 3. 
237. RENNER, supra note 39, provides a detailed analysis of the current state of the 
Citizenship Act, supra note 230, including amendments since that law entered into effect on January 
1,2000. 
238. The "extreme nature of [Gennan] ethnic preferences ... does not apply only to the Nazi 
period." NATHANS, supra note 34, at I. Rather, "[f]rom the 1880s to the 1980s Gennan 
naturalization policies assumed ethnically exclusive fonns that can best be described as anxious and 
even obsessive." [d. 
239. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 5. 
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resulted from a long process characterized by complexity and contingency. The 
concept of German nationhood that emerged in the context of the old Empire, 
and later became enmeshed with the formation of a German nation-state in 
1871, was a cultural one.240 Nationalist forces24I seeking an ethnically 
homogeneous German nation-state in the nineteenth century mobilized this 
cultural and linguistic242 notion of nationhood for their own purposes. Those 
nationalist forces were countered in the nineteenth century-and again after 
1949-by proponents of a universalistic notion of citizenship that reflected the 
yearning "to live under the representative government of a single polity" and 
aimed to realize "the ideals of the French Revolution.,,243 During the nineteenth 
century struggle against authoritarian rule, the "German liberation movement" 
regarded as "mutually reinforcing" the goals of national unification and 
constitutionalism.244 The ensuing "ethnification of German nationhood and 
240. This historical overview relies heavily on PreuB, supra note 13. The original concept of 
"German Nation" had a different meaning from the modern concept that links nation to statehood 
and peoplehood. Rather, in the context of the medieval Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, 
the original concept of nation "was embodied by the Imperial Estates" who ruled the old Empire. Id. 
at 24. Thus, unlike in France, England and Spain, where the idea of the nation became "associated 
with the monarchy and its emerging ius territaria/e," the German concept of nation was pre-
political, and was viewed as the alternative to a bounded nation-state. Id. at 24-25. 
The Germans lived in a plurality of territories and were ruled by a plurality of princes, while 
the single king who existed, the Emperor, had no immediate power over them. Moreover, 
none of the sovereign princes, including the hegemonic Prussian king, wished to establish a 
German nation-state. Thus, in eighteenth-century Germany the idea of a German nation 
emigrated into the sphere of culture. 
Id. at 25. 
241. PreuB, supra note 13, at 28. The nineteenth century proponents of particularism were 
"xenophobic and anti-Semitic" and "oscillated between ... ethno-cultural and ... biological racist" 
definitions of "'Germandom' (Deutschtum)." Id. The Nazis "realized the goals of the nationalist 
movement" by providing a "racist definition of Germanness" in the "Greater German Empire" 
(GrafJdeutsches Reich) in 1933.1d. 
242. PreuB, supra note 13, argues that the terms 'deutsch' and 'deutsches Va/k' were 
originally used to designate "a linguistic community" and were not limited to the "neutral 
designation of a particular collectivity in a delineated territory." !d. at 26. It was the latter 
"particularistic notion... which... anticipated important elements of the right-totalitarian 
movements of the twentieth century." !d. at 28. With regard to the notion of linguistic community, 
however, Franck argues that 
to the historically trained eye, this linguistic affinity is not a natural given. It has evolved 
through a synthesis of persons whose tribal origins and language may have been Visigoth, 
Prussian, Rhenish, Alsatian, Westphalian, Hannoverian, Saxon, Bohemian, Frisian, Sorb, 
Bavarian, Tyrolean, Celt, Slavic or Danish. These languages, to the extent they have 
survived, even today show differences from one another. German, like almost every other 
living language, is to a degree synthetic. Germany, moreover, is only in a mythic sense the 
manifestation of an eternal genetic or cultural unity. 
Franck, supra note 12, at 366. 
243. PreuB, supra note 13, at 27-28. 
244. PreuB, supra note 13, at 27 ("[T]hey were convinced that Germans could achieve 
political freedom in a constitutional state only through being united in one single nation-state. As we 
know, this belief proved to be over-optimistic."). In other words, Germany tried to achieve in one 
step what France had achieved in "two consecutive and protracted steps, and with great difficulties, 
suffering and violent struggles." Id. 
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consequently of German citizenship" resulted not from some innate 
characteristic of the German people, but rather from the concrete political 
circumstances surrounding state-formation in 1871.245 Indeed, one leading 
scholar finds the "definition of nationhood in ethnic terms" and ensuing 
"distortion of the concept of nation... surprising," since "geographical, 
religious and socio-economic fragmentation" were "constant in German 
society ... ever since the Middle Ages.,,246 In the alternative, it may have been 
precisely this experience of fragmentation that produced a "longing for social 
homogenization.,,247 
Whatever constellation of factors generated the assumptions about 
membership that prevailed in the latter part of the nineteeth century, those 
assumptions were crystallized in the 1913 Citizenship Ac248 enacted during the 
Wilhelmine era. That law remained in effect through the Weimar Republic, the 
Nazi reign of terror, and the Cold War division of Germany, though it was 
amended numerous times. The 1913 Citizenship Act applied the principle of jus 
sanguinui49 --or the principle of descent-to determine who belonged to 
Germany.250 While some view this legal rule as proof of German racism, it 
245. PreuB, supra note 13, at 33, argues that the top-down nature of state formation was 
"probably ... the main cause" of ethnification. In particular, he argues that the "congenital defect of 
the Empire, namely its establishment from above ... without the participation of significant parts of 
the population" produced a "latent tendency towards aggressiveness, scapegoating and the need for 
identified enemies." !d. 
246. PreuB, supra note 13, at 34. This outcome is also surprising, because "Prussia was the 
hegemonic power in the Empire and had a record of having a universalist state ethos." !d. Compare 
NATHANS, supra note 34, at I ("It would not have been hard to predict in the mid-nineteenth century 
that if a German nation-state were founded it would attempt to promote a feeling of ethnic solidarity 
among its inhabitants," given that "German national feeling did stress the bonds created by a 
common ethnicity and culture."). 
247. PreuB, supra note 13, at 34 ("[T]he trauma of territorial, religious and political 
splintering created a more or less conscious longing for social homogenization among large 
segments of the German population. This desire entailed the suppression of the tradition of openness 
in German society and gave way to the high degree of authoritarian rule characteristic of both the 
Wilhelmine Empire and the ... Third Reich."). 
248. The 1913 Citizenship Act, supra note 230, was in tum, a revision of the 1870 
Citizenship Act (Gesetz iiber die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Bundes- und Staatsangehorigkeit), 
RGBI I 355, which had "by and large standardized the particularistic rules of the member states." 
PreuB, supra note 13, at 33. It may be a tel1ing parallel to contemporary European conditions that the 
German Empire founded in 1871 "rendered national membership of the Empire ... dependent on the 
possession of nationality in one of its member states." !d. at 32. Thus, prior to 1871, there was no 
such thing as German 'nationality' but rather only individual membership in one of the 40 German 
states, pursuant to each state's rules on Landesangehorigkeit, which was the conceptual predecessor 
of Staatsangehorigkeit. [d. at 31. One author has argued that unlike Imperial Germany, "there is no 
equivalent of an intimidating Prussian state that can dictate policy changes" in the EO. Tobias 
Brinkmann, Book Review, 22 GERMAN POL. & SOC'y 65, 68 (Winter 2004). 
249. Jus sanguinus implies that "every person born to non-citizen parents will remain a 
foreigner unless he or she naturalises." Ludvig, supra note 61, at 502. Seen in historical context, the 
emergence of jus sanguinus represented a progressive break with feudal traditions that treated the 
individual as "a mere appurtenance of the soil." PreuB, supra note 13, at 31. "The defeat of the 
estatist orders by the state required the emancipation of the individual from several obligations to 
feudal lords, and the establishment of a singly and exclusive duty to obey the unifYing ruler." !d. 
250. Nazi elements of the 1913 Citizenship Act, supra note 230, were eliminated after 
376 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:1 
bears mention that although the jus sanguinus principle "[can] be used as an 
instrument of ethnification," it does "not necessarily entail an ethnic definition 
of belonging.,,251 Indeed, even before the new Citizenship Act entered into 
effect in 2000, the principle of jus sanguinus meant that one "became a German 
citizen at birth simply by being born to a German parent, irrespective of the 
'ethnicity' of the citizen parent.,,252 Yet such arguments about the ethnic 
neutrality of jus sanguinus, while technically correct, beg the question of how 
one becomes a German parent in the first place. Moreover, where there is a 
large foreign population, as in Germany since the Second World War, the jus 
sanguinus principle "constantly reproduces 'new-born' foreigners" in practice, 
since it denies citizenship to children born on German soil to foreign parents.253 
Such a regime ultimately denies equality, in particular to second- and third-
generation foreigners who have no opportunity to naturalize in the country of 
their birth.254 Another "systemic weakness of pure jus sanguinus is that 
citizenship with some of its related rights can be transmitted over generations to 
persons residing abroad, without any substantial connections to the polity, 
whereas non-citizens remain non-citizens over generations, despite continuous 
residence and membersh~ in a society.,,255 
Group selectivit05 did (and does continue to) exist in Germany, but it 
cannot be attributed solely to the principle of jus sanguinus. Rather, to the 
extent Germany did practice group-based exclusion, it resulted not from "the 
citizenship attribution viajus sanguinus" per se, but rather to a large extent from 
"the administrative implementation of naturalization (which in the inter-war 
period had preferred German-origin applicants from Russia and excluded 
eastern Jews).,,257 Moreover, for those determined enough to apply, the process 
of naturalization was time-consuming, costly, and potentially bewildering. 
The new German Citizenship Act significantly alters the conditions for 
acquiring, as well as for losing German citizenship. It does not wholly abandon 
World War II. Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 20. For an analysis of the Nuremburg Laws of 1935, 
see GOSEWINKEL, supra note 13, at 383-93. 
251. Preufi, supra note 13, at 33. Joppke, supra note 2, at 52-53, similarly observes that jus 
sanguinus "does not as such imply group selectivity," and thus that the "stereotype that ethnic 
citizenship is 'racist' ... does not correspond to legal reality." 
252. Joppke & Morawska, supra note 3, at 53 ("German citizenship law had never been 
based on a legal definition of German ethnicity."). 
253. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 499. 
254. Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 166. 
255. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 504. The Citizenship Act, supra note 230, addresses this 
problem by providing a new rule that cuts off the operation of jus sanguinus under certain 
circumstances in regard to the children of German citizens who are born and also reside abroad. 
RENNER, supra note 39, para. 1.5, at 12 (Generationenschnitt). 
256. For the contrast between group and individual selectivity, see Joppke, supra note 2. 
257. Joppke, supra note 2, at 53 (citing GOSEWINKEL, supra note 13, ch. 7, at 328-68). 
Under the 1913 Citizenship Act, supra note 230, "there had always been the possibility to acquire 
German citizenship through naturalizing," though it was difficult to do so. [d. Still, this possibility 
implies that '''blood' in the principle of 'jus sanguinus' was formal and instrumental, not 
substantive." [d. 
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jus sanguinis in favor of the jus soli principle, which grants citizenship 
according to principle of territoriality.258 However, the Citizenship Act does 
mitigate the "ethnic underpinnings of the state,,259 by rendering German 
citizenship "less exclusive and more accessible to the outside,,260 in a number of 
important respects. First, at the symbolic level, the changes mark a clear 
departure from the government's long-standing position that Germany "is not a 
country of immigration.,,261 Second, and of greater practical import, Germany 
has joined most of its European neighbors by introducing the jus soli principle in 
certain cases.262 And third, the new Citizenship Act continues the trend started 
in the 1970s to simplify procedures, curb administrative discretion, and lower 
costs, in the hope of encouraging more foreigners to naturalize.263 
Under the jus soli provisions of the new Citizenship Act, a child born in 
Germany to non-German parents automatically becomes a German citizen, 
provided that the parents meet certain criteria, including legal residence in 
Germany for a period of eight years.264 Citizenship is also available as a matter 
of right to other persons through naturalization, if the applicant has lawfully 
resided in Germany during the eight years preceding the application and satisfies 
258. Under the jus soli principle, "anyone, whatever their ethnic, racial, or national origins, 
will be granted automatic citizenship at birth (or optionally at a later stage)." Joppke, supra note 2, at 
53. Some scholars argue that "territorial citizenship [that is,jus soli] has become the favoured form 
of citizenship in international law." Id. (citing Diane Orentlicher, Citizenship and National Identity, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT (David Wippmann ed., 1998)). 
259. Dieckhoff, supra note 14, at 14 n.28. 
260. Joppke, supra note 2, at 53. 
261. "[S]ince 1977 successive German governments have proclaimed that, contrary to the 
facts, Germany was not an immigration country." Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220. This oft-
quoted statement comes from a 1977 report prepared by a joint commission of the federal and state 
governments. "The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration. West Germany is 
a country in which foreigners reside for varying lengths of time before they decide on their own 
accord to return to their home country." Vorschliige der Bund-Liinder-Kommission zur 
Fortentwicklung einer umfassended Konzeption der Ausliinderbeschiiftigungspolitik (Feb. 1977), 
quoted in JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 287 (citing PETER KATZENSTEIN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN WEST 
GERMANY 239 (1987)). 
262. This change "marks Germany's long-overdue 'catching up' with its Western European 
neighbours, that is, the modernisation of its politics of citizenship by combining a residence-based 
nationality code (ius soli) in addition to the origin-based current code (ius sanguinus) with a well-
regulated immigration policy." Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 219. However, Minkenberg disputes 
that the recent changes amount to "full 'catching up' with the policies of other Western countries" 
or, for that matter, that they constitute "an adequate response to the country's long-term needs for 
immigrants to maintain the viability of its labour markets and its social insurance system." /d. at 220. 
263. See generally Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 195-202 (noting various procedural 
changes, including changes in the types and degree of discretion), and at 202 (noting the newly fixed 
fees of 255 Euros per adult and 51 Euros per child). Prior to 2000, even the fee for naturalization 
was subject to administrative discretion. [d. 
264. These conditions are spelled out in Article 4(3) of the Citizenship Act, supra note 230. 
See generally Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 199-200; RENNER, supra note 39, para. 2.3, at 24-28 
(Geburt im Inland). In such cases, the child born in Germany must, between age 18 and 23, either 
elect to retain German citizenship, or risk automatically losing it on his or her 23rd birthday, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of the Citizenship Act. 
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all other statutory criteria.265 Naturalization may also available in other cases 
on a discretionary basis.266 The new Citizenship Act does not abandon the 
presumption against dual nationality,267 but merely tolerates it during the 
minority of children born in Germany to foreign parents.268 
The limited introduction of jus soli has not obliterated the legal distinction 
between foreigners (Ausliinder) and resettlers (Aussiedler).269 Inclusive group 
selectivity continues to exist in the form of "automatic citizenship ... for ethnic 
Germans.,,270 Thus, some potential immigrants remain entitled to German 
265. The Citizenship Act formally consolidates the right to citizenship by individuals on the 
basis of long-term residency, provided that all statutory criteria are satisfied. These requirements are 
spelled out in Article 10(1) of the Citizenship Act, supra note 230, which was Article 85 of the 
Foreigners' Law prior to January 1,2005. See generally Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 200-01 and 
RENNER, supra note 39, para. 2.4.4, at 31-33 (Liingerer Aufenthalt). The notion of a right to 
citizenship was already introduced in 1993, at least in limited cases, but remained subject to 
considerable discretion, such as connection with the requirement that naturalization be in the public 
interest. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 8. 
266. See generally Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 201-02 and RENNER, supra note 39, para. 
2.5, at 34-35 (Ermessungseinbiirgerung). 
267. This issue was hotly contested during the debates leading up to the adoption of the new 
Citizenship Act, supra note 230. The Red-Green coalition originally wanted to allow it 
unconditionally, but the CDUlCSU successfully opposed it, on the ground that it "devalues German 
citizenship." Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 166. See also Alice Holmes Cooper, Party-
Sponsored Protest and the Movement Society: The CDUlCSU Mobilises Against Citizenship Law 
Reform, II GERMAN POLITICS 88 (2002); Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 230-32; Green, supra note 
176, at 97-98; Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 12-13. In the end, the new 
Citizenship Act both expands and restricts the availability of dual nationality in Germany. RENNER, 
supra note 39, para. 1.5, at 13. 
268. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 13, notes that dual citizenship is also 
tolerated in the case of resettlers, as well as in cases involving applicants who want to keep their old 
passports for economic reasons, such as to avoid disinheritance. See generally Otto Kimminich, The 
Conventions for the Prevention of Double Nationality and their Meaning for Germany and Europe 
in an Era of Migration, 38 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 224 (1996); RENNER, supra note 39, para. 2.6, at 
35-39. Germany withdrew from the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality 
and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, Council of Europe, May 6,1963 (ETS 
no. 43), entered into effect Dec. 22, 2002, and has been party to the 1997 European Convention on 
Nationality, supra note 23, since September 1,2005. 
269. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 5. However, ethnic priority 
immigration policies have been hollowed out, id. at 16-27, and "other criteria-above all language-
gain importance." ld. at 27. See also RENNER, supra note 39, para. 1.4, at 10 and para. 21, at 15-20 
(explaining changes affecting Statusdeutsche-including Aussiedler and Spiitaussiedler-in greater 
detail). 
270. Joppke, supra note 2, at 52. Article 116 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 
defines Germans to include certain groups of ethnic Germans living outside the territory of the 
Federal Republic, notably resettlers from Eastern Europe (Aussiedler) and from the former GDR 
(Ubersiedler). In particular, Article 116 GG provides: 
(I) Unless otherwise provided by statute, a German within the meaning of this Constitution 
is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of 
the German Reich within the frontiers of 21 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of 
German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such a person. (2) Former German 
citizens who, between 20 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship 
on political, racial or religious grounds, and their descendants, are re-granted German 
citizenship on application. They are considered as not having been deprived of their German 
citizenship where they have established their residence in Germany after 8 May 1945 and 
have not expressed a contrary intention. 
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citizenship, while other long-term German residents who wish to naturalize still 
face limited opportunities to do so. 
The liberalization of voluntary naturalization has not come without a cost. 
In particular, the right to naturalize on the basis of long-term residency may not 
be exercised if the applicant lacks sufficient knowledge of the German language, 
if he or she can be shown to have acted against the constitutional order, or if 
there are grounds for deportation.27l Further requirements include a written 
commitment to uphold the liberal democratic German constitutional order,272 
the ability to support him- or herself, and renunciation of his or her former 
citizenship. In general, no naturalization is possible unless the applicant shows 
that he or she is both willing and able to integrate into German society.273 
Some of these requirements are in tension with Germany's stated goal of 
curbing the high level of administrative discretion that has characterized 
previous efforts to liberalize naturalization. In particular, the renewed 
integration push (discussed in greater detail below in Part IV) suggests that 
discretion is likely to remain a significant factor. Still, it is significant that the 
bases upon which discretion may be exercised have been reduced in principle. 
University of Wiirzburg, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/gmOOOOO.html(source 
of translation). See also 1953 Refugees' and Expellees' Law (Bundesvertriebenen- und 
Fliichtlingsgesetz). See generally Rainer Miinz & Rainer Ohliger, Long Distance Citizens: 
Ethnic Germans and Their Immigration to Germany, in PATHS TO INCLUSION: THE 
INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 161 (Peter Schuck & 
Rainer Miinz eds., 1998); Stefan Wolff, Changing Priorities or Changing Opportunities? 
German External Minority Policy, 1918-1998, in WOLFF, supra note 4, at 183. Germany took 
special precautions in the EU context to accommodate these special interests. See, e.g., Albert 
Bleckmann, German Nationality within the Meaning of the EEC Treaty, 1978 COMMON 
MARKET L. REv. 435; de Groot, supra note 60, at 8 (noting that Germany was the only Member 
State besides the U.K. to issue a declaration of its nationals for Community purposes). 
271. Article II, Citizenship Act, supra note 230, which was Article 86 of the Foreigners' 
Act prior to January I, 2005. This requirement also applies in connection with naturalizations of 
spouses and minor children and in connection with discretionary naturalizations. Ludvig, supra note 
61, at 507, considers the introduction of language tests for all naturalizations a "backlash" insofar as 
no proof of language ability was required under the liberalized naturalization procedures that had 
been introduced in the 1990s. For an historical overview of evolving linguistic and other additional 
requirements, see Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 195-202. 
272. The details to be included in the "declaration of loyalty" are spelled out in Section 
85.1.1.1 of the Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zum StaatsangehOrigkeitsrecht (StAR-VwV) (Dec. 
13,2000), GMBI. 2001, 122 [hereinafter Citizenship Regulations]. These Citizenship Regulations 
are not binding on courts, but merely attempt to direct the authorities in the exercise of their 
discretion and in this way to achieve a certain level of harmonization. RENNER, supra note 39, para. 
1.3, at 10. 
273. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 15 suggests that "the most difficult 
question within German society ... [is 1 into what should integration be accomplished?" In response 
to this challenge, the German government has, inter alia, prepared a new guide book for immigrants. 
Among other entries, it lists the d6ner kebab as Germany's most popular fast food, and provides a 
large color photo of a garden gnome. Ray Furlong, Germany Welcomes Immigrants with Book, BBC 
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2004), at http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/worldleurope/3487144.strn (last visited Nov. 29, 
2005). For a discussion of the positions taken by different parties in regard to integration, see Haas, 
Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 168. Germany's new integration requirements are analyzed in 
greater detail infra in Part IV. 
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One leading scholar places great theoretical weight on the importance of 
such constraints on state discretion. Joppke argues that, once migrants have 
"passed the hurdle of entry, ... a democratic logic enters, according to which 
immigrants become cooperating members of society who are owed equal 
consideration by the state under whose roof they have come to reside, and on 
whose protection they now depend.,,274 Moreover, in his view, such changes 
constitute "a true constitutional revolution across Western states,,,275 which is 
all the more "astonishing" since it occurs in a realm where "state discretion had 
previously been at its peak.,,276 Ultimately, Joppke argues that this trend-
combined with the trend towards "non-discriminatory admissions and residence-
granting procedures"-must result in a "decoupling of the citizenry from a 
particular nation or ethnic group, and a weakening of the entire construct of 
'ownership' of the state by that group.,,277 While legal developments in the EU 
provide considerable evidence to support his claims about the enhanced status of 
residence and its approximation to citizenship, they find little support in the new 
German Citizenship Act, which constitutes a vital step, but hardly a great stride 
towards the goals Joppke envisions. 
For the time being, careful attention is warranted to the implementation and 
effects of the Citizenship Act. One major question is whether enhanced 
naturalization opportunities will actually produce a dramatic rise in German 
naturalization rates. Earlier German efforts to liberalize and encourage 
naturalization produced only marginal improvements.278 To be sure, the 
naturalization rates quadrupled between 1991 and 1999 in the wake of those 
reforms,279 but overall, naturalization rates have remained relatively low in 
Germany, compared to other West European countries.280 In fact, while 
naturalizations in Germany rose in 2000 by 30% to an all-time high of just under 
186,700, they declined steadily every year since then.281 Naturalization rates 
274. Joppke, supra note 2, at 51. 
275. Jd. at 52. 
276. Jd. 
277. Jd. at 53. 
278. Simplified naturalization procedures were adopted for two categories of persons in 
1991, namely for young persons between the ages of 16 and 23, and for long-term residents-in 
most cases Gastarbeiter-who had lived in Germany for at least 15 years. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 
507. These rules were liberalized further in 1993, in the Anderungsgesetz zur Verwirklichung des 
Asylkmopromisses (Amendment to Implement the Asylum Compromise), which converted the 
former "entitlement (Regelanspruch) [into] a 'definitive right.'" [d. However, simplified 
naturalizations were "de facto abandoned" under the Citizenship Act. !d. 
279. Green, supra note 176, at 95. 
280. Green, supra note 176, at 95-97; Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 230. 
281. The German Federal Statistical Office reports that about 178,100 foreigners were 
naturalized in 2001, 154,500 in 2002, and 140,700 in 2003. DeStasis Press Release, May 24, 2004. 
In each year, the largest group of persons naturalizing were Turks (40%), followed by Iranians. 
Among all persons naturalized in 2003, about 61% of them were long-term residents. 2003 also saw 
a big (77%) jump in the percentage of naturalizations of former German citizens who were deprived 
of their citizenship for political, racist or religious reasons between 1933 and 1945, and of the 
descendants of such persons. In 2004, a total of 127,150 persons were naturalized, which represents 
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may jump again when the "third wave of migration [that] started in 1989" 
reaches the minimum period of required residency,282 or around the year 2020, 
when children born in Germany and entitled to invoke the jus soli principle must 
choose which nationality they prefer. Meanwhile, observers are left wondering 
why German naturalization rates are dropping after the greatest liberalization in 
German history. 
Numerous "practical and psychological disadvantages,,283 have been cited 
to explain low rates of naturalization. One key practical consideration has been 
the risk of subjecting male children to conscription.284 The new language 
ability requirement and the cost of naturalization are also likely to affect a 
number of applicants.285 Moreover, the general prohibition of dual citizenship 
presents special practical and psychological barriers for some, if not many, lon~­
term residents from non-EU countries who might otherwise opt to naturalize.2 6 
In practical terms, loss of home country nationality may entail "difficulties of 
entering or returning to the country of origin, acquiring, selling or inheriting 
property.,,287 In psychological terms, the prohibition of dual nationality 
confronts potential German citizens with loss of identity and self-esteem.288 
Further, some may perceive the general prohibition against dual nationality as 
"unwillingness" on the part of the host country to "welcome pluralism and 
cultural difference.,,289 Indeed, retention of home country citizenship may well 
a nearly 10% decline vis-a-vis the preceding year, thus marking the fourth consecutive year of 
declining naturalization rates since the Citizenship Act entered into force. Deutschland: Riickliiufige 
Einbiirgerungszahlen [Dropping Naturalization Rates], 7 MIGRATION UNO BEVOLKERUNG 1 
(September 2005). By contrast, in Austria, where recent reforms tightened the citizenship 
requirements, naturalization rates have risen. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 509. 
282. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 509. 
283. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511. 
284. Hanagan, supra note 93, at 400. 
285. According to one source, around 20% of applicants during the first three months of 
2000 failed the language tests, while the fees of 250 Euros discouraged others from applying. 
Ludvig, supra note 61, at 507-08. 
286. Randall Hansen, A European Citizenship or a Europe of Citizens? Third Country 
Nationals in the EU, 24 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 757 (1998); Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511. 
287. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Turkey 
facilitated the acquisition by its nationals of German citizenship by removing restrictions on 
acquiring and inheriting property, and by facilitating the process of regaining Turkish citizenship 
after it had been renounced in connection with naturalization. JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 205. 
288. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511. 
289. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511. In course of the Leitkultur ("leading culture") debate that 
first erupted in 2000, the CDU issued a statement that "German cultural norms" are derived from 
Christianity and the Enlightenment, classical philosophy, humanism, and Roman law. Haas, Roever 
& Schmidt, supra note 2, at 164. The FDP took the position that aspects of Islam are clearly 
incompatible with European values. Id. More recently, CDU leader and new chancellor Angela 
Merkel's statement that "[a]nyone coming here must ... tolerate our Western and Christian roots" 
was prompted by the broadcast of a Berlin imam who was caught on camera telling worshipers that 
Germans would "bum in hell" because they were unbelievers. Furlong, Germans Argue Over 
Integration, supra note 50. In response, the conservative culture minister from Baden-Wiirttemberg, 
Annette.Schavan, called for a law requiring preaching in mosques to be in the German language. 
Bernstein, supra note 2. However, this proposal encountered stiff resistance, and was unambiguously 
rejected by Mariluise Beck, the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration 
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serve non-Christian immigrants as a source of resistance in the context of 
debates over the central role of Christianity in Gennan, as well as in European 
identity.290 . 
Judgment as to whether these changes truly represent a paradigm shift291 
or mere symbolic politics292 is beyond the scope of this article, and must await 
empirical analysis.293 Despite some significant changes, the new Citizenship 
Act maintains a tight clamp on the acquisition of Gennan citizenship by 
foreigners. Indeed, one unanticipated consequence of the new Citizenship Act is 
that many thousands of Gennan citizens of Israeli or Turkish origin face the risk 
of automatically losing their Gennan citizenship.294 Still, if such a step away 
from traditional exclusive modes of belonging can be successfully taken in 
Gennany, a country having an ethno-cultural tradition of membership, then it 
surely bodes well for the development of more inclusive fonns of belonging. 
Indeed, an optimist might hope that Gennan steps toward multinational 
citizenship and multicultural tolerance could set an example for the rest of 
Europe, just as Gennan litigants and courts drove the incorporation of 
fundamental (human) rights into the EU's legal order.295 A realist, on the other 
hand, would be cautious about making any such predictions, particularly in view 
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung for Migration, Fliichtlinge und Integration). Philip Grassmann, 
Zum Patriotismus Einladen [Invitation to Patriotism], SOOOEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Nov. 24, 2004, at 
56-57. 
290. Hanagan, supra note 93, at 400, argues that "[m]any immigrant identities originated in 
conflict with European imperialism, sometirries in struggle against the colonialism of the very 
nations to which they migrated." This reason seems particularly salient in France, but could also be 
relevant in Germany, particularly in connection with the Leitkultur debate discussed supra in note 
289 and infra in Part IV.A. 
291. See, e.g., Green, supra note 176, at 97 ("radical reorientation of citizenship"); 
Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 4. Compare RENNER, supra note 39, at 21 n.110 (arguing that one 
cannot speak of a paradigm change so long as jus sanguinus maintains its traditional dominance). 
292. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 237 (arguing that "the much celebrated 'paradigm shift' 
is an expression of symbolic politics rather than a reflection of truly substantial and effective 
changes"). 
293. In the meantime, there is no shortage of proposals for further liberalization. Ludvig 
suggests, for example, that "receiver states" could "stock up the budgets of [their] bureaucracies, 
facilitate administrative practice, lower the fees, reduce the required periods of residence, accept 
dual nationality, .increase information policies and ... turn obtaining [their] nationality into more of 
a celebratory moment." Ludvig, supra note 61, at 510. 
294. Article 25(1) of the Citizenship Act provides for automatic loss of German citizenship 
upon the volitional acquisition of citizenship of another state. This provision has already affected 
tens of thousands of German passport holders of Turkish origin who have reacquired their Turkish 
nationality, as well as a smaller number of Israeli-German dual nationals. See Deutschland: Verlust 
der deutschen Staatsbilrgerschaft droht [Germany: Threatened Loss of German Citizenship], 2 
MIGRATION UNO BEVOLKERUNG 2 (March 2005); Israel/Deutschland: Doppelte Staatsbilrgerschaft 
nicht mehr sicher [GermanylIsrael: Double Nationality No Longer Certain], 4 MIGRATION UNO 
BEVOLKERUNG 2 (May 2005). 
295. Paradoxically, European public opinion polls have shown that "Germans are 
significantly less likely than [ other] Europeans to name the guarantee of human rights and respect 
for democracy in Europe as a priority matter for the European Union." Haas, Roever & Schmidt, 
supra note 2, at 157. However, those authors go on to point out that "[ e ]Iite opinion matters at least 
as much, more if we consider decisions that result in public policy." Id. at 160. 
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of the difficult demographic and employment conditions in Germany today.296 
Legal reforms do not automatically resolve underlying social tensions. Indeed, 
under contemporary conditions, the liberalization of citizenship--as well as of 
migration, discussed below in Part m.B-might even exacerbate such tensions, 
at least in the short term, particularly given the "welfare chauvinism" and 
"subculture of resistance" that have been identified as part of the German 
popular response to growing multiculturalism.297 The "underlying controversy 
over the degree of tolerance to be accorded to diversity remains unresolved,,,298 
and is likely to stay that way for some time to come. 
B. MiGRATION 
Despite strict migration laws during most of the post-war period, more than 
10 percent of Germany's current population is foreign.299 Germany became one 
of the world's largest immigrant-receiving countries during the second half of 
the twentieth century,300 even after being virtually closed to foreign workers 
296. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220; RENNER, supra note 39, at 4. 
297. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 237. See also Furlong, Germans Argue Over 
Integration, supra note 50 (quoting a politician as saying "[I]f multiculturalism means that it's OK 
for 30,000 Turks to live in a certain quarter of Berlin, and never leave, and live like they're still in 
deepest Turkey, then the term is now discredited"). 
298. Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 164. Those authors go on to note, however, 
that this fact "hardly portends a return to the nationalism of yore. Nor does it differ greatly from 
similar controversies raging elsewhere in the EU." /d. The issue of headscarves has become 
increasingly controversial in Germany, as numerous Liinder have prohibited the wearing of religious 
symbols by teachers in public schools. The German Federal Administrative Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) upheld one such state law in June 2004. Deutschland: Kopftuchverbot 
bestiitigt [Germany: Head Scarf Prohibition Upheld], 5 MIGRATION UND BEVOLKERUNG 2, 2-3 (July 
2004). See also Das Kreuz mit dem Kopftuch, GOETHE-INSTITUT/QANTARA (2004), available at 
http://qantara.de(lastvisitedNov. 21, 2005) (summarizing criticisms of the head scarf decision). 
299. I use the term 'foreign' as a rough proxy to encompass the many types of persons who 
may be counted as falling outside the native-born norm. Both the term and the content of such a 
composite group are highly contestable. According to official German government statistics, the 
foreign population has stabilized at 8.9 percent since the end of 1998. Bundesamt fur Migration und 
Fliichtlinge (BAMF), Migration und Asyl in Zahlen (2004), at 65 [hereinafter BAMF 2004]; 
Bundesministerium des Inneren (BM!) Sachverstandigenrat fur Zuwanderung und Integration, 
Migrationsbericht (Nov. 2004), at 26 [hereinafter BMI, Migrationsbericht] (reporting that, between 
1992 and 2003, the percentage of foreign population in Germany rose from 8 percent to 8.9 percent, 
where it has stabilized since 1998). However, the actual popUlation of foreign-born residents is 
considerably larger, since these figures do not include ethnic Germans-as defined in Article 116 of 
the Grundgesetz (Basic Law)-who have migrated to Germany from Central and Eastern Europe 
(Spiitaussiedler). While substantial in number, these persons are not treated as foreigners for 
statistical purposes. According to Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220, "the net balance of nine 
million immigrants during [the period from 1954 to 1999] accounts for more than ten per cent of 
today's population," and "[b]y 1999, immigration to Germany had reached a magnitude that was 
comparable only to that of the USA" with "14 per cent of the population ... born outside the 
country." Id. at 223. See also Joppke, supra note 2, at 62 ("[B]etween 1950 and 1993, the net 
migration balance has been an astounding 12.6 million, accounting for 80 percent of the country's 
population growth."). But see Bereinigtes Ausliinderregister, supra note 38 (revised official 
statistics reveal that only 6.7 million non-German nationals were legally residing in Germany at the 
end of 2004). 
300. See, e.g., Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220. 
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from outside the EU after the first energy crisis in the 1970s. 
The first wave of post-war immigration consisted of the so-called 
Gastarbeiter (guest workers) who came between 1955 and 1973.301 These 
workers, who were expected to be temporary residents, were soon followed by a 
second wave consisting of their family members.302 The illusion that the guest 
workers and their families would someday return home persisted until the 
1980s.303 The third wave of post-war immigration to Germany started after 
1980, when some eastern bloc countries-notably Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland-allowed some of their citizens to travel to the West. Yet another wave 
of post-war immigrants came to Germany under its generous asylum 
procedures.304 Indeed, between 1987 and 1992, the number of aS6;lum seekers 
rose from 57,000 per year to a peak of around 438,000 per year.3 5 The latest 
wave of immigrants to Germany has arrived since the collapse of the 
Communism in 1989. These immigrants comprise numerous different groups, 
inc1udinji ethnic German resettlers (Spiitaussiedler) from Central and Eastern 
Europe, 06 Jews from the former Soviet Union,301 and persons fleeing wars, 
301. Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI), Zuwanderung - Das neue Gesetz (2005), at 6 
[hereinafter BMI, Zuwanderung], available at http://www.bmi.bund.de (last visited Nov. 29, 2005). 
The guest workers came from Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and 
Yugoslavia. Guest worker recruitment was stopped abruptly in November 1973 (Anwerbestop), in 
the wake of the first energy crisis. By that time, approximately four million foreigners were residing 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. The halt to recruitment after the 1973 oil crisis-in Germany as 
elsewhere in Western Europe-''was country-blind, even though the preponderance of certain 
national or regional origins among immigrants (Turkish in Germany and Switzerland; Algerian or 
North African in France) arguably was the bone of contention." JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 50. While 
the focus here is on post-war immigration, Germany has "received immigrants in growing numbers" 
since the late nineteenth century. Brinkmann, German Migrations, supra note 36, at 140. 
302. In 1999, 30 percent of all foreign residents in Germany had been living there for 20 
years or more. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 500. At present, approximately 1.5 million foreign (that is, 
non-citizen) minors are living in Germany, of whom approximately two-thirds were born there to 
one or more non-German parents. 
303. The Turks in Germany "abandoned the discourse of return and replaced it with talk of 
permanent settlement and political rights" in the 1980s. KASTORYANO, supra note 42, at 117. 
304. Asylum has been a particularly salient issue in Germany, whose post-war asylum law-
embedded in Article 16 of the Basic Law-was the most liberal in Europe and granted a higher level 
of protection than guaranteed by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 137, as modified by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,1967,606 
U.N.T.S. 267. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 223; Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 9. The number of 
asylum seekers in Germany rose dramatically and provoked a political crisis in the immediate 
aftermath of the collapse of Communism. Green, supra note 176, at 92-95. 
305. After Germany's asylum law was tightened up in 1993, the number of annual petitions 
dropped again. 50,500 asylum petitions were filed in 2003. At present, some l.l million people live 
in Germany who are recognized or seeking recognition as refugees. BMI, Zuwanderung, supra note 
301, at 6. After the recruitment of guest workers was banned in the 1970s, "seeking asylum was, 
from the immigrant's perspective, easier and more beneficial than choosing the other possible legal 
path into Germany through family reunion." Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 9. 
306. The peak years for ethnic German migration were 1989 and 1990, when 380,000 and 
400,000 persons respectively immigrated to Germany. All told, around 4.4 million such persons 
have migrated to Germany since 1950. BMI, Zuwanderung, supra note 301, at 6. 
307. Since 1990, around 188,000 Jewish persons immigrated to Germany from the former 
Soviet Union, mainly from Russia and Kazakhstan. BMI, Zuwanderung, supra note 30 I, at 6. 
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particularly in the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East. 308 At present, some 
7.3 million foreigners live in Germany, of whom more than half have spent ten 
or more years there.309 
Germany's ncw Immigration Act signals the formal end of decades of 
official insistence that Germany was not a "country of immigration.,,310 The 
discrepancy between de facto immigration and its political denial, which a 
leading scholar has labeled the "single most enduring puzzle in the German 
immigration debate,,,311 has been significantly narrowed by the reforms passed 
under the Schroder government (1995-2005). Although reforms were finally 
passed into law during an extended period of SPD-Ied coalition government, the 
major parties on both the Left and the Right have invoked the non-immigration 
trope in recent decades.312 Indeed, even Chancellor Schroder, on whose watch 
the German legal frameworks for both citizenship and migration have undergone 
historical reversals, has stressed that the new Immigration Act was designed to 
enable the government to regulate and in particular to limit migration, rather 
than to encourage it.313 This statement by a leading reformer suggests that the 
underlying fear of migration314 may not have subsided, but rather merely been 
suppressed in view of the "demographic reality of aging societies with social 
security and health care systems under the threat of collapse. ,,315 
308. See sources cited supra in note 42. 
309. BM!, Zuwanderung, supra note 301, at 6. 
310. See sources cited supra in note 262. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 223, calls this 
policy "a Lebensluege (a false myth) of the Federal Republic" and explains its persistence "as a 
feature of symbolic politics in the face of globalisation and loss of national control." 
311. JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 62. 
312. Brinkmann, German Migrations, supra note 36, at 140 n.l, notes that "[t]his was the 
position of the CDU-Ied government between 1982 and 1998," but hastens also to add that "shortly 
before its demise in 1982, the interior secretary of the SPDIFDP coalition government declared that 
'the Federal Republic is not a country of immigration and that it should not become one'" (quoting 
BARBARA MARSHALL, THE NEW GERMANY AND MIGRATION IN EUROPE 13 (2000». By the same 
token, "all parliamentary parties put fOlWard proposals to liberalize citizenship law" in the 1990s. 
Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 10. See also Green, supra note 176, at 40-44; Irnke Kruse, Henry 
Edward Orren & Steffen Angenendt, The Failure of Immigration Reform in Germany, 12 GERMAN 
POLITICS 129 (2003); Malcolm MacLaren, Framing the Debate over the German Immigration Bill: 
Toward Reasoned Policymaking, 2 GERMAN L. J. 16 (2001). 
313. To be fair, it may be that this statement was made with the aim of smoothing passage of 
the Immigration Act, supra note 231. In his first speech as Chancellor in 1998, Schroder stated that 
"he did not see the basis of the national self-conception in traditions of descent, but rather in the 
certainty of German democracy." Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 19 (citing DIE WELT, Feb. 11, 
1998). 
314. See, e.g., Brinkmann, German Migrations, supra note 36, at 140 ("Migration by non-
Germans was perceived by the state and the public as a problem, often even as a threat."). 
315. Brinkmann, German Migrations, supra note 36, at 149 (noting that "Germany is not the 
only country to face the contradiction between the obvious long-term need for migration to save 
social networks and to fill jobs on the one hand and, on the other, popular resentment against 
immigration"). See also BBC NEWS (July 9, 2004), Germany approves immigration law, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/worldieurope/388052I.stm (last visited Nov. 29, 2005) ("Supporters say 
law is crucial as the country battles with an ageing population and a skills shortage" and addresses 
"Germany's need for skilled migrant workers from outside the EU.") [hereinafter BBC NEWS, 
Germany approves]. 
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Although debates over multiculturalism in Germany continue to rage,316 
the last formal bastion of official resistance to Germany's multicultural fate fell 
in July 2004, with the passage of the new Immigration Act 
(Zuwanderungsgesetz)317 by an overwhelming majority of the Bundestag after a 
tortuous journey through the legislature and the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht).318 The Immigration Act has been reported as 
Germany's "first immigration law,,,319 but it is more accurate to say that it is 
Germany's first comprehensive legal framework for immigration. Taken 
together with the Citizenship Act, the Immigration Act constitutes a serious 
attempt to adapt the German legal framework to existing conditions, and to 
address current as well as future needs. An assessment of the impact of the new 
Immigration Act must await further scrutiny, since it is too soon to draw lasting 
conclusions about its implementation, particularly at a time of regime change 
and economic difficulties. This proviso aside, the following discussion 
considers experience since the Act entered into force on January I, 2005, after 
examining the main features of Germany's new legal regime. 
The new Immigration Act constitutes Germany's second major step, after 
adoption of the Citizenship Act, towards greater openness and inclusiveness. 
Like the Citizenship Act, Germany's new law on migration marks numerous 
historical departures. At the same time as recognizing its historical significance, 
however, it must also be acknowledged that this new regime is unlikely to prove 
a stable one. Expanding EU competence and activity in the field of migration 
renders developments at the level of the Member States more tentative and 
vulnerable to change in the short run. For this reason, one leading German 
expert on migration law has predicted that the new Immigration Act will require 
substantial revision within the short span of two years.320 But notwithstanding 
316. See the discussion of the Leitkultur debates supra in note 289. Various other 
controversies relating to the integration of migrants are discussed infra in Part IV.A. 
317. Supra note 231. 
318. The passage of the Immigration Act put an end to four years of "bitter struggle, in 
which the conservative opposition fought the original government proposals in both the parliament 
and in the courts." BBC NEWS, Germany approves, supra note 315. The Immigration Act was 
initially passed into law in June 2002. Shortly thereafter, six "opposition-ruled state governments" 
brought a case to the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), arguing that "the 
law should be declared invalid because of the unorthodox voting procedures by which it had been 
passed." Kruse, Orren & Angenendt, supra note 312, at 134. The Court declared the Immigration 
Act invalid in December 2002, shortly before it was due to enter into force on January I, 2003. 
Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfD] (Federal Constitutional Court) of December 18, 
2002,37 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfDE] (Decisions of the BverfG) 271 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). The Act 
was re-introduced in unaltered form, but subsequently altered in numerous respects. See Kruse, 
Orren & Angenendt, supra note 312, at 134-43 (discussing the topics covered in the reopened debate 
over the content of the Immigration Act). 
319. BBC NEWS, Germany approves, supra note 315. 
320. Gunter Renner, Das Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht nach der Reform reformbedurftig? [Is 
the Reformed Citizenship Act in Need of Further Reform?], 24 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDERRECHT 
UNO AUSLANOERPOLlTlK 176 (2004). 
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the overarching question of its ability to stand the test of time, Germany's new 
Immigration Act deserves to be analyzed on its own terms. 
The 2004 Immigration Act is an omnibus bill that adds two new laws to the 
books, repeals some old laws, and revises a number of existing laws (including 
the Citizenship Act). The most imJlortant new law, for present purposes, is the 
Residence Act (Aujenthaltsgesetz),321 which replaces the former Foreigners' 
Act (Ausliindergesetz).322 The analysis below focuses on the new Residence 
Act and related regulations, since these will have the greatest impact on current 
and new immigrants from non-EU countries.323 
A few words about terminology are needed before proceeding to examine 
the principal changes that have been introduced. The German designation 
Zuwanderung was chosen in lieu of Einwanderung as the title for the new 
Immigration Act. The connotations of these two terms are different, despite the 
fact that both would be rendered in English as 'immigration'. During the 
protracted debates leading up to adoption of the Immigration Act, the (adopted) 
term Zuwanderung was preferred by those urging a more restrictive posture 
towards immigration, since it implies "unwanted immigration that is tolerated 
for constitutional and moral-political reasons.,,324 The rejected term 
Einwanderung, on the other hand, "connotes actively solicited, wanted 
immigration.,,325 Given this background, one might expect the new 
Zuwanderungsgesetz to hew to tradition, yet this is far from the truth. 
Paradoxically, the title ultimately chosen for the new law is at odds with its 
content, at least in regard to the concrete provisions of the new Residence Act 
pertaining to labor migration. The historical debate over terminology is noted 
here as a reminder that the new law is a hard-fought compromise between well-
articulated positions across the political spectrum, and that conceptual debates in 
this complex field must take second place to concrete analysis of legal 
provisions and their implementation over time. 
In substantive terms, the new Residence Act introduces a number of 
important reforms aimed at simplifying the rules and procedures governing 
immigration. The former complex system of five "residence titles" has been 
reduced to just two: the limited-term residence permit (Aujenthaltserlaubnis)326 
321. Article 1 of the Immigration Act, supra note 231, sets forth the new Gesetz iiber den 
Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstiitigkeit und die integration von Ausliindern im Bundesgebiet (AufenthG) 
(Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory) 
[hereinafter Residence Act]. The Residence Act entered into force on January 1,2005. 
322. The Immigration Act repealed the Gesetz iiber die Einreise und den Aufenthalt von 
Ausliindern im Bundesgebiet (AusIG) , BGBI 1 1990, 1354, 1356 (Law on Entry and Stay by 
Foreigners in Federal Territory) (9 July 1990) [hereinafter Foreigners' Act] and related regulations. 
323. Article 2 of the Immigration Act, supra note 231, sets forth the new Gesetz iiber die 
allgemeine Freiziigigkeit von Unionsbiirgern (FreiziigGIEU) (Act on the General Freedom of 
Movement for EU Citizens), which brings German law into compliance with EU rules on free 
movement of persons. 
324. JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 97. 
325. JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 97. 
326. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 7. 
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and the unlimited-term settlement permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis).327 These, 
in turn, are functionally linked to the recognized purposes of residence in 
Germany (that is, education, employment, family reunification, and 
humanitarian considerations).328 The new Immigration Act creates a procedure 
under which students are permitted to remain in Germany for up to one year 
after completing their studies, in order to gain work experience.329 
Some of the most significant changes introduced by the Residence Act 
reflect an interest in attracting or retaining skilled labor. In general, it will be 
considerably easier for "highly qualified persons" to immigrate to Germany, 
whereas the general ban on immigration by "unqualified" persons, as well as on 
those having "low" or ordinary qualifications, remains in effect. 330 As for the 
favored "highly qualified" persons, they may be granted permanent residence 
from the outset, under a unified ("one-stop government") procedure331 that 
replaces the prior cumbersome dual procedure that separated the process of 
seeking permission to work from the process of seeking a residence permit. 332 
Family members of "highly qualified" persons may also work under Germany's 
new rules.333 In addition, self-employed persons may receive a residence 
permit if they invest at least one million Euros and create at least ten jobs. 
Asylum and family reunification continue to play an important role in 
German immigration law. However, these topics are already covered to a large 
extent by applicable provisions of international and EU law, and for that reason 
are not considered here in detail. It does bear mention, however, that the 
Residence Act extends the new integration requirements (discussed below in 
Part IV) to certain family members of persons entitled to reside in Germany 
under either asylum law or the rules on repatriates (Spiitaussiedler). 
Finally, in institutional terms, the Immigration Act created a new Federal 
Office for Immigration and Refugees (Bundesamt for Migration und 
Fliichtlinge), which takes over the responsibilities of the former Federal Office 
for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees.334 This new office-known by its 
acronym BAMF-will maintain the central registry of aliens and collect data 
relating to migration patterns, but will also develop and implement the new 
327. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 9. 
328. Residence Act, supra note 321, § I. 
329. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 16(4). 
330. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 39(4). However, some special rules apply to so-
called "qualified" persons. For one, there is an exception to the general ban that permits the 
authorities to grant qualified persons a residence permit where it would be in the public interest to do 
so. Residence Act, supra § 18(4). Second, there is a special rule granting priority to qualified 
nationals in regard to jobs for which no German person is available. Residence Act, supra §§ 
39(2)(b),39(6). 
331. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 39( I). 
332. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 19. In other words, highly qualified persons are not 
required to wait for five years before applying for permanent residency. Jd. 
333. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 29. 
334. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 75. 
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integration programs.335 This institutional development marks an important 
change from the past, when "no federal agencies [were] specifically designed to 
administer migrant-related tasks.,,336 BAMF, which is an agency of the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior (BMI), does not replace the independent Federal 
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration (Beauflragte for 
Fliichtlinge und Integration), who since late 2005 has had cabinet status as 
Minister for Integration. 
IV. 
INTEGRATION: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM? 
Germany's new laws on citizenship and on immigration attest to 
heightened, albeit not entirely new concerns with integration and security. 
Indeed, the limitations imposed on the pragmatic openness of Germany's new 
Citizenship and Immigration Acts are directly attributable to such concerns. 
These are, in a sense, the political price to be paid for liberalization. In 
particular, the new Immigration Act (including its amendments to the 
Citizenship Act) aims to balance the needs of Germany's labor market against 
its security needs, by making it easier for the authorities to deport people who 
are suspected of supporting political violence. This section examines the new 
rules that have been put in place, and considers available evidence regarding 
their implementation to date. 
The perennial topic of integration raises some of the most controversial 
questions in the field of migration and citizenship.337 Scholars have long 
recognized that there is no single model of integration.338 From this theoretical 
perspective, Germany's approach to integration-its "incorporation regime"-
consists of "strategies, policy instruments and organizational arrangements" that 
differ substantially from those found in other countries339 and reflect the 
peculiarities of its own notions about membership, as well as about state-society 
relations. An emerging alternate theoretical perspective emphasizes the 
commonalities that are visible through the lens of comparative analysis,340 and 
raises questions about whether convergence is occurring. The recent emergence 
of EU Ifidelines pertaining to the integration of migrants in EU Member 
States,3 1 which appears to provide some support for each of these theoretical 
335. !d. BAMF also plays a central role in regard to asylum. In particular, it decides asylum 
petitions and carries out the asylum-related provisions of the Schengen regime. 
336. SOYSAL, supra note 76, at 77. 
337. Davy, supra note 46, at 123 (noting that integration "became the buzzword in 
Germany's recent migration policy"). 
338. See, e.g., FAVELL, supra note 2; KASTORYANO, supra note 42; SOYSAL, supra note 76. 
339. SOYSAL, supra note 76, at 2-6. 
340. See, e.g., Joppke & Morawska, supra note 3, at 6-7 (arguing that the "popular notion of 
national models of immigration integration has obscured the similarities of integration approaches 
and assimilation concerns across liberal states"). 
341. Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration, supra note 213. See generally 
Kees Groenendijk, Legal Concepts of Integration in EU Migration Law, 6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 
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perspectives, raises further questions about the relationship between 
developments at EU level and in its Member States. 
A. GETTING TOUGH: INTEGRATION 
With regard to integration, Germany appears to be taking a new get-tough 
policy.342 But despite the presence of new rules, resources and rhetoric, it bears 
asking how new any of this really is. In fact, the need to promote better social 
integration of guest workers was already on the German agenda in the 1970s,343 
and stayed there during the 1980s and the 1990s.344 Initiatives varied widely 
from one state (Land) to another, even after the establishment of the Federal 
Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs (Ausliinderbeauftragte der 
Bundesregierung) in 1981. Early efforts consisted largely of pragmatic attempts 
to integrate foreigners into existing social structures, but fell far short of cultural 
assimilation. The limitations of the postnational integration postulated by 
Soysal became painfully apparent during the xenophobic violence against 
immigrant families in Solingen and Molin in the early 1990s,345 and have 
returned with renewed force after the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh in mid-2004 and the outbreak of violence in France in late 2005 and in 
Denmark in early 2006. 
The question of integrating immigrants has been a particularly fraught one 
in post-war Germany. Policy-makers shied away from the stance of insisting 
that post-war immigrants take on "membership in a tainted nation.,,346 Another 
factor limiting the push towards integration of immigrants prior to German 
unification was the Federal Republic's telos of achieving unification of all 
Germans, defined in ethno-cultural terms. These historical conditions made it 
difficult for Germans to contemplate citizenship for immigrants, and resulted in 
a situation in which neither the Left nor the Right expected post-war immigrants 
to assimilate. Rather, German political elites largely converged on a "mellow 
concept of integration" based on the idea of a "relaxed coexistence" without any 
loss of identity on the part of the immigrants.347 This tendency to preserve 
III (2004); Yongmi Schibel, Integration and the Role olLoeal Authorities, 5 EUR. J. MIGRATION & 
L. 99 (2003); Katja S. Ziegler, Editorial: Integrating Integration?, 7 EUR.1. MIGRATION & L. 119 
(2005). 
342. Residence Act, supra note 321, §§ 43-45. 
343. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220. 
344. This discussion is based on the analysis found in SOYSAL, supra note 76, at 61-64, 77-
79. 
345. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 186. These tragic events galvanized the immigrant (and 
particularly the Turkish) community in Germany, as well as the German political parties, and 
sparked discussions that ultimately resulted in passage of the new Citizenship Act with its "civic-
territorial redefinition of the traditional German model ofethno-genealogical citizenship." Id. 
346. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 187. Karl Jaspers expressed the "delegitimation of 
nationhood" in the early years of the Bundesrepublik, when he proclaimed the end of the nation-state 
and pronounced it "the disaster (Unheil) of Europe and of all continents." Id. 
347. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 188. Thalheimer points to a vast gulf between 'integration' 
which implies fitting into society, and 'assimilation' which implies dissolving into society. Philipp 
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difference was bolstered by the "few immigrant voices in the integration 
debate," whose demands for "equal co-existence" between immigrants and 
Germans also tended to keep these groups apart.348 Immigrant activists in 
Germany were more inclined to see citizenship as a "means of guaranteeing 
residence and the political rights associated with it [than] of ensuring a cultural 
integration.,,349 The growing influence of Islamic organizations in Germany 
has furthered this tendency, since they opposed assimilation and pushed towards 
"an institutionally complete parallel society.,,350 
This rough equilibrium has been disrupted by recent legal reforms, which 
have taken the first real step towards decoupling citizenship from ethno-cultural 
membership in the German nation, and thrown the doors open to at least some 
categories of labor migrants. As noted earlier, both the new Citizenship and 
Immigration Acts hang an 'integration' price tag on the liberalizations they 
offer. This is one, but by no means the only reason why debates on integration 
and multiculturalism have erupted once again in Germany. The Federal 
Government has taken concrete steps to facilitate, and simultaneously to push 
for further integration. As one government expert pointedly put it, "integration 
is particularly important for Turks, who make up more than 25 per cent of all 
foreigners livin
s9 in Germany and are citizens of a country that aspires to ED membership.,,3 I 
The new demand that immigrants demonstrate their willingness and ability 
to integrate applies both in connection with citizenship and immigration. In 
practical terms, the integration requirements overlap. However, they may play 
out differently in these two contexts, and considerable uncertainty remains over 
how the new requirements will be implemented. These uncertainties are 
exacerbated by the fact that the Lander may, and in fact do implement the 
applicable federal laws in a non-uniform manner.352 
An overarching question concerns the precise nature of the German society 
Thalheimer, Migration und Integration am Beispiel TUrkei, in BUNDESAMT FOR MIGRATION UNO 
FLOCHTLINGE, WANDERUNGSBEWEGUNGEN: MIGRATION, FLOCHTLlNGE, UNO INTEGRATION 
[FEDERAL OFFICE OF MIGRATION AND REGUGEES, MIGRATION MOVEMENTS: MIGRATION, 
REFUGEES, AND INTEGRATION] (2003), at \05. 
348. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 189. 
349. KASTORYANO, supra note 42, at 117. 
350. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 215. 
351. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at \02. 
352. The Citizenship Regulations, supra note 272, allow Liinder some leeway to make their 
own rules, for example, in regard to language tests, dual nationality, and residence of less than eight 
years (in the case of voluntary naturalization). RENNER, supra note 39, para. 1.3, at 10. For examples 
of how these local variations play out in practice, see, for example, Ludvig, supra note 61, at 507 
(noting some "high discrepancies ... in ... naturalisation rates"); RENNER, supra note 39, para. 
2.4.4, at 32-33 (observing different standards in regard to linguistic capability). Ludvig, supra at 
508, argues that there are many reasons why naturalization rates differ widely from one Land to 
another, including "the duration of the naturalisation processes, the structures of bureaucratic 
organisation and decision-making in the single cases, information policies and the differences in the 
level and amount of human resources." 
392 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W [Vol. 24:1 
into which immigrants are expected to integrate.353 In the Leitkultur debate that 
first erupted in 2000, there was "nothing specifically 'Gennan' about the culture 
that immigrants were to be asked to share," indeed the "only non-procedural 
element of this culture (next to the language requirement that no state qua state 
can do without) was [the CSU's] commitment to 'Christian-occidental culture' 
which implicitly excluded Islam.,,354 On this basis, Joppke argues that the only 
"exclusionary potential" inherent in Gennany's "civic-nationalist turn" is to 
"'thicken' the liberal-democratic integration requirement and to make the liberal 
state for liberal people only.,,355 Yet it is precisely this requirement that collides 
with religious fundamentalism and the anti-feminist practices of some minority 
groups in Gennany. In fact, a major controversy of this nature erupted in early 
2006 over an arguably anti-Muslim questionnaire that one of the Lander (state 
governments) prepared for persons seeking to naturalize in Gennany.356 
Language ability, which is the front line of integration, plays a central role 
in both the naturalization and immigration contexts. It is essential to one's 
ability to participate in Gennan society, and is the key to education and 
successful integration into the labor market. 357 While there is little 
disagreement about the importance of language training for integration and 
social hannony, concerns about education appear to be a strong factor behind 
Gennany's intensified commitment to language training. The PISA process 
dealt Gennany quite a shock when it revealed that Gennan school graduates 
made a poor showing in cross-European comparison.358 There is some data 
indicating that the foreign population among children in Gennan schools is 
353. Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 15. 
354. Joppke, supra note 2, at 56-57. The Leitkultur debate has resurfaced. See, e.g., "Eitte, 
lemt Deutsch!" Debatte fiber Integration, Werte, Nation ["Please learn German!" Debates over 
Integration, Values, and Nation], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 22, 2004, at I 
(reporting statements by leading CSU and CDU politicians at a CSU party convention). 
355. Joppke, supra note 2, at 56-57. 
356. The Baden-Wiirttemburg state (Land) government prepared a questionnaire ostensibly 
designed to ascertain whether the views and values of candidates for naturalization are compatible 
with the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). This questionnaire, which inter alia asks pointed 
questions about religion, gender relations and homosexuality, has offended Germany's Muslim 
population in particular, and caused general uproar across the political spectrum. See Gejohle und 
Zwischenrufe [Hoots and Cat Calls], K6LNER STADT-ANZEIGER, Jan. 20, 2006, at 6 (describing the 
atmosphere in the Bundestag during debates over the • Stuttgart Directive '). Many politicians, 
including Turkish-German politicians on the Left and Right, have labeled the questionnaire 
discriminatory and called its legality into question. See, e.g., Ein ganz anderer Vorschlag [An 
Entirely Different Proposal], K6LNER STADT-ANZEIGER, Jan. 20, 2006, at 6; Frageb6gen iindem 
nicht das Verhalten [Questionnaires Do Not Alter Behavior], K6LNER STADT-ANZEIGER, Jan. 20, 
2006, at 6; Zweifel an der Rechtsmiij3igkeit [Doubts About Legalilty], K6LNER STADT-ANZEIGER, 
Jan. 20, 2006, at 6. 
357. BAMF 2004, supra note 299, at 83. 
358. According to the former German Federal Minister for Education and Research, "[a] 
country with the top economic and political significance of Germany belongs at the top of the league 
and cannot be satisfied with an education system performing at the OECD average level-never 
mind below it." Edelgard Bulmahn, PISA: The consequences for Germany, OECD Observer 
2311232 (May 2002), available at http;llwww.oecdebserver.org(last visited Nov. 21,2005). 
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partly responsible for Germany's poor showing in the PISA studies.359 Acute 
public concern about basic education is at the very least compatible with a 
greater push towards linguistic competence for immigrants.360 This linkage 
seems even more compelling, in view of official statistics showing that Turks 
living in Germany are poorly educated, relative to Germans and other 
immigrants, and that they have higher rates of unemployment.36I To be sure, 
Thalheimer also notes the tendency of this gap to shrink as second- and third-
generation Turks become better educated and improve their socio-economic 
position vis-ii-vis their parents.362 Still, there are signs of a lingering perception 
of Turks as an entrenched underclass. In this context, linguistic competence is 
seen as a crucial intervention to break a cycle of dependency. 
In the naturalization context, Article 11 of the Citizenship Act makes clear 
that the right to citizenship is not available if the applicant lacks sufficient 
knowledge of the German language. The language requirements are spelled out 
in detail in the Citizenship Regulations (StAR-VwV), which demand not only the 
ability to speak in daily life, but also to communicate with authorities in a 
manner appropriate to one's age and education.363 Early debates over the 
required level of spoken, reading and written competence364 have been largely 
359. For example, Thalheimer's study of Turkish migrants in Germany shows "deficiencies 
in education and vocational training," relative to the German population, among Turkish migrants 
(and particularly among Turkish women) living in Germany. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 102-03. 
The implication of this study is that the poor performance of migrant populations is exerting 
downward pressure on aggregate German performance in the PISA studies. This effect is more 
clearly demonstrated in a report prepared by the German PISA Consortium, which shows a clear and 
dramatic link between school performance, as measured by the PISA process, and the migration 
status of the affected school children. Manfred Prenzel et aI., PISA 2003: Ergebnisse des zweiten 
intemationalen Vergleichs: Zusammenfassung [Results of the Second International Comparative 
Study: Summary], at 25-26, available at http://www.pisa.ipn.uni-kiel.delErgebnisse]ISA_2003.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005). See also Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierungfor Migration, 
Fliichtlinge und Integration iiber die Lage der Auslanderinnen und Auslander in Deutschland 
[Report of the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration on the Status of 
Foreigners in Germany] (August 2005); Ingrid Gogolin et aI., Report der Bund-Lander-Kommission 
for Bildungsplanung und Forschungsforderung iiber Fiirderung von Kindem und Jugendlichen mit 
Migrationshintergrund [Report of the Federal-State Commission on Education and Research on 
Support for Migrant Children and Youth], (2003) (proposing measures to meet the special needs of 
young members of Germany's migrant community). 
360. Seyran Ates, a leading Turkish-born legal activist in Berlin, supports linguistic 
integration, but argues that this will not suffice to prevent "a shockingly high number of third-
generation children from becoming bilingual illiterates, many of whom are destined for a career as 
social welfare recipients." Integration fonktioniert nur miteinander [Integration is a Two-Way 
Street], SODDEUTSCHE ZElTUNG, Nov. 24, 2004, at 2. 
361. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 102-04. 
362. ld. 
363. Citizenship Regulations, supra note 272. The Regulations state explicitly that it is 
insufficient to "simply get by" in spoken German, and additionally require the ability to read an 
everyday text in German. They also contain detailed criteria regarding acceptable forms of proof of 
language competence. 
364. See, e.g., RENNER, supra note 39, para. 2.4.4, at 32-33 (discussing at length the 
different linguistic standards imposed in various laws and arguing that the new requirements fall 
somewhere in between the minimum and maximum levels required in other contexts). Renner argues 
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resolved, at least in principle. The head of the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees (BAMF) indicated in January 2005 that a "relatively high level" of 
Gennan linguistic ability would be required "for day-to-day" communications, 
and reiterated the need to demonstrate written as well as spoken knowledge of 
Gennan.365 
In the immigration context, the integration requirement has been 
crystallized under the Residence Act, which provides for the creation of a new 
system of integration courses designed to impart language competence as well 
as basic familiarity with history, culture, and the legal system.366 While the law 
often speaks of participation in the new integrations courses as an entitlement, it 
is clearly obligatory for new migrants (including Jews367 and ethnic Gennans), 
as well as for certain foreigners already living in Gennany, insofar as places are 
available for them.368 In fact, sanctions are attached to failure to participate in 
the required courses. In particular, renewal of a residence pennit is conditioned 
upon participation in such a course (or otherwise satisfying the 
requirements),369 and social benefits may be cut (up to 10%) for failure to 
participate in a mandatory integration course.370 
The courses themselves will be developed and implemented by the new 
BAMF, in accordance with extensive guidelines laid down in the Ordinance on 
Integration Courses, which entered into effect January 1,2005.371 The courses 
involve a total of 630 hours of instruction: 600 hours of language and 30 for the 
orientation component. The bulk of the costs will be born by the Federal 
Government, which estimates that it will cost 188 million Euros per annum for 
new immigrants (including repatriated ethnic Gennans), plus an additional 76 
further that ideally, the test should be whether the applicant possesses sufficient ability to understand 
the fundamental principles of political life and participate therein, particularly by voting. !d. At the 
very least, however, he suggests that the standard must encompass age-appropriate ability to get 
along in daily life and at work. !d. See also Davy, supra note 46, at 135-36, 142-43 (discussing the 
history of and further ambiguities in the new language requirements). 
365. Kragenow, supra note 46. 
366. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 43. 
367. The federal government announced soon after the Immigration Act entered into force 
that it would apply the integration requirements to Jewish immigrants and place more emphasis than 
in the past on German language ability. This decision was made in the context of a rising number of 
Russian-speaking Jews and older petitioners who were past working age. However, a representative 
of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern) said that "certain groups" of 
Jewish immigrants would be able to obtain residence permits outside the framework of the new 
law." New regulations are to be worked out with the Zentralrat der Juden (Jewish Central Council). 
Jfidische Einwanderer sol/en sich integrieren [Jewish Immigrants Should Integrate], FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Jan. 20, 2005, at I. 
368. The right to participate in an integration course is spelled out in § 44 of the Residence 
Act, supra note 321, while the obligation is spelled out in §44a. The affected groups of current 
resident foreigners under Article 44a of the Residence Act are those drawing unemployment benefits 
and those having "special integration needs." 
369. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 8(3). 
370. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 44a(3). 
371. Verordnung fiber die Durchfohrung von Integrationskursen for Auslander und 
Spataussiedler (IntV), BGBI2004 Part I, no. 68, at 3370 (Dec. 17,2004). 
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million Euros to make the courses available to the 50,000 to 60,000 foreigners 
already living in Germany. Course participants are expected to contribute 
towards the courses on a graduated basis, according to their financial ability. 
For their part, the Lander are expected to cover the cost of child-care incurred 
by participants in these courses. Former Federal Interior Minister Otto Schily 
stated that this program "does not make up entirely for the variety of 
shortcomings of integration policy in the past," and has urged Lander and 
municipal governments to step up their provision of measures aimed at 
integrating immigrants already living in their territories.372 Today, as in the 
past, the Lander offer different levels and types of support and programs to their 
foreign populations. 
The contemporary German discourse on integration is not limited to 
linguistic competence, however. The official rhetoric calls for "intercultural 
competence" in which both immigrants and those already living in Germany 
make an effort to get to know and learn how to get along with each other.373 A 
number of different types of programs are offered, ranging from intercultural 
training to advice on how to manage day-to-day life in Germany. Another 
important aspect of German policy recognizes that immigrants' experience of 
discrimination has a direct effect on their willingness to integrate. Every 
instance of discrimination has the potential to push immigrants in the direction 
of ethnic segregation.374 Public opinion data from Turkish residents in 
Germany in the year 2000 revealed that 91 percent of the persons surveyed 
viewed intolerance of foreigners (Auslanderfeindlichkeit) as the most important 
problem that politicians should address.375 More than one third of the surveyed 
Turks cited experience with discrimination in connection with securing school 
admission, a job, or housing.376 Rights-based strategies may provide 
immigrants with a constructive avenue for seeking redress of their grievances in 
the future.377 
It is too soon to assess the impact of the integration requirements on the 
targeted populations. Yet this empirical lacuna must not stand in the way of 
asking how the new integration regime squares with former German policies and 
practices regarding immigrant integration, or how it is likely to be received. On 
372. Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI), Schily: Principle of "Give and Take "; 
Ordinance on Integration Courses Clearly Outlines Immigrants' Rights and Duties for the First 
Time (Dec. 1,2004), available at http://www.bmi.bund.de(lastvisitedNov. 21, 2005). 
373. BAMF 2004, supra note 299, at 84. 
374. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 105. 
375. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 104. 
376. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 104. 
377. The long-awaited German antidiscrimination legislation (Gesetz zum Schutz vor 
Diskriminierung) implementing EU directives aimed at combatting race- and gender-based 
discrimination is pending. A bill was passed by the Bundestag (lower house) on June 17,2005, but 
rejected by the Bundesrat (upper house) on July 8, 2005. The process was subsequently put on hold 
by the federal elections in September 2005, and is due to be taken up again by the new Grand 
Coalition government under Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
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the one hand, there is a high degree of rhetorical continuity with earlier 
statements calling upon Germans and immi~ants alike to meet each other 
halfway on the road towards social integration, 78 as well as practical continuity 
with earlier policies designed to further progress towards this goal. 379 On the 
other hand, however, there are some reasons to expect real change in the wake 
of Germany's new emphasis on integration, particularly if the language 
requirements are strictly applied.380 
There were good reasons to anticipate that Germany's new push for 
integration might encounter resistance within the affected population, even 
before controversy erupted in early 2006 over Baden-Wiirttemburg's 
discriminatory naturalization questionnaire.381 In particular, the obligation to 
attend integration courses may be perceived as a burden by some, whereas the 
sanctions attached to failure may work a hardship in other cases. 
B. GETTING TOUGH: DEPORTATION 
Last but not least, the new Immigration Act attaches new security 
limitations to the newly liberalized migration regime. Most significantly, the 
Residence Act has introduced the possibility of deporting a foreigner with 
immediate effect "on the basis of a prognosis based on facts, in order to avert a 
special danger to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany or a terrorist 
threat. ,,382 Such a deportation order can be issued either by the competent 
Lander authorities or, in special cases, by the Federal Government. Only a 
single avenue of appeal will be available, running through the Federal 
Administrative Court in Leipzig. In addition, Articles 54 and 55 of the 
Residence Act provide a broad range of bases for ordinary or discretionary 
expulsion of foreigners, including anyone who: belongs to an organization 
which supports terrorism or supports or has supported such an organization;383 
endangers the free democratic basic order or the security of the Federal Republic 
or participates in acts of violence or publicly incites to violence in pursuit of 
political objectives or threatening the use of violence;384 or belongs to the 
leadership of a banned organization;385 or is an "intellectual incendiary" who 
378. BAMF 2004, supra note 299, at 83-84. 
379. The new integration courses must be viewed in the context of earlier efforts by the 
Federal Government, starting in early 2003, to provide language training. In 2003, for example, 
more than 67,000 people from 172 countries participated in government-sponsored language 
training. BAMF 2004, supra note 299, at 83. 
380. For example, language is "perhaps the biggest problem" for some migrant 
communities, such as the more than two million Russian-Germans who have come to Germany since 
the 1980s. Ray Furlong, Ghetto Woes Afflict Russian-Germans, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2004), at 
http://news.bbc.co.ukIllhilworidleurope/4076245.stm (last visited Nov. 29, 2005). 
38 I. This controversy is discussed supra in text accompanying note 356. 
382. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 58a. 
383. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 54(5). 
384. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 54(5a). 
385. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 54(7). 
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(a) publicly, at a meeting or by disseminating literature, endorses or promotes a 
crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity or terrorist acts of 
comparable importance in a manner conducive to disturbing public safety and 
order, or (b) incites hate against sections of the population or calls for violence or 
arbitrary measures against the same in a manner conducive to disturbing public 
safety and order or attacks the human dignity of ot~~1(5' by insulting, maliciously 
disparaging or slandering sections of the population. 
Pursuant to the new national security provisions in the Residence Act, 
Gennan officials commenced 'Operation Cleanup' (Kehrau~, which involves 
compiling a 'black list' of Islamic extremists for deportation. 87 After the new 
Immigration Act entered into force, numerous sources reported plans to deport 
hundreds of people from Gennany in the near future. 388 The first Muslim cleric 
facing deportation under the new Immigration Act is the Berlin-based cleric, 
Imam Yakup Tasci, who has lived in Gennany since 1971 and become infamous 
as a preacher of hate and intolerance.389 His deportation would continue a trend 
that started with the deportation of Metin Kaplan-the self-styled "Caliph of 
Cologne"-in mid-October 2004.390 While not alone, Gennany is, among EU 
countries, the one making greatest use of "deportations via immigration 
refonn. ,,391 
In the end, Gennany's renewed (if not entirely new) emphasis on 
integration and efforts to deport undesirable aliens have the potential to 
386. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 55(2)(8). 
387. 'Operation Kehraus ': Innenminister bereiten Ausweisung Hunderter Islamisten vor 
['Operation Clean Up': Interior Ministers Prepare to Deport Hundreds of Islamic Extremists], 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jan. 22, 2005), available at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2005). See generally Liz Fekete, "Speech crime" and deportation, European Civil Liberties 
Network (2005), at 1,3, available at http://www.ecln.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (analyzing the 
increasing tendency in some EU countries, including Germany, to extend the definition of terrorism 
to include "speech crimes" in connection with fast-track national security deportations). 
388. Id.; see also Ahmed AI-Matboli, Anti-Imam Drive Goes Unabated in Germany, 
ISLAMONLINE.NET (March 23, 2005), available at http://www.islamonline.netlEnglishlNews/2005-
03/23/article05.shtrnI (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (reporting the preparation of "lists of thousands of 
Muslim immigrants-whom the German authorities dubbed as suspects-for immediate 
deportation"). 
389. Imam Jakup T. came under increasing scrutiny in 2004 after he publicly expressed 
sympathy for suicide attackers in the summer and was filmed making inflammatory remarks while 
preaching in November 2004. The Berlin Interior Minister issued the deportation order in December 
2004. Berliner Hassprediger muss Deutschland verlassen! [Berlin Hate Preacher Must Leave 
Germany!], NET-TRIBUNE.DE (Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://www.net-
tribune.de/articleIl71704-09.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). However, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court blocked his deportation in June 2005. Karlsruher Gericht: Kreuzberger Imam 
daif vorerst nicht ausgewiesen werden [Karlsruhe Court: Kreuzberg Imam May Not Yet Be 
Deported], DIE WELT (June 23, 2005), available at http://www.welt.de/datalI005/06/231735922.html 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005). 
390. Deutschland: Kaplan in die Tiirkei abgeschoben [Germany: Kaplan Deported to 
Turkey], 8 MIGRATION UND BEVOLKERUNG I, 12 (Nov. 2004). Kaplan's deportation was upheld by 
two competent courts, the Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen (Supreme Administrative 
Court for North Rhine-Westphalia), case 17 B 2251104, and the Leipzig-based 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), BVerwG I C 14/04, Judgment of 
December 7, 2004. 
391. Fekete, supra note 387, at 3. 
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exacerbate ethno-cultural tensions, and even to provoke a response by some 
sectors of Germany's immigrant population. The German legal reforms invite a 
series of long-term empirical inquiries about how they are implemented by 
German authorities, how they affect the immigrant populations, and whether 
they foster social peace or provoke polarization and conflict. These reforms 
equally compel further reflection on the relationship between the experience and 
practice of belonging, on the one hand, and the legal framework in which they 
are embedded, on the other. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent German reforms of citizenship and immigration laws radically alter 
the opportunities for many non-Germans who already live or wish to live in 
Germany, though experts continue to debate whether they provide conclusive 
evidence of a paradigm shift. Whatever their actual impact may be in the long 
run, it would go too far to assert that German legal reforms have resolved 
fundamental tensions over political, socio-economic or cultural inclusion. If 
anything, the recent legal and institutional reforms have channeled divisive 
social questions onto the front burner of public debate and created conditions 
that might well produce occasions for confrontation in the short term. 
Meanwhile, outbreaks of violence in the Netherlands and France have created a 
climate of heightened tension that is exacerbated by-though not necessarily 
causally linked to-developments on the political far right. 392 
Debates over multiculturalism are back in the headlines, as a result of 
increasingly visible events, blundering politicians, and vocal minorities. Tens of 
thousands of people, mostly Turkish men, demonstrated peacefully in Cologne 
in November 2004, where they protested against terrorism and pressed their 
claims for acceptance as members of German, as well as European society. 393 
The Cologne demonstration, which denounced violence and voiced the 
participants' commitment to social harmony and human rights, provides one but 
by no means the only conceivable model for migrant politics in Germany. 
While many members of the non-German population living in Germany have 
welcomed the opportunity to learn German (largely at government expense), not 
all have enthusiastically embraced the new official insistence on greater 
392. For an analysis of mobilization against immigrants by moderate, nonviolent Germans 
operating at the sub-national level, see Roger Karapin, Protest and Reform in Asylum Policy: Citizen 
Initiatives versus Asylum Seekers in German Municipalities, 1989-1994,21 GERMAN POL. & SOC'y 
I (2003). Karapin's goal is to supplement but not displace analyses linking anti-immigration politics 
to the radical right or to other causes. Id. at 45. For examples of such scholarship, see HANS-GEORG 
8ETZ, RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN WESTERN EUROPE (1994); SHADOWS OVER EUROPE: 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN WESTERN EUROPE (Martin Schain, 
Aristide Zolberg & Patrick Hossay eds., 2002). 
393. Peter Schilder, Islam heifJt Frieden [Islam Means Peace], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG, Nov. 22,2004, at 3 (reporting a peaceful demonstration of approximately 30,000 persons). 
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integration into Gennan society. At the very least, there appear to be different 
opinions among migrant groups about the desirability of integration and the best 
way to ensure social peace. 
Neither of the traditional metaphors-melting pot or boiling kettle-aptly 
captures changing conditions in Gennany's de facto multicultural society. 
While I do not wish to exaggerate the level of current tensions, I believe that a 
frying pan metaphor is more appropriate. Radical legal refonn is too often 
viewed as the end of a long process of debate and struggle. In my view, 
however, Gennan legal refonns mark the beginning of a new phase of 
increasingly contentious politics, during which the new rules are implemented 
and their impact on existing societal relations is felt. In this sense, immigration 
and citizenship in Gennany have moved 'out ofthe frying pan, but into the fire' 
of civil society. My initial choice of the tenn 'fire' was intended to invoke the 
notion of combustion and suggest the likely intensification of public debate and 
political confrontation, rather than to predict conflagration and violence. 
Regrettably, European developments in 2004, 2005 and 2006 have confinned 
even the literal meaning of this metaphor, although Gennany remains thus far 
virtually unaffected by the eruption of migrant rage that has badly shaken the 
Netherlands, France, Denmark, and other neighboring countries. 
The efforts by the EU and its Member States, including Gennany, to 
enhance both internal and external dimensions of belonging by means of legal 
refonns, including measures aimed at promoting integration of immigrant 
populations, stand in stark contrast to the enonnity of the socio-economic 
problems on the ground. The outbreak of violence in Europe in late 2005 
vividly illustrates the limitations of exclusively cultural or identity-based 
approaches to the question of belonging. While essential to human well-being, 
identity and culture provide no real substitute for education, adequate housing, 
or jobs. It would be a mistake to view the rioting that started in France merely 
as an expression of "the wrath of a Muslim community.,,394 Rather, the 
violence that erupted in France in October 2005 and spread to other EU 
countries should be seen as the "temporary rising up of one small part of a 
Western underclass culture that reaches from Paris to London to Los Angeles 
and beyond" to "express simmering anger fueled by unemployment and 
racism.,,395 Similarly, while EU-prescribed anti-discrimination laws are likely 
to provide a growing avenue for underprivileged persons to seek legal remedies, 
they cannot fully resolve the inequalities, and may even serve to exacerbate 
social tensions by fueling resentment against migrant groups. Such risks aside, 
it is far better to address the manifold challenges of belonging from all available 
angles, than to insist blindly on any fonn of mono culture-be it the CSU's 
vision of 'Christian-occidental culture' or French Republicanism-in the face of 
394. Olivier Roy, Get French or Die Trying, NEW YORK TiMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A27 
("[T]here is nothing particularly Muslim, or even French, about the violence. "). 
395. ld. 
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real existing multiculturalism and socio-economic inequality in Europe. 
Special considerations warrant further attention to the position of the EU's 
Turkish population, which is the largest foreign group in Germany but present in 
other EU Member States as well. This population's situation is complicated by 
the ongoing discussions over Turkey's desire to join the ED. Despite heated 
debates over this historical decision throughout the EU, this overarching 
question of belonging generated little uproar among the local Turkish 
population. Rather, the largest public demonstrations supporting Turkish 
accession to the EU took place in Turkey itself. Investigation of this 
phenomenon could provide valuable insight into notions of belonging among 
this population and attitudes towards formal legal guarantees, as well as into the 
dynamics of diasporic politics. 
In the end, this survey of the contemporary German and EU legal 
landscapes affecting citizenship and migration suggests that we must greet 
claims that we live in a postnational world with skepticism.396 Dramatic 
changes in the legal framework affecting migrants in Europe in general, and 
Germany in particular, have loosened the grip of narrow notions of belonging in 
small but significant ways. Still, the ability to opt into Germany, and by 
extension the EU, remains elusive, even for the highly ~ualified and low-risk 
applicants who are favored by recent legislative reforms. 39 
The limiting notion of the territorial state remains the crux of legal 
belonging, despite the fact that the everyday realities of "diasporic lives,,398 lead 
many people to "live between different spaces.,,399 I join the many who reject 
"the assimilationist demand to centre experience and loyalties in a single 
space,'AOO and adopt instead a posture in which "both the nation and migration 
form a loci of sentiments and emotions crucial to a sense ofhome.'AOI 
396. See, e.g., WESTWOOD & PHIZACKLEA, supra note 15, at 7 (urging those "who have 
suggested we are not in the era of postnationalism ... to re-examine the ways in which they have 
arrived at this conclusion," which is premised on the false binary "idea that either there are nations 
or there is globalisation which ruptures the national project"). Rather, "nations are constituted in 
multi-centric ways which means that they are not unitary and that they hold within them a vast array 
of both centring and decentring mechanisms." ld. 
397. Decision of the Stadt Koln Amt flir offentliche Ordnung-Arbeitsmigration (Aug. 15, 
2005) (denying permanent settlement to an applicant who fulfilled all formal legal requirements). 
398. WESTWOOD & PHIZACKLEA, supra note 15, at 4. 
399. SEIDLER, supra note 15, at xi. 
400. ld. 
401. WESTWOOD & PHIZACKLEA, supra note 15, at 11 (emphasis added). 
